The curb of the Constitutional Court to the abuse of the budget veto: analysis of the constitutional jurisprudence in the art. 134.6 Spanish Constitution

Abstract

This article intends to analyze the jurisprudence arising from the Spanish Constitutional Court in the art. 134.6 of the Spanish Constitution. This section of art. 134 constitutionalizes the power of the Government not to give its consent to the processing of proposals for laws that entail budgetary effects. After a briefing on the legal regime of the budget veto, we proceed to analyze each one of the sentences issued by the High Court. Given the role of supreme interpreter that the Constitutional Court holds, its jurisprudence could even influence certain political decisions. In the present case, an interpretation of art. 134.6 EC «pro government» could have contributed —if certain political circumstances also converge— to using the veto as a political instrument, as has happened in the XII legislature. On the contrary, an adequate interpretation of the precept —which we understand is given from STC 34/18— would be a crub on this politicized use of the budget veto power that the Government has.

We think that this last sentence correctly frames art. 134.6 CE. From this
approach derives a constitutional interpretation of the power of adequate
and complete budget veto. This interpretation starts from the singularity
that the Constitution grants to the budget bill, and could stop the abusive
use of it.

Summary:
I. Introduction. II. Brief approximation to the constitutional legal regime of the budget veto. III. Analysis of the constitutional jurisprudence in the art. 134.6 Spanish Constitution: from a deficient exegesis to a sufficient one. IV. Conclusions.