The parliamentary nomination of State authorities. The blockade, the veto and the «institutional basket»

Abstract

The parliamentary function of appointing State authorities (constitutional judges, members of the General Council of the Judiciary, counselors of the Court of Accounts or the Ombudsman), beyond its specific categorization, has as its reason to provide democratic legitimacy by origin to the affected organs. The attribution to the parliamentary Chambers of a task of such responsibility has been accompanied by precautions aimed at guaranteeing consensus in the election and partisan neutralization of the nominated candidates, through the provision of qualified majorities and the establishment of technical competence requirements for access to the position. However, despite the good intentions of the organic-institutional design, the practical application of the norms that discipline the parliamentary election by the main political forces, determined to «control» as far as possible the resulting composition, has become in a series of perverse phenomena worthy of being analyzed in perspective: the distribution of quotas, the long delays due to blocking attitudes, the formulation of vetoes or the accumulation of various renewals in an « institutional basket » abusing the prorogatio. Faced with this drift, a solution line to the problem is presented through, mainly, the modification of the temporal aspects of the mandate. Advocating for long temporary mandates (far from the logic of legislatures), giving them priority over institutional mandates in case of antinomy, and, ultimately, advancing in models of partial and staggered renewal, which avoid the accumulation of positions to be filled, forcing a genuine consensus due to the impossibility of applying the logic of distribution. A fractioning of the renewals that would allow for the repeal of the extension of functions, as the risk of total paralysis of the organ’s activity disappears, and thereby discouraging strategic behaviors in the management of time for the conscious manipulation of the balance of majorities. All this under one premise: the frontal rejection that the logic of confrontation and non-compliance with the constitutional mandates for the provision of vacancies is imposed in future reforms of the organic-institutional design applicable to some of the highest authorities of the State.