La neutralización de los Tribunales constitucionales en los regímenes populistas-iliberales: un análisis a partir de los casos de Hungría y Polonia
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5944/rdp.116.2023.37160Palabras clave:
Tribunales constitucionales, populismo, regímenes iliberales, neutralización, modelos alternativos de justicia constitucionalResumen
En este artículo se analizan las relaciones entre los regímenes populistas-iliberales y los Tribunales constitucionales, a partir de los casos de Hungría y Polonia. Estos casos de estudio demuestran que los Tribunales constitucionales que operan en un régimen populista-iliberal pueden transformarse rápidamente de blancos de los Gobiernos a importantes aliados de las mayorías en el poder. En ese punto, el reasoning de dichos órganos puede parecerse muy a menudo a la retórica que utilizan las fuerzas populistas. Otra lección importante que ofrece el análisis de los casos húngaro y polaco es que las posibles soluciones que se han planteado, desde una perspectiva de constitutional design (especialmente en lo que se refiere a los procesos de nombramiento y composición de los Tribunales constitucionales, así como a la adopción de modelos alternativos de justicia constitucional), para evitar, o por lo menos dificultar, la captura de los órganos de justicia constitucional por parte de los regímenes populistas-iliberales, tienen sí algunos puntos fuertes, pero también debilidades evidentes.
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