The European Economic Governance and its juridical and institutional implications: twenty-five years of adjustments

Abstract

Abstract:
The economic and financial crisis of 2007 has forced to adopt a whole set
of measures to reform the rules and functioning of the EMU and strengthen the economic governance of the EU. Measures that imply an increasing transfer of Member State’s autonomy and that affect their sovereignty, having seen their decision-making capacity in economic, budgetary and fiscal issues seriously limited. Limitation that, in particular, is clearly reflected in the supervision and control of Member State’s policies in the aforementioned areas carried out through the European Semester. The current paper analyses the nonstop process of creation of institutions and mechanisms to strengthen the economic governance of the UE carried out during the past decade. Process that has generated a scarcely harmonized construction, which can be criticised, mainly, for the decision-making method used —with the creation of new working methods and the use of mechanisms outside the Treaties that are little transparent—, as well as the low role assigned to the European Parliament and the lack of control mechanisms.

Summary:
1. A preliminary contextualization. 2. EU’s economic governance since 2007 financial crisis. 2.1 EMU’s internal economic governance. 2.2 The European Council as the origin of the new rules of economic governance of the EU. 3. The European Economic governance effects on Member States sovereignty. 4. Spanish legislation before the regulations governing the economic governance of the EU. 5. EU’s representation in International Monetary Bodies. 6. Conclussions.