Strong constitutionalism at the crossroads. Deliberative constitutionalism as a way out
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5944/rdp.118.2023.39106Keywords:
Judicial review, judicial dialogue, deliberative democracy, dialogic constitutionalism, counter-majoritarian difficultyAbstract
Strong constitutionalism, currently predominant at the global level, is at a crossroads. On the one hand, from the growing and detailed objections to judicial review that have been directed since the mid-20th century. On the other hand, from the standards offered by the deliberative turn of democracy, which took place at the end of the 20th century, to evaluate and improve the decision-making processes. In this context, deliberative constitutionalism is an alternative that moderates the objections to judicial review by committing to the standards of deliberative democracy. This article, then, addresses how both challenges call into question strong constitutionalism, and how the meaning of both challenges is recovered by deliberative constitutionalism.
Summary: 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. STRONG CONSTITUTIONALISM: 2.1. The beginning, the expansion and the alternative model; 2.2. Objections to judicial review; 3. THE DELIBERATIVE TURN OF DEMOCRACY: 3.1. The core of the model; 3.2. Democratic deliberation as a rupture in the history of constitutionalism; 4. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A DELIBERATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM.
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