Some gradual proposals for democratizing the Constitutional reform procedure

Abstract

Abstract

In recent years, a part of the Spanish constitutional doctrine has focused its attention on the procedure of constitutional reform of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 suggesting diverse reform proposals. Practically all of the researchers who have dedicated efforts to this issue start their analysis from a conception of the Constitution according to which the constitution-making process is considered secondary, if not irrelevant, or playing down the possibility of direct citizen participation. The goal of this article is to present a series of gradual proposals for democratizing the constitutional reform procedure from a differentiated approach of the one commonly defended by the majority of the Spanish doctrine. On the one hand, usually, scholars depict a Constitution as the set of fundamental norms that characterize any legal order. In this article I begin from a different standpoint assuming that a Constitution requires a democratic and participatory procedure in order to make reality the principle according to which a Constitution is an agreement of society on how the State should be governed. On the other hand, the methodology of analysis that is used, practically unexplored by the Spanish doctrine, is growing field of study of the constitution-making analyisis. Therefore, the results achieved differ substantially from what has been proposed up to now.

Summary

1. INTRODUCTION. 2. CONSTITUTION AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION. 3. THE REFORM OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE CHAMBERS. 3.2. PROHIBITION OF THE PROCEDURE OF URGENCY AND SINGLE READING IN THE CASE OF REFORM THROUGH ARTICLE 167. 3.2. THE INTRODUCTION OF PARTICIPATORY MECHANISMS AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE CASE OF REFORM THROUGH ARTICLE 168. 4. RECONSIDERATION BY ARTICLES OF THE REFORM PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED IN THE CONSTITUTION. 4.1. INTRODUCTION OF THE INITIATED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND TO CALL A
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. 4.2. OBLIGATORY REFERENDUM IN CASE OF ACTIVATION OF THE REFORM PROCEDURE OF ARTICLE 167 EC. 4.3. THE UNNECESSARY DETERMINATION OF ONLY SOME PRECEPTS TO BE SUBJECT TO PARTIAL REFORM THROUGH ARTICLE 168. 4.4. THE SEPARATION BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUENT BODY. 4.5. THE MAJORITY REQUIRED FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT BY THE CONSTITUENT BODY. 4.6. THE PRIOR CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM BY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT. 4.7. THE CORRECTION OF ARTICLE 169. 5. A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL OF A NEW TITLE X.