El legislador ausente del articulo 18.3 de la Constitución (la construcción pretoriana del derecho al secreto de las comunicaciones)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5944/rdp.100.2017.20702Palabras clave:
Secreto de las comunicaciones, interceptación de las comunicaciones, derechos fundamentales, garantías constitucionales, Secrecy of communications, interception of communications, fundamental rights, constitutional guarantees.Resumen
Resumen:
Este trabajo aborda los problemas jurídicos generados por persistente ausencia de una ley de desarrollo del derecho fundamental al secreto de las comunicaciones acorde con las exigencias constitucionales. Centrándonos
en el estudio de cómo, mediante la presencia del juez y la ausencia del legislador, se ha producido una construcción pretoriana de este derecho, tanto en su dimensión procesal, como en la sustantiva. Y, finalmente, abordamos en qué medida, siguiendo la doctrina constitucional, la recientemente reforma de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal ha venido a colmar el vacío normativo; quedando pendiente la exigencia de regular, con la garantías que ofrece la ley, el contenido
material de este derecho.
Summary:
I. Introduction. II. Framing constitutional. III. The jurisprudential construction of the substantive dimension of the right to the secret of communications. 1. Configuration of the right to secrecy of communications 2. Extend of the right to secrecy of communications. IV. The jurisprudential construction of the requirements for the intervention of communications. 1. Insufficiency of the
norm and jurisprudential fixation of the intervention requirements. 2. Persistence in not legislating. 3. The insufficiency of the precept not by what it says, but by he stops saying. 4. The requirement of motivation of the intervention as part of the essential content of the right. V. The required reform of the criminal procedure law. VI. Final considerations.
Abstract:
This paper addresses the legal problems generated by the persistent lack of a Law on the secrecy of communications, as demanded by the Constitution. This article studies how there was a praetorian construction of this right, both in its procedural and in its substantial dimensions, due to the presence of the judge and the absence of the legislator. It also analyses to what extent, (following the constitutional jurisprudence) the last reform of the Criminal Procedure Law fulfilled the normative vacuum regarding the secret of communications.
Nevertheless, it rests pending to regulate, as legally requested, the substantial content of the right including the due legal guarantees.
