Counter-reform in the Spanish judiciary
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5944/trc.34.2014.14098Keywords:
judiciary, judicial power, judicial council, judicial independence, judges, courts, guaranties of independence, constitutional regulation, separation of powers, civil rights limitation, oligarchical reaction, political interests, Counter-Reformation, ideological mystification, unconstitutionality, discipline of judges, culture of judicial independence,Abstract
The Judiciary Council has been ineffective in its constitutional mission: helping to sustain the judges’ independence against the other — dignified or efficient — Powers’ pressures. The way its members are appointed and how they in turn elect the holders of the main judicial positions has shown their dependency on the political parties. But the 2013 reform does not resolve this problems, does not fulfil the constitutional provisions on pluralism in its composition and collegiality, creates some new ones as a consequence of the reinforcement of its president’s powers and transfers a substantial part of its former competences to the Executive power. It is a deliberate setback to the pre-constitutional way of governing the judiciary: a genuine Counter-Reform.Downloads
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Published
2014-07-01
How to Cite
Íñiguez Hernández, D. (2014). Counter-reform in the Spanish judiciary. Teoría Y Realidad Constitucional, (34), 333–348. https://doi.org/10.5944/trc.34.2014.14098
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