Response to Graham Harman (II): Phenomenology and speculative realism

Abstract

In this essay we continue the debate with Graham Harman around Ortega's philosophy, Husserl's phenomenology, and the (complex and problematic) relationship between phenomenology and speculative realism. After presenting the background and the central themes of the debate in an introductory section, we divide our paper into three main sections. In the first one, some fundamental concepts of phenomenology are exposed, especially the meaning of transcendental idealism; the phenomenological peculiarity of the concept of immanence, and consequently the concepts of reduction and epoché. In the following section, the link between Ortega y Gasset and the phenomenological movement is clarified, which runs until the middle of 1929 without any reluctance, then the Ortega criticism is exposed from that moment, but relativizing it. In the last and third section, following the critical discussion of Harman's interpretation of both questions, we extend the debate to the relationship between phenomenology and speculative realism, responding to the objections raised by the American philosopher in his previous writing.