Biological Naturalism in John Searle: Epistemic Objectivity and Ontological Subjectivity as Makers of Consciousness

Abstract

The present article emphasizes the thematic of consciousness, as a crucial point in mental studies, beginning with a historical resumption, encompassing the main thesis that justifies and concept this phenomenon. Initially, discussed amid the problematic “mind-brain”, the consciousness becomes preeminent in Philosophy of Mind, founding two great strands: monist and dualist. Both, theoretically, come from branches of Cartesian thought, which divides the brain and the mind into two dichotomous substances, or reduce them to pure materialism, neglecting subjectivity. Searle, from his Biological Naturalism, will stand out as an innovative thinker, who despises both theories, proposing the analysis of the mental states from epistemic objectivity together with the notion of ontological subjectivity. The author introduces new concepts to mental phenomena, affirming that consciousness is the result of neuronic processes, verified by the biological analysis of the third person and that it is only realized, as an emerging phenomenon of this process, in the first person, by the subjective perspective of each conscious being. Therefore, we highlight the main characteristics that constitute conscious states, namely: subjectivity, quality, and unity. Therefore, we highlight the main characteristics that constitute the conscious states, namely: subjectivity, quality, and unity. These consolidate the author's thesis and endorse the continuity of his research. Searle is concerned with consolidating, with good arguments, the unquestionable existence of consciousness, and will open the door for future research in terms of how it is constituted, especially its realization as a subjective ontology, proposing a new methodological conception to be explored. values the first-person experience, still incompatible with the current scientific research model.