The Resistance of Perception to Kantian transcendental Analysis. Merleau-Ponty’s Project of a radical Reflection

Abstract

It is evaluated the possibility of characterizing Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology as transcendental. Starting from the critique to the problem of affection in Kant, developed in Th Structure of Behaviour (section 1), there are made explicit the difficulties of adopting a formalist approach of consciousness, together with Merleau-Ponty’s alternative proposal (section 2). Subsequently, it is vindicated perception as apprehension of structures and existences, against the intellectualistic approach of the Critique (section 3). Finally, it is argued that the issues previously developed expresses the merleau-pontyan project of undertake a radical reflection which implies recognizing the body as the subject of perception and redefining the a priori (section 4). It is concluded that his position is incompatible with transcendental philosophy.