The cognition of passions : the contemporary relevance of the Aristotelian thought in moral psychology

Authors

  • Diego S. Garrocho Salcedo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5944/endoxa.31.2013.9364

Keywords:

Aristotle, passions, emotions, reason, moral psychology, cognition,

Abstract

Our philosophical tradition has mainly been devoted to the task of shedding light on the problematic relation between reason and passion, continuing the ancient clash between λόγος and πάθος. From William James until now, natural science has emphasized the cognitive dimension of passions (Lazarus) and its involvement in the construction of certain moral categories (Prinz). In line with the implication, by some recent research, of the contemporary relevance of Aristotelian thought in neuroscience (D. M. Gross), this paper aims to reveal the classic roots of this paradigm. In order to achieve this goal —and fully aware of the Platonian precedents— we propose to analyze the specific link established by Aristotle between αἴσθησις and πάθος in Nicomachean Ethics and On the Soul. Starting with the premises traced by Deborah Achtenberg, Martha Nussbaum and John M. Cooper, this paper will try to underpin the validity of Aristotelian description of passions by means of the strength of three main notions: the intentional quality of passions, the involvement of passions in the perception of moral value and their moral.

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Published

2013-06-01

How to Cite

Garrocho Salcedo, D. S. (2013). The cognition of passions : the contemporary relevance of the Aristotelian thought in moral psychology. ENDOXA, 1(31), 15–30. https://doi.org/10.5944/endoxa.31.2013.9364

Issue

Section

Miscellaneous

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