Heidegger or the methodical “destruction” inside the phenomenology of Husserl

Abstract

Within the framework of the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger carries out a double philosophical proposal: the “destruction” or “dismantling” of the concepts from the tradition, beginning with those ones of the phenomenology of his teacher, and the construction of his own philosophical project, based on an analysis of the existence. The “destruction” is practically considered by Heidegger as a philosophical method, which is developed in parallel but in a contrary direction to the phenomenological method of Husserl: the epoché. This methodological difference, applied to the intentionality of the consciousness, that the two philosophers consider, separates the phenomenological projects of Husserl in Ideen I and Heidegger in Sein und Zeit: eidetic or ontological. So and from his destructive method Heidegger is going to radicalize the main notions of the phenomenology of Husserl.