The problem of reflection in Husserl and Heidegger

Abstract

The idea that Husserl’s phenomenology is a kind of reflective philosophy inspired by the Cartesian tradition has become a common-place in the philosophical literature. Heidegger was one of the first thinkers who criticized the Husserlian emphasis on reflection. Since then it is easy to find the affirmation that Husserl and Heidegger developed two different, even antagonistic concepts of phenomenology. Here is not the place to continue embracing this discussion. One the one hand, the present article shows Heidegger’s early criticism developed in the course of his first lectures in Freiburg (1919-1923) and Marburg (1924-1928). On the other hand, it weighs up some of Heidegger’s critical remarks regarding the reflective nature of Husserlian phenomenology in the light of important textual evidences ignored not only by Heidegger, but also by a surprising number of specialists in the fields of philosophy, cognitive sciences, and philosophy of mind.