Dissecting Mental Experiences: Husserl’s Phenomenological Reflections on the Erlebnis in Ideas

Abstract

What interests us are not the facticities [Faktizitäten] of consciousness and in-stances of it elapsing [Abläufe], but ra-ther the problems of its essence [Wesensprobleme], problems which would need to be formulated there. (Husserl, Ideas, § 135, p. 269; Hua III/1 312)

In this paper I shall focus on the following matters: (a) what is new in Husserl’s Ideas (b) the need for a transcendental epoché or reduction in order to access the noesi-noema correlation (c) the complex structure of an intentional Erlebnis and some aspects of noesis and noema (d) the eidetic laws Husserl identifies, and, finally, (e) some remarks on the role of the ego in the stream of experiences (Erlebnisstrom).