MERLEAU-PONTY AND THE GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY

Abstract

On the basis of the relationship Merleau- Ponty establishes with Gestalt psychology, I seek to provide an interpretation his phenomenology as an ontological reading of the notion of form. Therefore, I claim that Merleau-Ponty is able, not only to develop an alternative to Husserl’s phenomenology, but also to elaborate his own idea of Being; in addition, he can offer a new understanding of the Heidegger's ontological difference. From a phenomenological description of perceptive experience, and starting with the notions of behavior, form and structure, I will then show the sense of being mobilized by a philosophy of form. This sense of being implies a projection of a thinking of phenomenality's radical belonging to the existence and, also, renewal of a genetic phenomenology that considers the whole of transcendental consciousness within the framework of an originary facticity