Reliability, Language and the Ascription on Truth of Beliefs
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5944/endoxa.46.2020.23968Keywords:
Foundationalism, Reliabilism, True, Beliefs, Epistemic Justification.Abstract
This paper proposes that doxastic propositional attitudes, or beliefs, function in a structure of two levels. The first one is basic or foundational, conceived from language, and the second one is epistemic or non-foundational, created from a reliabilist process. The above represents only a model of the functioning of the mind in relation to the processes that originate knowledge, without assuming that such levels physically exist. What does exist, since we observe that its results are adapted to the model presented, are, on the one hand, processes that generate knowledge and whose behavior can be described by concepts of a probabilistic nature, and on the other, processes whose viability depends on the appropriate use of language.
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