¿Es el realista científico un realista de leyes naturales?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5944/endoxa.41.2018.19054Keywords:
Realismo Científico, Anti-Realismo, Regularidades, Explicación, Hechos BrutosAbstract
En este artículo se argumenta que, si uno ya es partidario del realismo científico, entonces uno será también realista de las leyes naturales. Para mostrar esto, se comienza argumentando que sólo los realistas científicos aceptarían que las leyes naturales explican las regularidades no accidentales. Luego, se arguye que a partir de esto es que los realistas científicos tendrían una buena razón para creer que las leyes naturales existen objetivamente, es decir, como parte de la estructura del mundo físico. Si esto último es cierto, entonces concluimos que parece no haber razones para que los partidarios del realismo científico sean escépticos de la existencia de las leyes naturales.
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