ONTOLOGICAL IRREDUCIBILITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND PROPERTY DUALISM IN JOHN SEARLE’S BIOLOGICAL NATURALISM
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5944/endoxa.51.2023.27691Keywords:
Consciência, Redução, Irredutibilidade, Causação mental, Dualismo.Abstract
This paper sustains the thesis that the ontological irreducibility that Searle ascribes to consciousness involves biological naturalism (proposed as a solution to the conceptual part of the mind-body problem) in many inconsistencies, especially with regard to the subject of mental causation. After a presentation of the basic theses
of the theory (section 2), the troubles that the thesis of ontological irreducibility creates for Searle’s view of mental causation are discussed (section 3), as well as the inconsistencies that arise from this thesis (section 4). The conclusion is that the way Searle conceives the ontological irreducibility of consciousness is a source of troubles
for biological naturalism.
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