Narrative Theories and Duplication Cases: A Defense of the Determinacy of Personal Identity

Authors

  • Alfonso Muñoz Corcuera Universidad Complutense de Madrid

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5944/endoxa.45.2020.23108

Keywords:

Personal identity, narrative theories, philosophical intuitions, duplication cases, Parfit.

Abstract

In this article I argue for two theses. First, I defend that narrative theories of personal identity must endorse the intuition that personal identity is determinate. Second, I show how narrative theories can succeed in this project by appealing to the social dimension of our existence as persons. To structure my discussion, I use one of the most troubling cases for personal identity theories: duplication thought experiments. Faced with those cases, the only available options seem to be either accepting that personal
identity is indeterminate or give an arbitrary solution to the case that let us keep the intuition that personal identity is determinate. I will show why narrative theories can scape this dilemma thanks to a third alternative.

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References

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Published

2020-06-08

How to Cite

Muñoz Corcuera, A. (2020). Narrative Theories and Duplication Cases: A Defense of the Determinacy of Personal Identity. ENDOXA, (45), 175–198. https://doi.org/10.5944/endoxa.45.2020.23108

Issue

No. 45 (2020)

Section

Papers and Texts

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