Unemployment insurance in Peru : a preminary analysis through the Legal, Neo Institutional Economics and Austrian Law and Economics approaches
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5944/rduned.14.2014.13317Keywords:
labour market, unemployment insurance, institutional coordination, moral hazard, adverse selectionAbstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the implementation of a system of unemployment insurance in Peru and their implications from institutional coordination as a theoretical model. Following a cultural approach, this manuscript is implemented through the contributions of the Legal Theory, the Neo Institutional Economics and the Austrian Law and Economics perspectives. In addition, from the methodological point of view, this manuscript introduces a case study and hypothetical-deductive analysis instead an empirical-experimental exercise.
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Published
2014-01-01
How to Cite
Méndez Reátegui, R. (2014). Unemployment insurance in Peru : a preminary analysis through the Legal, Neo Institutional Economics and Austrian Law and Economics approaches. Revista de Derecho de la UNED (RDUNED), (14), 375–422. https://doi.org/10.5944/rduned.14.2014.13317
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Section
Estudios
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