HUME ON OUR GREAT PROPENSITY TO PRIDE

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5944/endoxa.55.2025.33641

Palabras clave:

Pride, Moral sense , Artificial virtues, Hume, Mandeville, Hutcheson

Resumen

Hume admits we have a great propensity to feel pride and he dedicates a lengthy treatment to its analysis. Yet his intentions in doing so are puzzling: How does pride fit into his philosophical system, and what role does it play? This paper argues
that Hume found a middle ground between two divergent treatments of this passion.
He criticised Hutcheson’s reliance on the moral sense and sense of honour to feel pride;
and he corrected Mandeville’s insistence on pride and it’s external manifestation,
honour, being the basis of morality. Hume bridged previous conceptions by making pride a “social moral sense”. Hume broadens pride’s scope beyond the virtuousness and viciousness of the passion, and depicts it as a regulatory passion on a societal level.

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Publicado

2025-06-23

Cómo citar

Barrenechea, B. (2025). HUME ON OUR GREAT PROPENSITY TO PRIDE. ENDOXA, (55). https://doi.org/10.5944/endoxa.55.2025.33641

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