Kant and the scandalous topic of lying: a different reading from the philosophy of law

Authors

  • Dulce María Granja Castro
  • Eduardo Charpenel Elorduy

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5944/endoxa.29.2012.5309

Keywords:

Benjamin Constant, declarations, lies, deception, duty,

Abstract

The aim of this article is to present an interpretation of Kant’s essay On a Supposed Right to Lie for Philanthropy grounded on the fundamental concepts of his own philosophy of law. By means of this reading, we will explain why many commentators have failed to the see what was at stake in the debate between Kant and the French jurist Benjamin constant. In our understanding, the two main points that Kant tries to defend in the until-now infamous essay are the nature of juridical declarations and the impossibility of a duty or an obligation to lie in a legal context. The theses that we will try to defend are, on the one hand, that the validity of the Kantian position regarding both subjects does not depend, in any sense whatsoever, on his flawed treatment of the polemical example that he discusses, and on the other hand, that both topics are of great relevance in order to understand adequately how juridical institutions should impart justice.

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Published

2012-06-01

How to Cite

Granja Castro, D. M., & Charpenel Elorduy, E. (2012). Kant and the scandalous topic of lying: a different reading from the philosophy of law. ENDOXA, 1(29), 15–44. https://doi.org/10.5944/endoxa.29.2012.5309

Issue

Section

Papers and Texts