THE IDENTITY THEORY OF PROPOSITIONAL TRUTH
IN DORION CAIRNS

LA TEORÍA DE LA IDENTIDAD DE LA VERDAD PROPOSICIONAL
EN DORION CAIRNS

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Abstract: Previously unpublished passages from the Cairns Nachlass are assembled and commented on to present the identity theory in contrast with the traditional coherence and correspondence theories, and then seven more detailed analyses of related aspects are also edited.

To say that a syntactical object is true or is a fact, is to say that the act of intending it as having a perhaps indistinct structure and a perhaps obscure material content may unite in a positive synthesis of identification with an act wherein "the same" syntactical object is distinctly and clearly evident as having "the same" structure and content. The fulfilling act is eo ipso a grasping of the still grasped syntactical object as having been produced by a syntactical activity founded in original explication of the subject-matter. The realization of such a synthesis is a verification of the truth (and consistency) of the syntactical object, a verification of the "existence" of the fact (01710).

Resumen: Se reúnen y comentan pasajes inéditos del *Nachlass* de Cairns para presentar la teoría de la identidad en contraste con las tradicionales de la coherencia y la correspondencia, también se editan luego siete análisis más detallados de aspectos relacionados.

Decir que un objeto sintáctico es cierto o es un hecho, es decir que el acto de mentarlo como teniendo una estructura tal vez confusa y un contenido material tal vez oscuro, puede unir en una síntesis positiva de identificación con un acto en el que "el mismo" objeto sintáctico es clara y evidentemente teniendo "la misma" estructura y contenido. El acto de cumplimiento es eo ipso un captación del objeto sintáctico todavía captado como habiendo sido producido por una actividad sintáctica fundada en explicación original de la materia. La realización de tal síntesis es una verificación de la verdad (y la consistencia) del objeto sintáctico, una verificación de la "existencia" del hecho (01710).

Key Words: Dorion Cairns, Truth, Theories of Truth, Propositional Truth.

Palabras clave: Dorion Cairns, verdad, teorías de la verdad, verdad proposicional.

1. Introduction

Although he did begin one in 1937, Dorion Cairns (1901-1973), Edmund Husserl's disciple, never wrote essay on verification and truth, but it is sure that he could have done so. The present study assembles a score of unpublished passages from his lecture scripts and research manuscripts to convey much of what such an essay by him would have included. To begin with, there are passages expounding and opposing two traditional theories of truth and then there are sometimes overlapping complementary passages of phenomenological analysis. The passages in Roman print are from Cairns and italicized passages here are by me as editor. The parenthesized six-digit numbers refer to the holographs of the Cairns Nachlass in the archival repository of the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc. from which the passages have been transcribed. I thank Professor Richard M. Zaner, Cairns's literary executor, once again for permission to edit a text by our teacher.

2. An alternative to previous positions

In England, during the 1870's, there set in a reaction against the type of philosophy represented by Mill and Spencer. It is the movement known as "British Idealism"; and it dominated British academic philosophy until shortly after 1900. Its most important representative, I believe, was Thomas Hill Green. At least for the purposes of this course, the most important elements in Green's thought are: First, his thesis that mental activity is essential to the producing of objects of knowledge. Second, the so-called "coherence theory" of truth.

The first of these doctrines is opposed to the view that subjective data associate themselves automatically to make up the objects of possible knowledge. According to Green, the elementary components must be actively related, in order to produce a world of cognizable things.

The "coherence theory of truth" cannot be stated so simply. Green postulates an absolute mind that relates everything to produce an all-embracing and perfectly consistent whole. This whole he calls "reality." "Reality" lies beyond the realm of our cognition. Consequently we cannot see that data, as we relate

them, correspond to anything in reality. All we can see is the extent to which we have organized our limited data coherently. Hence, the only "truth" we can approximate consists in their coherence, their mutually consistent organization, but we can be sure that, so far we approach such a coherency, we are in some measure approaching the universal and perfect coherency of reality, as constituted by the absolute mind.

Considerations of time have led me to omit criticisms of most of the 19th century doctrines I have presented. Concerning Green's, however, I suggest: First: He presents us with an illegitimate disjunction when he assumes that the objects of possible knowledge are produced either by automatic association or by active thinking.—Secondly: The all-inclusive and perfectly self-consistent whole which he calls "reality" is an ideal, rather than an actuality.—I may add that it is not self-evident that all-inclusiveness and consistency are compatible. In actual fact we attain a relatively consistent world only by rejecting some data (011283).

So much for Cairns's response to the coherence theory of truth. There is then the correspondence theory:

For Locke, as we know, the idea is merely the "impression" on the mind. "Idea" ceased to mean the form of an object that makes the impression, though some idea corresponded to the form of the object. [...] Moreover, Descartes and Locke extended the concept of idea to include any object of consciousness, whether impressed [or] caused by an outside object or not. And, since he thought that all our ideas [or] objects of consciousness are particular objects, the Platonic and Aristotelian sense of the idea as a general form, as a universal, is lost. For Locke, the so-called universal is a particular abstract idea associated with a name & used to stand for all other particular ideas that contain that idea as a part (038603).

The presupposition underlying the Cartesian and Lockean concept of truth as correspondence was that there is an order of real existences to which ideas and asserted relations among ideas either correspond or do not correspond (011303).

Setting aside the enormous problem of ascertaining correspondence, its degree, or its lack with so-called (and presumably unobservable) outside objects or real existences, there is this also reaction from Cairns:

Explicit judging, judging explicitly "step by step" is an explicitly predicative act. It predicates explicitly and thus constitutes a predicatively formed affair-complex as something given distinctly. But it is said also to constitute a judgment, a judged proposition, as something given distinctly. What then is the relation between the predicatively formed affair-complex (the *Sachverhalt*) and the judgment or judged proposition (the *Urteil* or *Satz*)?[1]

Traditionally, *Sachverhalt* or state-of-affairs and judged proposition or *Satz* were regarded as never identical. Propositions were said to be true or false and accordingly to correspond or not correspond to states of affairs. This manner of speaking is based on the conception of states of affairs exclusively actual or as existent states of affairs, exclusively as "facts" in a broad sense (037989).

Cairns disagrees with this. His alternative position focuses on the identity of the Satz *and the* Sachverhalt*. Although more explication will follow below and hopefully help, the following is the best concise statement that I have found in the Nachlass— although it could have been clearer about the change from the straightforward to reflective attitudes that is involved:*

Judging is a founded syntactical act—founded on intendings of the affairs (*Sachen*) judged about. [There is a w]ider and narrower sense of "judged about" (*Gegenstände worüber*) [and n]ormally, in the course of my judging, I am attentive to the affairs judged about, not to the *Sachverhalt schlechthin* and not to the Urteil (*der vermeinte Sachverhalt als vermeinte*) [sic].

In consequence of the judging, the judicatively produced *Sachverhalt* is there for me. It attracts my attention; and I may turn to it and grasp it "monothetically"—i.e., in a non-syntactical doxic act. Suppose that I do so. Normally, I shall grasp it as *Sachverhalt schlechthin*: i.e., in grasping it, I shall be simply believing in the state-of-affairs, the fact, rather than regarding it as what I judge, the supposed state-of-affairs. Nevertheless, it is a vermeinter *Sachverhalt*; and it may be grasped as such,—in other words, as *Urteil*, as *Satz*.

And I do take the *vermeinter Sachverhalt als vermeinte* [sic], when my attitude is "critical"—or when it is that of the apophantical logician dealing with judgments or propositions. The indicated doctrine, that *Sachverhalt schlechthin* and *vermeinter Sachverhalt*—that "fact" and "judgment"—are identical when

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[1] *While Sachverhalt is traditionally translated as "state-of-affairs," Cairns tends to render it as "predicatively formed affair-complex."*

the judgment is true is fundamental to Husserl's theory of truth and verification. Let me elaborate it. In the case of a judging that is "evident," the supposed state-of-affairs is the given state-of-affairs. We do not have then two things that are individually distinct and merely correspondent.

Verification of a judgment takes place in a consciousness that the supposed state-of-affairs is the true or existent state-of-affairs. In short, Husserl's theory of propositional truth is neither a coherence theory nor a correspondence theory but what may be called "an identity theory." The nature of this doctrine is clearer when we compare verification of syntactical judgings with verification of pre-syntacical beliefs. I mean the other side of physical thing as green. When I turn the thing around [,] I see what I meant, as I meant it. That which was merely intended is now itself presented in person. There is coincidence of identity between the previously meant and the now seen (013679).

Some additional passages in the Cairns Nachlass on language, propositions, syntactical forming, manner of givenness, positional character, intentional synthesis, and clarification enhance the above account. There is more emphasis on the preconceptual in them, Cairns holding that verification occurs prepredicatively as well as predicatively.

Language and judging

Let us return now to Husserl's distinction between proposition and sentence. We said that distinct step-by-step judging *usually* involves expressing the proposition in a *sentence.* It does not necessarily involve such expression; and even when it does involve expression[,] the expression may be either incomplete or inadequate. At times I may not bother to express all parts of a judged proposition in words, even though I am judging it distinctly and completely. At times I may be at a loss for words—for *any* words to express my judgment or only for words to express it adequately. Nevertheless I may be judging distinctly and clearly; I may "know" precisely what I *want* to express.

Furthermore, the expressing of a proposition in a sentence need not involve speaking or writing. It need not involve "embodying" the sentence in sensuously perceivable real sounds or marks. The sentence may be embodied in *phantasied*, *fictitiously* perceived, sounds or marks. This is usually the case when we judge silently. The judgment or proposition is more or less completely expressed in words, but the words are not actually said or heard, written or

read. It is only *as-if* we were saying or writing, hearing or reading them: the real sounds or marks that embody the words are *phantasied* real sounds or marks.

Thus we must distinguish not just *two* but *three* things on the noematic side of an act of express judging:

1. The judgment or judged proposition.
2. The more or less complete sentence.
3. The actual or fictitious realities that embody the sentence.

Both the proposition and the sentence are *ideal*;[2] whereas the judging act and the sounds or marks are *real*, though they may be only fictitious, phantasied realities. An act of judging can happen just once. Another *similar* act can happen at other times, either in the same flux of mental life or in another. But this similar act is not strictly *identical* with the first, even though it resembles the first perfectly. On the other hand, identically the same proposition can be judged any number of times and by any number of people.

Again, a physical sound or mark can happen just once. There may be other similar sounds or marks but they are not strictly identical with the first sound or mark. On the other hand, the same *sentence* can be repeated as identical any number of times; it can be embodied as identical in any number of distinct and different sounds or sets of marks. For example, two copies of the same book contain more or less similar printed marks. But no matter how *similar* the printed marks in one copy are to those in the other, they are not *the same* marks. Yet the sentences embodied in one set of marks and the other are strictly identical and not merely similar.

This is what Husserl means when he calls the mental acts of judging and the physical sounds or marks *real* and calls the proposition and the sentence *irreal* or *ideal*. There is a broader sense in which even physical realities are "ideal": they are like identical objective senses of subjective intendings: sensuous perceivings, rememberings, etc. Indeed, the identical real subjective proc-

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ess,[3] e.g., the individual act of judging or perceiving, is ideal in this broader sense, since it is the identical objective sense of different processes in which it is expected, presented, retained, and recollected *as* an identical real process. I mention this broader sense of the word ideal only to prevent confusion. What interests us now is the narrower sense, in which the ideal or irreal is contrasted with the real: *Real* mental processes, *real* physical processes, things, and properties on the one hand; irreal or ideal propositions and sentences on the other hand. (There are, however, irreal objects of other kinds.)

Obviously, if Husserl's three-fold distinction between proposition, sentence, and real embodiment of a sentence is correct, then the fashionable type of logic that recognizes only sentences—and moreover identifies sentences with actual real marks or noises—is wrong from the start. It cannot hope to give a true account of the facts.

The noematic complexity of the concrete subjective process of judging, and at the same time the expression of the judgment verbally, is the clue to a corresponding noetic complexity: a complex structure *founding* of one noetic stratum or another. The concrete mental process has, as it were, two sides or aspects. One is the judging; the other relates to the verbal expression. Let us consider this aspect first. This *aspect* of the concrete subjective process has two strata. The lower stratum is consciousness of something physical. It may be a sensuous perceiving or recollecting; it may be a phantasy-modification of a sensuous-perceiving or recollecting. On this stratum a consciousness of the sentence, as embodied in the something physical, is founded.

Turning now to the other aspect of the concrete subjective process—namely to the judging—we find that it too has two strata. They are essential to the judging, regardless of whether the judged proposition be expressed in a sentence.

The judging as such is a higher noetic stratum, founded on a lower. And the judgment, the judged proposition, is a higher noematic stratum, a higher thesis, founded on lower theses.

To make this foundedness apparent, consider that predicative judging is not only *judging* something but also judging *about* something. Take a simple predi-

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[3] *Early on, Cairns thus translated Husserl's* Erlebnis *as "subjective process" in his translation of the* Cartesianische Meditationen, *later, in his translation of* Formale und transzententale Logik, *as "mental process" and finally, in his own lectures and analyses, as "intentive process".*

cative judging, e.g., the act of judging that all men are mortal. It is an act of judging a proposition about *men.* But in a wider sense it is a judging also "about" *mortality*. In another sense, it is a judging also about the *situation* in which men and mortality figure. *Men* and *mortality* are not components of the proposition; nor is the proposition the situation in which men and mortality are involved. Relative to the proposition, men and mortality are *substrate* objects and the situation in which they figure, is the substrate of the proposition.

When judging that all men are mortal, I am also intending these substrates. Furthermore, when judging that proposition with simple doxic certainty, I am intending these substrates with simple doxic certainty: I am simply believing in men and their mortality. The judging, as a categorial or syntactical act, is *founded on* the precategorial, presyntactical intending of the substrate objects (01394).

Propositions and judging

Cairns repeatedly discusses propositions and how they are constituted:

There is [...] manifested a will to "communicate," to address myself to the auditor, to have him believe what I assert. But "what I assert" is not a noise I make, nor a biological adjustment, nor yet is it the act of asserting what I assert. It is the "meaning" of my words, a "proposition," as logicians say. I express the proposition and intend that my hearer shall grasp it (037058).

In perhaps the last 100 years philosophers have used the words "true" and "false," "truth" and "falsity," almost exclusively as names for properties of *propositions*. Not uncommonly, indeed, a proposition is "defined" as something that is either true or false. In present *non-philosophic* usage, the words often express different senses, as they did quite frequently in earlier *philosophical* usage. Descartes, for example, uses the phrase "*res vera*" to mean an *existent* thing.—The nature of the truth and falsity supposedly peculiar to propositions is controversial. Apparently they are properties that depend on the relation of a proposition to something else. In most cases one can understand a proposition completely, in respect of all its parts and their interrelations, and yet not know whether it is true (023117).

Concerning our terminology, note that usually the English word "proposition" designates just what Husserl calls the *sense* of the judging, not what he calls the *Satz* of the judging. There would be some advantage in conforming to

common English usage here. But there is no alternative to translating *Satz* as "proposition." It should always be borne in mind, however, that what Husserl calls the *Satz* or "proposition" is what is usually called, in English, "the asserted proposition," or "the judgment." Its assertedness is its noematic thetic quality, its quality as the thesis of a simply believing act of judging (013595).

The above passage somewhat clarifies why Cairns refers to the identity theory of "propositional" truth rather than, perhaps, "judicative" truth. Thetic qualities will be returned to presently.

Before they can speak of what they call "propositions," before they can distinguish the forms of propositions, logicians must objectivate or grasp "propositions." When *we* speak of "propositions" we are not speaking of them as objectivated by logicians. We are speaking of them as the objective senses of *judgings*, which are not themselves objectivating acts, in the sense of grasping acts. Judging is a *productive* act; it *produces* a syntactically formed object as its sense. But it is not itself a grasping, objectivating act. It is not a grasping of the "fact," the syntactical affair-complex (*Sachverhalt*) simpliciter. Nor is it a grasping of the supposed "fact" as supposed (i.e., judgment). The grasping, or even the active mere intending of either of these, is another act.

To be sure, there is a sense in which we too, as phenomenologists, "objectivate" the objective-sense of the judging act, which is our sole accepted datum: we do grasp it, but precisely as exclusively a noematic-objective sense of the judging. We do not objectivate it (as does the logician) in the sense of *positing it* as an ideal entity (013733).

Cairns usually refers to singular propositions about physical realities, e.g.,"The apple is red,*" but it should be recognized that his concern is broader:*

In the case of singular propositions about physical realities (for example: "There is someone at the door" or "I have a headache") the general nature of verification seems obvious. Verification is based ultimately on perception of what the proposition is about. Similarly, in the case of "Mr. A had orange juice for breakfast." If someone can remember A's having or not having orange juice, there is a prima facie verification or refutation.

But the most prized alleged knowledge is not knowledge of such *singular* propositions but knowledge of *universal* propositions.

The problem of knowledge of *singular* propositions may seem easy to the uninitiated. But that is not the case with knowledge of a *universal proposition*

that is not merely a compendious statement of verified singulars. Here arise obviously tremendous problems.

Such universal propositions have commonly been divided into two kinds: Empirical generalizations and strictly universal propositions. I have perceived many cows with cloven hoofs, and none without. I judge that probably all cows have cloven hoofs. The proposition that some cow does not have cloven hoofs is not self-contradictory. Yet, I judge it to be probably false. I have made an inductive or empirical generalization. What is the justification for believing, as I do, that it is probably true (023119-023120)?

Although one could expect that they be discussed in connection with eidetic method, Cairns unfortunately says little about "strictly universal propositions" in his Nachlass*, but there is this passage.* [T]he legitimate propositions included in an eidetic science are neither hypotheses nor inductive generalizations but strictly universal propositions, open to no possible exception. Eventual discovery of an actual or even a possible exception shows that the proposition was illegitimate in the first place (013388).

Syntactical forming

*It is crucial for the present account that matters or, as Cairns prefers to say, affairs (*Sachen*) are syntactically formed:*

In calling the judging "syntactical" I am not referring to the grammatical syntactical form of a *sentence*. Judgings and their theses (the judged propositions) are *intrinsically* syntactical in structure or form. If the sentence that expresses a judgment has a syntactical form or structure (in the linguistic sense)—that is because the expressed judgment has its pre-linguistic syntactical form. And, so far as the sentence fits the proposition that it expresses, the grammatical syntax fits and expresses the propositional syntax. This propositional syntax or form corresponds to the syntax or form of the act of judging the proposition about the substrates. The source of propositional and sentential syntax is the syntax of judging, step-by-step.[4]

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[4] *It is interesting that Cairns recognizes more than one species of the predicate form in the genus of syntactical form:*

Predicatively formed affair-complexes are *syntactically* formed affair-complexes that contain a subject-member and a predicate-member. "*That Socrates is mortal*," "*that Eloise loved Abelard*," "*that if wishes were horses, beggars would ride*," are particular names for three different predicatively formed affair-complexes. Each contains at least one subject-member and one predicate member. In the first, the word "*Socrates*" designates a subject-member, and the phrase "*is mortal*" designates a predicate

With the first step of judging that this surface is yellow, *this surface* is intended in particular; and in the first judging step, the objective sense of the surface-intending is given a syntactical form, namely the subject-form. Thus formed, the sense is now the subject of an as yet incompletely judged proposition.

With the second step of judging that this surface is yellow, particular attention turns from this surface as such to its color. The color, the *yellow*, is now particularly intended and, moreover, the sense of the intending is given syntactical form, namely predicate-adjective form, in the second step of judging. The transition from the first to the second step of the predicative judging is not a mere *surface* to *yellow.* It is an active relating of them *as* subject and predicate respectively. This relating has its noematic counterpart, the relation of propositional subject to propositional predicate. In English and similar languages it so happens that this relation is commonly expressed by a distinct word, the copula. But that is not true in the case of all actual languages. Still the propositional relation of subject to predicate is there, in the proposition, even if it does not receive particular expression.

Naturally, the subject-predicate form is not the only possible syntactical form. Nor is the subject predicate-adjective form any more fundamental than some other syntactical forms. (*This is red. This is a man. This lives.*) An actual language, particularly one that is richly equipped with distinguishable elements that express syntactical relations within propositions, provides ready clues to a variety of such elementary forms. There is, of course, a danger of relying too exclusively on such clues, as provided by actual languages with which one is acquainted. It seems to me that Husserl did not escape that danger completely. Ultimately we must ascertain the possible fundamental syntactical forms of judgments by varying as widely as possible the act of syntactical judging.

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member. In the second, the word "*Eloise*" designates a subject-member, and the phrase "*loved Abelard*" designates a predicate member. In the first the verb "*is*" has other functions besides its function as part of the phrase designating a predicate. It designates the specific predicative form exemplified in the affair-complex, namely the *copular* predicative form. The second affair-complex has a different specific predicative form, which is designated by the verb "*loved*" (038002).

    Furthermore, Predicatively formed affair-complexes are a species of *syntactically* formed affair complexes. *Collections* are another species. To indicate the parallel between the two species we might call collections "*conjunctively* formed affair complexes." Anything that exemplifies the universal form *S is p and T is q* is both a predicatively and a conjunctively formed affair-complex. *Predicatively* formed affair-complexes and *conjunctively* formed affair-complexes are not the only species of *syntactically* formed affair-complexes. The affair-complex, *the sun or the moon* is [another] (037992).

Besides the elementary syntactical forms there are complications of these. "*This surface is white*" is already more complex than "*This is a surface*." [Then there is] "*This surface, which is white, is also smooth*." "*This surface is yellow-ish-white*."—Also [there are] forms that have complete sentences as dependent parts [e.g.,] "*If this is smooth, it will reflect light*."

More significant for us now is that syntactical forms are not imposed directly on raw material. Regardless of whether the sense "*This surface*" is given subject-form it already has the substantive form. And as having substantive form, the sense could function syntactically as predicate-object in "*I like this surface*."

In short, besides syntactical forms there are core-forms (*Kernformen*), which the sense of the acts of intending the substrates must have, in order to assume syntactical forms in a proposition. These core-forms point back to subjective forming processes. Thus the act of judging is more highly stratified than at first it seems. At bottom there is always a discriminable stratum of intending that has a formless sense. Form, be it substance form, adjective form, or syntactical subject or predicate form, or the like, is originally the correlate of *acts*. The stratum of primary passivity yields only raw material (01394).

Manner of givenness

Returning to our examination of the intended object with its objective sense, we find that an object, X, can be intended as having one and the same objective sense in acts that differ in such a manner that what Husserl calls the "manner (or "mode") of givenness" of the object (in its objective sense) differs accordingly. Something can be "given" in a sensuous perceiving, or in a remembering, or in an empty, completely "blind" intending, as having the sense "red, spherical, hard." Correspondingly, it has a perceptual, or a memorial, or an empty "manner of givenness." The word "givenness" expresses here a broad sense: not only what is strictly given, presented, but also what is not strictly given at all, but only meant (as part of the sense of the object) is said to have its "manner of *givenness*." Again, within the sphere of strict presentation, perceptual or memorial, the difference between, e.g., tactual presentedness and visual presentedness (now or in the past *or the future)* is a difference in manner of givenness. The *red* perceived or remembered sense *red* is given visually; the perceived or remembered *hard* is given "tactually." And, if we confine at-

tention to one such mode of givenness, we find that, for example, the visually given objective sense can remain identical, while the *clarity* of the givenness varies.

Now, just as I can make the objective sense of the object, *X*, explicit, so I can make the manner of givenness explicit. In the first case, *I turn my attention* to the elements of the objective sense and, objectivating them, intend: *X-round, red, hard.* In the second, I turn to the mode of givenness and say *X-seen*, clearly seen as round and red, emptily intended as hard, non-inflammable, etc. Such words as *seen, emptily intended, evident, perceived*, signify manners of givenness, not elements of the objective sense of the object actively intended *in a seeing,* or an empty intending, etc. (037993).

Positional character

Let us turn now to yet another dimension of intentional acts: their "positional character," as Husserl calls it. We have already mentioned this. In the first place we find the class of so-called *doxic* acts, acts with a *doxic positional character.* This class includes all acts that involve believing in, *or disbelieving* in, their objects, either with simple certainty or with some degree of uncertainty. For example, normal clear and consistent sensuous perceivings are doxic acts; and more particularly, they are simply certain believings in their objects as having such and such an objective sense. It may be, however, that with respect to some of the objective sense (perhaps because it presented obscurely or not strictly presented at all) the object is posited with doxic uncertainty. On the other hand, it is not always the case that non-presentedness involves uncertainty. I am quite certain that this paper is inflammable, though I do not see it burning.

Thesis.[5] Now the positional character, particularly the doxic positional character, of the act has as its correlate what Husserl calls the "thetic character," particularly the doxothetic character of the *act-thesis*. The object, as "posited" with its objective sense, is the "thesis" of the act. If I am simply believing in X, I may go on to objectivate the thetic character and say: "X-*existent*." If I am uncertainly believing in X, I may objectivate, and say "X-non-existent" (013879).

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[5] *This shoulder head is by Cairns.*

We have distinguished several modes of intending something as a syntactically formed affair-complex and, correlatively, several manners in which something intended as a syntactically formed affair-complex can be given:

1. *Confused* intending and givenness in a confused manner.

2. *Distinct* intending and givenness in a distinct manner.

These concern the syntactical *form* of the intending and the correlative syntactical form of the intended affair-complex. The intending is confused to the extent that intended members of the complex are not intended separately—that is, each in a particular step of intending.

But we distinguished, on the other hand,

3. Blind intending and, correlatively, givenness in an empty manner.

4. Intuitive intending, clear intending, and, correlatively, givenness in a clear, an intuitionally full, manner.[6]

These concern, not the syntactical *form* of the intended affair-complex but the syntactically formed stuff: The intending called a *clear* intending of it to the extent that intending of the substrate affairs is clear or intuitive (037993).

Synthesis

How verification is synthetic is not as clear above as it could be. Mental or intentive processes together intend and posit things or are synthetic.[7]

As in the case of any other intentive process, so in the case of an intending that is not evidence of its object or in the case of an intending that is incomplete evidence of its object, there is an intentional horizon that includes potential intendings of something as identical with the non-evident, or the incompletely evident, thing. And, among these potential intendings, some are protended as evidences of the actually non-evident, or more nearly complete evidences of the actually incompletely evident thing.— For example, in the case of consciousness of something merely as one of the things named by the common name, "an apple," the intentional horizon includes potential intendings pro-

tended as perceivings of an apple or rememberings of an apple as previously perceived.

And, in the case of seeing an apple, the horizon includes potential seeings of its other side or its inside, potential tastings which would be evidence of its actually non-evident taste, and so forth.

Let us suppose now that one of these potential evidences becomes actual. An identifying synthesis occurs. The evident or more completely evident thing is identified with the thing as intended in the now retained non-evidential or incompletely evidential consciousness. But this is more than an identifying synthesis. It is also a verifying synthesis. The properties merely attributed to the thing in the non-presentive or incompletely presentive consciousness of it are now presented (013456).

The intentional horizon belonging to any intentional processes includes possible processes of intending "something" as "*the same* as what is intended in this process." In the subsequent course of consciousness, one of those processes may become actual. The new process then intends its object as "the same as what was intended in the previous process." Thus there occurs, descriptively speaking, a *synthesis of identification,* or better an *identifying synthesis*.

Some intentional processes are consciousnesses of their respective objects as *presented* more or less *completely*, and more or less *clearly*, in respect of the sense that is attributed to the objects in those processes. Such processes are called "evidence" of their objects, or "experiencings" (in a broad sense) of their objects.

Let us consider any intentional process that is *not* presentive of its object, or any process that is *imperfectly* presentive of its object. As an example of *non*-presentive consciousness we may take the consciousness of something merely as "what is signified by this or that name, where the name's simply accepted as the name of an existent thing ([e.g.,] *Pike's Peak*).

As an example of *imperfectly* presentive consciousness we may take any sensuous perceiving: In any sensuous perceiving something is meant as having more to it than is presented. As a rule, some of the determinations in respect of which a sensuous thing is presented are meant as determinations given with less than optimal clarity. As in the case of any other intentional process, as in the case of such a *non-presentive* or *imperfectly presentive* process, there is a

co-intended horizon of potential processes of intending the actually intended object as "the same."

Moreover these horizonal processes include some possible processes that would not *only* intend but also *present* something as "the same that is actually intended." In the case of an *incompletely* presentive process, the horizon includes possible presentations of the *same* intended thing with respect to its *non-presented* but meant properties.

In the case of an *obscurely* presentive process, the horizon includes *clearer* presentations. *For example*: In a completely non-presentive intending of something as *an apple*, possible perceivings or rememberings of that apple are co-intended. In a perceiving of something as *an apple*, possible perceivings of it in which another side would be not only meant but *perceived* are cointended. Likewise, perceivings of it with respect to its aroma, flavor, weight, etc. And perhaps *clearer perceivings* of its *presented* color, shape, etc.

Verifying synthesis.[8] In the case of such a non-presentive or imperfectly presentive intending, the subsequent flux of consciousness may actualize a horizonal presentive or more perfect presentive consciousness of "the same." There is thus a synthesis of identification, which is also a synthesis of *verification*.

The non-presentive intending of the other side of this apple is a believing in the other side. When something is seen or touched as "the other side"—the same other side that was meant before it was seen—that believing is verified. And, if the other side was meant as *red*, seeing it as red verifies the previous meaning of it as *red*. Or, if I see it obscurely as red, seeing it *clearly* as red involves a synthesis of verification.

As a rule, the horizonal anticipations of things are less completely determinate than the presentations that fulfill them. The non-presented other side of what is presented as an apple is meant, let us say, as red only more or less similar in color to the presented side. But, when the other side is seen, it may be seen as having a more precise shade of red color. Thus, as a rule, synthesis of verification involves *more complete determination* as well as identification and verification.

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[8] *This is Cairns's shoulder heading.*

Synthesis of verification has, as its opposite counterpart, synthesis of *annulment.* The horizon of any non-presentive or obscurely presentive consciousness includes possible processes in which "the same" would be presented as being otherwise than it is now intended as being. For example, though the unseen other side of an apple is intended as red, and there is thus a horizonal anticipation of seeing the other side as red, there is also a predelineated possibility that the other side will be presented as green or even blue.

If the subsequent course of experience actualizes a seeing of the other side as blue, when it was believed to be red, we have indeed a synthesis of *identification* and even a synthesis of *partial verification* in so far as the thing was believed to have another side with some color. But the fulfillment of the empty consciousness is also a synthesis of partial annulment: the believing in the other side as *red* is annulled.

In some cases even that which is clearly presented may be annulled by the future course of experience. Consider, for example, things presented in dreams. At least in the case of sensuous perceivings syntheses of annulment are always horizonal possibilities.

But two facts should be noted about the normal case of annulment: (1) The annulment is only partial—i.e., there is also a partial verification. (2) The annulment does not leave a void: something takes the place of what has been annulled by evidence. It is a matter of "not so, *but otherwise*." This is true even of what is presented in a dream. A synthesis of identity between what was presented in dream and what is presented later becomes effected, and the latter replaces to former, annulling it, but not wholly (013484).

Clarifiction

Cairns writes: I can read and blindly judge: "The leaves are out on some of the trees in Central Park." I *clarify* this judgment by phantasying that it is being judged on the basis of seeing or remembering leaves on some of the trees. I.e., I must effect a *fictive* seeing, or *fictive* remembering of the leaves (013498).

Closely related to syntheses of verification and annulment are *syntheses of "clarification,"* in one sense of the word. Just as verification and annulment provide, respectively, evidence of the intended thing as being or not being, so syntheses of clarification provide evidence of the intended thing as *essentially possible or impossible.*

A synthesis of positive clarification occurs when, starting from an empty intending, the subsequent course of consciousness actualizes a fictive presentation of something as identical with what was intended. If, on the other hand, an attempt at positive clarification shows that intended determinations of the object are irreconcilable in a fictively presented object, then the clarification brings evidence of the object's essential impossibility.

In another sense of the word, "clarification" occurs when something already presented obscurely becomes presented clearly,

What is usually called clarification involves both types of identifying synthesis: On the one hand, certain things that were not presented become actually or fictively presented; on the other hand, certain things that were presented vaguely become more clearly presented (013918).

CONCLUSION

Although there are only a passing allusions to judging and judgment in it, the following passage can serve as a closing final statement of the identity theory of propositional truth.

There is now going on in my stream of mental life a process describable as "seeing a table." In this seeing, the table is intended as an object of other possible processes of intending it. It is intended as an object of possible seeings in which it would appear differently (from nearer or further, from the other side). It is intended as an object also of possible non-visual perceivings (tactual, auditory, etc.). Likewise, as an object of possible rememberings corresponding to such perceivings. Furthermore, it is intended as something that might be judged about, that might be named or depicted, and that might then be intended symbolically, perhaps without being intuited at all.

All these things, moreover, are true not only of this particular intentive process, but of any intentive process. Any conscious process intends its object as also the object of other possible conscious processes of various kinds. If one of these other processes becomes actual, there may also occur in my mental life an *identifying* synthesis. Thus, if I actually go on to see the table from another point of view the table seen from the new point of view may be identified with the table seen from the old point of view, if the previous seeing is remem-

bered. Or, when I judge about the table, the table as judged about is identified with the table as perceived.

We may say also that the process of seeing the table itself a continuous identifying synthesis, because the object of each phase of the seeing is identified with the objects of the preceding phases.

Now among identifying syntheses, or syntheses of identification, some are characterized as what Husserl calls "syntheses of fulfillment." Let me explain by returning to our example.

In my seeing of this table, this table is presented in respect of only that part of its surface that is strictly seen. But it is intended as having more to it than is actually presented. The particular seeing is an intuiting, but an incomplete intuiting, of its object. The intended but non-presented determinations of the table are, we may say, only emptily intended in this seeing.

But now, if I see the table from another point of view, or if I perceive it tactually, and a synthesis of identification occurs, then the previously empty intending becomes *filled* with something actually presented. For example: parts of the surface not seen before become seen; or surface textures that were only emptily intended become themselves presented, presented tactually.

Now a closer examination of the initial seeing will show that it intended the object not just as having *something* more to it than was presented, but as having something more *of* particular kinds. Since the actually presented surface is presented as brown, the non-presented surfaces are emptily intended as of a similar brown. If an identifying synthesis of fulfillment takes place, the fulfillment of the empty intending may be partially negative. For example, the surface, which was emptily intended as brown, may become presented as indeed the same surface that was intended, but presented as having some color other than brown. The empty intending of the surface as such is positively filled; but the empty intending of it as brown is negatively fulfilled.

Similarly, in the seeing, the table is intended not just as having some texture, but as having a rather smooth texture. If the tactual perceiving presents a rougher texture, then fulfillment of the empty intending is partly positive, since some texture is presented; but it is also partly negative (011344-011346).