

**THE INTERMEDIATE SITUATION.
ON AFFECTION AND TIME IN MICHEL HENRY**

**LA SITUACIÓN INTERMEDIA.
SOBRE LA AFECCIÓN Y EL TIEMPO EN MICHEL HENRY**

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Abstract: When we go back -by means of the epoché of the world, following Michel Henry- towards the originary "how" of all manifestation (*videor*), we stumble once and again upon the phenomenological situation of the body. The body is, then that originary hinge by means of which I manifest world in a continuous resistance. It will be, as well, within my own body where I am always aware of oneself, according to my own affection (self-affection, not previously constituted). Thus, the material condition of the body will be that of my *internal body*, or *subjective body* -as Henry initially read in Maine de Biran- or that of *my flesh*, as Henry himself would later say. Bearing all this in mind, the intermediate situation of one's own affection, of this body of mine, with regard to the world and the *videor*, turns out to be an appropriate medium to attempt a preliminary study of the problematic situation of the internal time of affection. For this purpose, we shall revise the analysis offered by Michel Henry in *Material Phenomenology* and in *Incarnation*, indicating possible aporias, as well as alternatives to these last ones.

Key Words: Body, Michel Henry, Self-Affection, Time.

Resumen: Cuando, siguiendo a Michel Henry, retrocedemos en una epoché hacia el "cómo" originario de toda manifestación (*videor*), tropezamos una y otra vez con la situación fenomenológica del cuerpo. El cuerpo es, pues, esta bisagra originaria a través de la cual yo manifiesto el mundo en continua resistencia. También será dentro del propio cuerpo donde uno será siempre autoconsciente, de acuerdo con la propia aficción (autoaficción, no constituida previamente). Por eso, la condición material del cuerpo será la de mi *cuerpo interior* o *cuerpo subjetivo*, de acuerdo con la lectura inicial que Henry hace de Maine de Biran; o de *mi carne*, como dirá el mismo Henry más tarde. Teniendo en cuenta todo ello, la situación intermedia, situación de la aficción propia y la de mi cuerpo en relación con el mundo y el *videor*, resulta ser un medio apropiado para emprender un estudio preliminar de la problemática situación del tiempo interno de la aficción. Para ello, revisaremos el análisis que Michel Henry ofrece en *Material Phenomenology* y en *Incarnation*, indicando las posibles aporías, así como posibles alternativas.

Palabras clave: Cuerpo, Michel Henry, autoaficción, tiempo.

Through our reading of Michel Henry and following his *epoché* -which goes from the world to the essence of manifestation-, we find in his approach of time

the turning point which places us before the following alternative: either we go with him to the end, that is, to his considerations on absolute Life, or either we pay more attention to the richness that time can hold in my life. We believe that this last option is possible if we approach it at the same time that we approach self-affection.

The possibilities would be: either we follow the *epoché* till we affirm the phenomenal basis of all manifestation in absolute Life (in what follows: *Life*) or either we suspend this step and we explore the situation of subjective tension of time as self-affection. Here we try to go through the way of the second possibility. Our main reason is that this would allow us to suggest ways that make us glimpse and take notice of another form of manifestation of my life, that is, that of a sense that comes to me. Therefore, it is not either a matter of ascribing the foundation of absolute manifestation exclusively to the ek-stasis itself (as Henry would do); in any case, however, it may not be necessary to absolutely exclude the object as ek-stasis presented to consciousness, since we will still have to study more closely the manifestation of the "duration" of temporal objects within time consciousness and through the intentional matter. We will speak thus of the intermediate situation *-hinge-* of subjectivity, that is: my finite life "finitising" itself (if I may use the expression) at each moment in my finite action and according to the corporeal subjective whole which is inner subjective body (Biran) or my flesh (Henry).

1

Let us go right to the heart of the matter. For this purpose, let us pay attention to the question repeatedly posed by Michel Henry about the "how" of all that appears. With this question, he tries to avoid any path that would divert him from the origin of manifestation, that is, ultimately, Life. He has arrived to Life, the essence of manifestation (after the *epoché*) through self-affection. Self-affection is initially affection (feeling) of oneself; it is feeling oneself in order to be later *pathos* of my life as well as vital matter of Life, which is primordially manifested by the *pathos* as pleasure-pain. Let us point out that it is precisely this *pathos* that guarantees that we will not fall in the infinite questioning about the "how", since it will be a question with material content and bound

within material immediateness, and not an intentional presentation of sense - and not at all a representation-.

Let us continue what we have just said. If we ask ourselves "What is manifested?", we would answer "Phenomena" (advancing what follows: lived world, my life). Let us see why. If we pay attention to the method, we see that the question is focused on the "*what*" of what is manifested. This "*what*" is necessarily related to a movement characterized as "*to*" (*towards*), since a "*what*" manifested in the question contains an intentional "*something*". This is so even if we ask ourselves "what is a 'what' that is manifested?", as it is a movement that allows us to direct the question to a possible "*what*". But it is not an empty question, for it involves that I take for manifested *something* that manifests itself: one or several possible "*what*", evident phenomena, about which there would remain much to say regarding its manifestation.

However, this intentional condition, the "*what*" of phenomena, is such because I *can* speak of it manifesting its evidence. Otherwise, I would be completely blind to the question itself. In fact, once the question would be posed and once we would have considered the possibility that it contains, that would be no place for such blindness. Therefore, if we speak about the possibility of giving an answer concerning "*a something manifested*" ("*a something*-here, "*a something*-there, or "*some*" *some*things there, etc.), then I already have a certain determination of this something. Such determination exists whether it is an exploration of something partially determined (of the "*something manifested*" sort) or whether it is the question itself, "What is manifested?" In both cases, we refer to phenomena and we expect to specify their particular kind.

At first it seems that asking "what is manifested?" is possible only because there are things that are, entities: all that is outside there before me; this includes me and all the others like me, all and everyone, being in something like the "world-space". However, if I am really coherent with what it seems to be manifested, I have to pay attention to the first and immediate doubt (*doxa*) by virtue of which this *outside-world* comes as a question. Through this *doxa*, I reflexively take notice of the world to which I seem to address my questions; but at the same time I see that the doubt itself was already within me, before this outside so outside, exterior to me, that simultaneously seems so mine. Therefore, my natural "to say" -that is, the "to say" of the many- about all this outside had already a deadly wound. Already in the first moment in which this

question about this outside of knowledge emerges -which I take for natural- there is no way back; for what I thought it was natural and seemed real is already doomed to irreality, if we understand "reality" in terms of entities among entities. Therefore, the phenomenon itself demands us to deepen into its manifestation as manifested phenomena.

Nevertheless, we also see that even if we try to introduce from the beginning terms like "phenomenon" and "manifestation", they seem to resist being understood in the terms of being and entity. This is due to the fact that, next to the affirmation of the phenomenon (the first answer to the "What is manifested?" question), we are submerged in our own doubting, a doubting of immediate apperception (M. Biran). In this doubt, I am before the manifestation of a world external to me, transcendent, with a duration that does not seem to be mine; here too manifest themselves "appearings" to which attention is paid, as well as "appearings" that are supposed, felt, suggested, imagined, dreamed, etc. within a duration that seems to be mine.

We then ask ourselves, "*How* is all this possible?" or better, "How is it possible that everything is manifested the way it seems to be manifested?" Here we are before the beginning of an option, of a bet: start from an *epoché*, elimination of the outside, the most outside of the world, and postponing the answer to the question "*What* is manifested?" till we are on our way back, when the possible answer, "phenomena are manifested" will reach as much as the answer to the question "*How they are manifested?*"¹ can reach. Perhaps we may be allowed to keep here this reserve, as its starting point is the collapse of the truth of the world, and the manifestation of phenomena paradoxically depends on giving a supposed world (not lived) the exclusivity of every possible truth, as Henry would say.

So far we have focused on what could be manifested and on the possible question about an appearing of something that we call phenomenon; we are not dealing here with a physical world in the sense of the external to me in an exteriority that is such not only regarding me, but an exteriority that seems alien to me in a space that belongs to it, a space founded by the things them-

¹ Concerning the object of phenomenology as the "object in the mode of the 'how'", cf. Michel Henry, *Phénoménologie matérielle*, Paris, PUF, 1990, p.26—in what follows quoted as *PM*—.

selves, a space previous to all appearing which is possible as a phenomenon. That is, we speak about the world of mere things.

On the other hand, if we pay attention to the mode of the manifestation, we see that we are immediately referred to an appearing *to me* of the phenomenon. As we can see, the path we have so far followed goes from the *world-phenomenon* to the *ego*. However, to say ego meaning "me" means "lived *ego* (me) *living world* (phenomena)". That is, phenomena are manifested as being lived by me, since otherwise I could not say anything of them and they could not manifest to me as lived by me; even less could we suggest a predicative judgement that said anything of them; and even less could we communicate this judgement with a minimal distance from the very manifestation of the phenomenon. In this last case, in which we speak about phenomenological distance, we would already be suggesting a judgement in a new *Erlebnis* -this time presented by my *lived ego*- on the basis of the first *Erlebnis*, the one of a lived phenomenon experienced in the mode of *Erlebnis* [erlebt], in the immediateness of its manifestation.

2

Let us stop and analyse this very issue following this other path, that is, the "*lived ego – living world*", that deepens into –and even founds– the initially indicated relationship in terms of *ego-world*, which in the end will reveal itself to be a situation, as we shall see.

The manifestation of myself takes place in my most radical immanence, in an individual *immediate apperception* of me and to me. This manifestation occurs particularly –it seems– by virtue of myself. The manner how this "*ego living itself*" manifests itself is possible within reflection as power of my ego: that is, reflection as power of my subjectivity, as studied by Henry in *Philosophie et phénoménologie du corps*². We would be speaking, then, of my ego *living itself and at the same time conscious of this, of my ego present to itself and present from itself*. This reflection, a reflection that itself appears and that manifests my subjectivity in immediate apperception, is already equipped with its own and

² Michel Henry, *Philosophie et phénoménologie du corps. Essai sur l'ontologie biranienne*, 5^a édition, PUF, Paris, 2003.

first movement (power) within the complex of my subjective body; this is called by Henry “*inner transcendental experience*”.

When we turn to immediate apperception we see that it manifests itself, apparently, as a perception addressed to itself: a taking notice of oneself living, being, perceiving oneself. But in its very appearing, this apperception is manifested as immediate consciousness that assists in person or gives originarily the manifestation of all appearing; the difference is that now this manifestation speaks of itself, and of apperception itself, according to consciousness in the temporal flux of oneself. That is to say, now the originary situation of apperception occurs in the consciousness of living *myself* in the continuum of *Erlebnis*, that is, in “time consciousness” (as Husserl would say) or in the “living present” (Henry).

In this sense, according to Henry’s critique, Husserl’s consciousness –as far as it is impression- would initially be self-impression, and its analysis would not have been consequently followed till the last and originary phenomenal effectuations in the material (*hylé*) line of apperception. For Husserl, intentionality referred to the quality of the object of intention³ –noematically given- had more importance than the possibilities of originary impression⁴. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the difficulty lies here not only in the relationships of consciousness, perception, impression and distancing –or the lack of it- with regard to sensations; in fact, all this problem must be analysed along with the analysis of lived time in its manifestation, in time consciousness, since it is there that the answer to the “Originary ‘how’ of manifestation”, could find its possible horizon.

3

Once we are situated in the *self* through immediate apperception, we see that it appears as being constituted in the impression, affected in immediate experience. That is, the self, before it is subject of itself, is lived self in its immediateness, a self that assists to its own manifestation in the passage (in du-

³ Husserl's text from *Ideen*, 339, quoted and commented by Henry (Michel Henry. *Incarnation. Une philosophie de la chair*, Paris, Seuil, 2000, p. 72 — in what follows quoted as *I—*).

⁴ However, we would still have to come back to the hyletic situation of intentionality and the material object. In this task, we would have to refer to the first edition of the *Logische Untersuchungen* and to the reading of the fifth investigation proposed by Miguel García-Baró. Cf. Miguel García-Baró, *Teoría fenomenológica de la verdad. Comentario continuo a la primera edición de Investigaciones Lógicas de Edmund Husserl*, Madrid, Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, 2008, p. 118.

ration) of impressive apperception. Michel Henry sees in the centrality of impression -with regard to the "how" of the manifestation of oneself, as well as that of the manifestation of the world- a point in which to meet Husserl. However -says Henry- this centrality later disappears and instead of it we have the centrality of phenomenological distance, a distance set by intentional consciousness within time consciousness, in the retentions and protentions; here, Henry sees the ek-stasis of time in which the arch-impression decays.

Let us focus on this last point. In the distance of intentional consciousness - with regard to its intentional basis⁵-, the situation of the flux of manifestation of time consciousness is revealed. This distance, which is the distance of the temporal flux in its condition of a "before" retained in the "now" (retention) and a "now" disclosing what is coming (protention), is in Henry the breaking point in which the ek-stasis of manifestation is established, and the ek-stasis of manifestation is finally that of the world and its nothingness. That is, the material component of manifestation, the originary impression, is set as put by consciousness and exiled in a temporal flux that does not contain it. Here, manifestation does not deepen into the manifestation within the living present, but it gives in before the temporal flux of temporal points in the course of time consciousness.

Now we can see that what we called "self" does not present so much a constituted or manifested condition as it seems. In fact, if we remained in the confirmation of the manifestation of oneself as a self, we would have two aspects to consider: the affection of oneself in immediate apperception as impression of oneself; and the temporal course of the manifestation of oneself as affection. It is between these two aspects that the bet for the radicalisation of affection as the *pathos* of life is decided. Likewise, we are set before the difficult situation of considering whether the temporal ek-static course of an object is always materially emptied or not.

4

Speaking of each phase in the temporal flux, Husserl says that "the constant form is always once again full of 'content' and the content is nothing that

⁵ In this article "basis" corresponds to "fondo" in Spanish.

comes to fit from outside"⁶. Thus, the fact that the form is once again filled with content does not mean that the form of the flux, at a certain moment, can be empty of any content. Although an objectivation of the flux –in the mode of geometry⁷– can show abysses of nothingness between the temporal phases–like, for example, between the “now” and the retained phase–, this does not happen in impression. The temporal form impression in the immanence of its manifestation is the “continuum” of a whole (if the expression is allowed): an “at the same time” of the manifestation of time as a flux.

Situated in subjective time, retention and protention are “material contents” that fill the current of the flux in a way that is different from that of the sole “now”: protention is a “coming to the ‘now’”, it is not a simple “is coming”, it is an expectation *gerund* (a “seeing something coming”) and this *gerund* is filled in the impression, it is either letting down or fulfilling in immediate apperception; and retention is the “now” leaving in the arch-impression. As for the *passage*, that is, the lived as already passing, is tied to a “now” that is *impressional* and affective. We can call it *affective memory*, which would have a double condition: a) that of a new content filling my “now” and “modifying” it; and b) that of being the possibility of a new “now” manifested by the evocation of what has been lived.

Husserl came to the temporal form in the *Lessons*⁸ along with the study of temporal objects, in which he explains the originary form of the flux, since for

⁶ The full quote reads as follows: “Verbleibend ist vor allem die formale Struktur des Flusses, die Form des Flusses. D. h. das Fließen ist nicht nur überhaupt Fließen, sondern jede Phase ist von einer und derselben Form, die beständige Form ist immer neu von ‘Inhalt’ erfüllt, aber der Inhalt ist eben nichts äußerlich in die Form Hineingebrachtes, sondern durch die Form der Gesetzmäßigkeit bestimmt: nur so, dass diese Gesetzmäßigkeit nicht allein das Konkretum bestimmt. Die Form besteht darin, dass ein Jetzt ist konstituiert durch eine Impression und dass an diese ein Schwanz von Retentionen ist angliedert und ein Horizont der Protentionen.” Edmund Husserl, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* hrsg. von Martin Heidegger, Niemeyer, Halle, 1928, p. 467.

⁷ Concerning this issue and that of continuous time, García-Baró states: “El tiempo debe quedar libre de toda atadura con la interpretación en términos de *continuo*, cuando por tal se está entendiendo, como era evidentemente el caso en Brentano y en el joven Husserl, tan discípulo suyo, el tipo de ser que pertenece al espacio idealizado de la geometría. Esa interpretación espacializante e idealizadora puede muy bien ser la que abre, en el fondo, la puerta a todo empirismo, porque permite ensayar a entender el presente de la vida de la conciencia como un punto o límite, en el que luego puede uno pensar que cruzan sus fuerzas, estáticamente, *una* interpretación y *un* reducido o grande acervo de contenidos *representantes* de las cosas externas. No tiene, sin embargo, por qué haber nada de esto en la conciencia”. Miguel García-Baró, *Vida y mundo. La práctica de la fenomenología*, Editorial Trotta, Valladolid, 1999, p. 274.

⁸ We refer to the *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* (in what follows quoted as *VPIZ*). We have taken much into account the introductory study by Agustín Serrano de Haro to the spanish translation that has been translated and prepared by him. (Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Lecciones de fenomenología de la conciencia interna del tiempo* —traducción, introducción y notas de Agustín Serrano de Haro—, Madrid, Editorial Trotta, 2002). I have also taken into account Manuel Abella’s paper about this book (Cf. Manuel Abella, “Edmund Husserl: Génesis y estructura de las *Lecciones de fenomenología*”).

this objects its matter (*hylé*) is in their temporal form. In their manifestation, they are not tied to a temporal form given by intentional consciousness⁹ and later materially filled by the impression as –for example- a phenomenon – sound. Rather, the sound¹⁰, in its manifestation, allows the affirmation of the ontological difference¹¹ and its temporality, that is: when we follow in its living flowing (Consciousness) the temporal flux of impression (this would be the *videor* “side” of the difference) about the sound, there is “simultaneously” the manifestation of the sound as such sound in its form-matter of temporal flux (this would be the *videre mundum* “side” of the difference). Likewise, the temporal flux of arch-impression –that initially seems to be “the object consciousness that itself is not object”- is announced as self-affection lived in the temporal flux: “originary impression”¹², on one side, and on the other side remains the question about how it is given what makes possible the reflection by virtue of which I can go to each continuous point of the manifestation of sound¹³.

All this is in contrast with Henry’s capital critique of Husserl¹⁴, which is precisely about the manifestation of impression at the expense of the intentional

de la conciencia interna del tiempo”, Δαι΄μων. Revista de Filosofía, nº 34 (2005), 143-152 —Versión digital en: <http://digitum.um.es/xmlui/handle/10201/9105>—).

⁹ *VPIZ*, 464. “Ich kann auf irgend eine Phase dieser Erscheinung achten: Erscheinung ist hier der immanente Ton oder die immanente Tonbewegung, abgesehen von seiner ‘Bedeutung’. Das ist aber nicht das letzte Bewusstsein. Dieser immanente Ton ‘konstituiert’ flieh, nämlich kontinuierlich mit dem jeweiligen Ton jetzt haben wir auch die Tonerschattungen, und zwar stellt sich in diesen die Strecke der Tonvergangeheiten, die zu diesem jetzt gehören, dar.”

¹⁰ Once the form of the flux is determined by impression, once the protentions and retentions are their permanent form, and once we have the change of the proto-fact of “the consciousness of the change of impression into retention, as continuously we have once again an impression”, says Husserl, we arrive to “the question about time consciousness in which the time of time consciousness of the phenomena-sound is constituted” (“Wir kommen bei dieser Flussfassung also - wie schon früher angedeutet - auf die Frage nach dem Zeitbewusstsein, in dem flieh die Zeit des Zeitbewusstseins der Tonerschreibungen konstituiert.” *VPIZ*, 467).

¹¹ We assume here the formulation that García-Baró makes of the ontological difference in terms of *Videre video mundum* (I see –it appears- that I see world) in his introductory study to the Spanish translation of *Phénoménologie matérielle*.

¹² Husserl speaks about the originary impression and its relationship with consciousness as follows: “Die Urimpression ist der absolute Anfang dieser Erzeugung, der Urquell, das, woraus alles andere stetig flieh erzeugt. Sie selber aber wird nicht erzeugt, sie entsteht nicht als Erzeugtes, sondern durch genesis spontanea, Sie ist Urzeugung. Sie erwächst nicht (sie hat keinen Keim), sie ist Urschöpfung. Heißt es: stetig bildet sich an das Jetzt, das sich zum Nicht- Jetzt modifiziert, ein neues Jetzt an, oder es erzeugt, es entspringt urplötzlich eine Quelle, so find das Bilder. Es kann nur gefragt werden: Bewusstsein ist nichts ohne Impression.” *VPIZ*, 451.

¹³ Cf. Husserl, *Beilage VI* of *VPIZ*, 469: “Wir haben also ein stetiges Bewusstsein, von dem jeder Punkt ein stetiges Kontinuum ist. Das ist aber wieder eine Zeitreihe, auf die wir achten können. Also geht das Spiel von neuem los. Fixieren wir irgendeinen Punkt dieser Reihe, so scheint dazu ein Vergangenheitsbewusstsein gehören zu müssen, das sich auf die Serie der vergangenen Reihen bezieht usw”, likewise, I think that Husserl helps us seeing the importance of this issue in *VPIZ* §36. *Der zeitkonstituierende Fluß als absolute Subjektivität*.

¹⁴ *PM*, 39.

form of the temporal flux, which eventually is ek-stasis of the world¹⁵. This last point is considered by Henry because he sees retention and protention as empty points of present without impression, without phenomenal matter. The distance is established by intentional consciousness in its passive syntheses which, passive as they may be –phenomenally speaking–, have this component which we could characterise as “respective”; here, what is coming to the present is not still living present, and what is passing to an already lived point is not living present either; in no one of these cases we have the filled “now” of impression.

There would be no way either to ask about the originary manifestation (the “how”) of impression, since in any case the impression would escape through the form of the temporal flux. There would remain just “the so called present phase, which is only an ideal limit between two abysses of nothingness”¹⁶. Being fair with regard to this last quotation, Henry says that Husserl, from this intentional phase of present, passes to a “now” constituted by impression; however, Henry adds that this “now” is in Husserl incapable of answering to the question about the originary “how” of impression, since this impression is thrown to the already mentioned temporal intentional flux.

Thus, we do not take into account the strength that belongs to the living present in impression as originary impression, that will later be for Henry impression of oneself manifest as subjective flesh and corporeality which gives world within continuous resistance.

Thus, although “in the flux fundamentally nothing that is not not-flux can enter”¹⁷ –and thus we can say that the phenomenological distances of the flux are extremely shortened, without them becoming totalised as present and without them being alien to *the originary impression*–, this would not be, according to Henry, the capital problem. Following this, we place the beginning of the first alternative in a first moment; here, the issue Henry deals with is *where the impression comes from and how it takes charge of us*.

¹⁵ In *PM*, 109, Henry places the problem of the ek-stasis in the cogitatio, the life, and its corresponding absence as it is placed in the past (following his critique of Husserl). Thus, the situation of life –or rather, of its absence– is identified with the situation of the world and its ek-static nothingness (as the manifestation is erroneously made dependent of this situation of the world)

¹⁶ *I*, 78.

¹⁷ *VPIZ*, 466. (also quoted by Henry in *I*, 77.)

5

Thus, this situation makes us eventually make the option of analysing self-affection, my "feeling myself"; there is here the guarantee given by the adjustment of immanence and immediateness of manifestation in the form of present affection -lived in each "now", without any distance, without escape, without intentionality-; this would be the path of no return of *Appearing of appearance*, that is: the transcendental hyletic basis to which must point the answer to the question about the "how" of manifestation, the "how" of impression, the originary and founding "how". Furthermore, this phenomenal basis is, in Henry, something *prius* with regard to time¹⁸.

What we call originary impression is harboured in what is studied by Henry as the "subjective body" of Maine de Biran. It is our own body that gives the first horizon of impression as self-affection; it is the immediate and immanent "feeling myself". In this feeling, two senses of manifestation could be read –and simultaneously keeping the ontological difference-:

a) That of subjective corporeal whole, corporeity, that reveals world as it lives this world within continuous resistance. This resistance is given by the body and its complex of sensations, categories (faculties), movement, memory, habit, etc.¹⁹. This is so whether I refer to my own felt itching or to bug that in me and of me (of my body) is made manifest as bug within resistance -in this case, its manifestation would be, for example, that of "my lived world of a-bug-that-bites-me" or "lived world of the knowledge of the bugs that bite". We may say that the last formulation corresponds to the most "ek-static" situation in manifestation -situation of distance- that we find in Henry, that is: the situation that would be about "transcendent world" and its manifestation, where material-substantial reality appears in corporeity as continuous resistance according to the already mentioned bodily complex and clearly apart from the noematic that is intentionally constituted.

¹⁸ This topic is analysed in my paper "Logos de mi carne viva. Acerca de la relación vida-lenguaje en *Encarnación* de Michel Henry", Cuadernos CANELA, Vol. XXI (2010), 61-76. (on-line: <http://www.jdbarrientos.com/logos-de-mi-carne-viva>).

¹⁹ On the resistant continuum and this bodily complex, cf. my paper "Cinco datos fenomenológicos: preliminares para una ontología de la subjetividad a partir de Michel Henry lector de Maine de Biran" Research Bulletin (Nihon University), 60 (2008), 29-54. (on-line: <http://www.jdbarrientos.com/cinco-datos-fenomenologicos>)

b) The other sense lies also in the same bodily complex, but now -and accordingly with what we studied in the previous section (4) about impression- we do not pay attention to any constitution whatsoever or to passive syntheses of time consciousness in originary manifestation of subjective life. When we dealt with the flux of "originary impression", we spoke about the "proto-fact of change of time consciousness" in Husserl, as here the focus is placed on the radicalisation of impression in its subjective corporeal immanence. It is radicalisation until we *see living* the most passive basis, the only possible one. It is the basis that Husserl points to in the constituting flow and which is characterised as a "river"; even if we refer to it "according to the constituted", "it is nothing 'objective' in time"; it is "absolute subjectivity":

It is absolute subjectivity and it has the absolute properties of what in image has to be characterised as "flux", "river", as something that springs in a point of actuality, a point which is a primordial source, etc. In the *Erlebnis* of actuality we have the point which is the primordial source and a continuity of echo-moments. For all this we lack names²⁰.

As we mentioned earlier, this flux has no place in the primordial horizon of Life that -in Henry's research- previously founds the manifestation of everything. Life as well is *prius* to the flux in which there is no place for non-flux moments, even in the case that this flux can open to the deepening of this very flux in terms of absolute subjectivity in the *Erlebnis* of actuality. However, concerning the living present in Henry -referred to self-affection and in contrast to the *flux* that we have explained following Husserl-, there are two points that are halfway between the living present and the flux -even if it is almost only in this moment of the *epoché* of inner time-: a) *the present of self-affection*, on Henry's side and the "now" of the *Erlebnis* of actuality in Husserl; b) also in both cases, the material immanent "component" that impression is -although, as we can see, with different scopes in their phenomenal basis-.

²⁰ "Es ist die absolute Subjektivität und hat die absoluten Eigenschaften eines im Bilde als 'Fluß' zu Bezeichnenden, in einem Aktualitätspunkt, Urquellpunkt, 'Jetzt' Entspringenden usw. Im Aktualitätserlebnis haben wir den Urquellpunkt und eine Kontinuität von Nachhallmomenten. Für all das fehlen uns die Namen." *VPIZ*, 429.

6

We have then *a present, an "each now"*, that we can say it is full in originary impression. Its condition of present is manifested in my subjectivity and from my subjectivity; here we would be on the side of *videor* with regard to originary manifestation and we would be entering the most previous side of ontological difference, of what we initially called -somehow incorrectly- *ego manifested*. Thus, if we keep Henry's initial bet for the power of the subjective body as reflexive movement, we do not have an empty distance of oneself, that would present subjectivity *to oneself*. Rather, we keep an "intentional-material quasi-distance" that as self-affection fills subjectivity, and simultaneously reveals it as finite life and subjective body.

This is so if we hold to the manifestation of subjectivity according to the subjective body in the form of self-affection and giving as a whole (and *at the same time*), within affective immediateness, the categories (faculties). All this according to the movement of reflective immanence which does not get to, and does not find the power to substantialise²¹ the subjective life into Life; therefore, it can be spoken about originary passivity open from finitude. This indigence, which is lived within originary passivity and which, from my finitude, announces a basis, is due precisely to the finitude of self-affection, lived in my "now", in my living present.

However -and in spite of the *pathos* that this "living in self-affection" of mine may contain-, its vital immanent power is not even remotely enough for me to extend the situation of indigence (primordially lived as pleasure-pain) of my finite life -manifest in an initial basis of *actual absolute Erlebnis*- to an Absolute basis that is prius of time and which is characterised -owing to the vital finite pathos- as *Life that pervades everything*.

This situation of manifestation that we have just indicated is the path of *Appearing of appearance*, it is the *intermediate situation* we mentioned at the beginning of this paper. It manifests itself as *the dawn of my freedom*. It could be even said that in this situation -and before the originary basis of phenomenality- my freedom is always manifested as problematic: "I will do this

²¹ Concerning this possibility of substantialisation of finite life into Life, cf. my paper "Pasividad y sustancia en *Filosofía y fenomenología del cuerpo* de Michel Henry", *Phenomenology* 2010, Vol. 3: Selected Essays from the Euro-Mediterranean Area —Edited by Ion Copoeru, Pavlos Kontos, and Agustín Serrano de Haro—, Bucharest: Zeta Books / Paris, Arghos-Difusion, 2010.

or that", "I will have to do this or that", or this that I present to myself as what will be this or that. There I take notice of different ends -or I immediately assist to them- that are present in what moves my subjective life (causal movements) and which can be declared or not. Thus, on the side of philosophical experience in the *intermediate situation*, it is *manifested this sense of the absolute of myself that has come to me*, that we can initially call "more 'I' than I myself"²².

Such coming to me is partially given by me as far as I expect, but it is not put by me. It is longer mainly about my pleasurable-painful life, without phenomenological distance, but we are pulled -in the intermediate situation- by sense²³. All the "other than myself" pulls my freedom: the world of the others, the apparent neutrality of the world and my own situation of an *always* problematic *freedom*. It seems that it is only me who has to weave the basis of this tissue of senses, or teleological basis of manifestation, even if I have to risk my life for the sake of its good. This is due to the fact that this Good of the others and their world -which is obviously also mine- is above all an expectation given within myself as a good of myself²⁴, hoped by me; it is my hope, it is an expectation that I cannot let down because here my life is strictly at stake, because it is my life. In fact, maybe from all this -and as it came only from all this-, in my finitude, this material basis of good that can sustain the sense of all the other than myself can be woven. The other possibility would be letting down the expectation of that "more 'I' than I myself", this absolute of myself; and it would mean conferring to carelessness -or to that situation of indifference with regard to problematic freedom- the first meaning of the good over all the other than myself.

²² "Más yo que yo mismo" or "más tú que tú mismo" is frequently used by García-Baró in his papers and conferences.

²³ The sense establishes a phenomenological distance with regard to something, with regard to the manifestation of all that is other than me, and with regard to The Absolute. But more than being mere sense, this situation is teleological. That is so as I am thrown to this "being pulled" by the Enigma in the extreme indigence of my finite life, within a necessary distance from the teleological basis. The distance seems to be given by an emptying of infinitude into finitude, pulling my finite life to it; thus, I am redeemed in its teleological basis at the expense of this problematic freedom.

²⁴ We use here "good of myself" and not "my good" to stress the fact that we are referring to something that does belong to us but that simultaneously I do not contain entirely as a good.

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