HUME ON OUR GREAT PROPENSITY TO PRIDE
HUME ACERCA DE NUESTRA GRAN PREDISPOSICIÓN AL ORGULLO

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Abstract: Hume admits we have a great propensity to feel pride and he dedicates a lengthy treatment to its analysis. Yet his intentions in doing so are puzzling: How does pride fit into his philosophical system, and what role does it play? This paper argues that Hume found a middle ground between two divergent treatments of this passion. He criticised Hutcheson's reliance on the moral sense and sense of honour to feel pride; and he corrected Mandeville's insistence on pride and it's external manifestation, honour, being the basis of morality. Hume bridged previous conceptions by making pride a "social moral sense". Hume broadens pride's scope beyond the virtuousness and viciousness of the passion, and depicts it as a regulatory passion on a societal level.

Keywords: Pride, Moral sense, Artificial virtues, Hume, Mandeville, Hutcheson.

Resumen: Hume constata que tenemos una clara predisposición al orgullo y le dedica un largo análisis. Su intención de estudiarlo todavía nos resulta una incógnita: ¿Cómo encaja el orgullo en su sistema filosófico y qué papel juega en él? Este artículo argumenta que Hume encontró un término medio entre dos tratamientos dispares de esta pasión. Criticó a Hutcheson por hacer depender el orgullo del sentido moral y el honor. Corrigió, también, la insistencia de Mandeville en el orgullo y –su manifestación externa– el honor, como base de la moral. El filósofo escocés tendió un puente sobre las concepciones de los dos anteriores al hacer del orgullo un "sentido moral social". Amplía el alcance del orgullo más allá de su carácter virtuoso o vicioso, y lo describe como una pasión social reguladora.

Palabras clave: Orgullo, Sentido moral, Virtudes artificiales, Hume, Mandeville, Hutcheson.

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1. Introduction

The Hume reader cannot help but ask why pride is given such attention in his first major writing, *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Not only is pride right at the heart of the *Treatise*, but it is the single passion most written about in his oeuvre. Hume's lasting concern with pride remained intact throughout his life, continuing to edit his *Dissertation on the Passions* just a year before his death.

Scholarship on Hume's moral philosophy has indeed spotted the importance of pride in his work. On occasions, scholars have seen Hume as specially interested in speaking of properly grounded pride (proper pride or the dignity of pride) and about the virtuousness of pride. This is not the case because Hume spoke about the problematic as well as positive aspects of pride. Failing to acknowledge both aspects of the passion clouds Hume's more systematic ambition to offer richer views on human nature than those he had read about. Moreover, pride is not a tool in Hume's effort to do normative philosophy, namely to offer a recipe for happiness, he had no such agenda.

Contrary to prescriptive readings of (due) pride as a "master passion"1 focused on reflexivity to rebuild the destroyed self in Book I, the enigma of Hume's interest in pride must be answered by bringing both Mandeville and Hutcheson into the picture. They are, according to Hume, among the six philosophers beginning to put the science of man on "a new footing" (T. xvi)2, a task Hume himself sought to culminate. When the historical dimension of Hume's work is analyzed we find the questions he sought to answer were geared towards solving the selfish hypothesis at the social level instead of the individual.

In its *Abstract* Hume proclaimed that the *Treatise*'s opinion on the passions was "new and extraordinary"3 (T. 659). The indirect passions are Hume's concern for the larger part of Book II because they were Hume's own innovation;

[1] See Baier (1980) for the wrong reasons Hume gave pride 'philosophical priority': "The place given to pride is not so much a case of egotism as it is of preoccupation with reflection and reflexivity": p. 133 and her characterization of pride as a virtue (1987: 145, 147, 187, 206-212).

[2] Editions of Hume's work hereafter abbreviated as *A Treatise of Human Nature*: T.; *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals:* E.; *Dissertation of the Passions*: DoP.

[3] Hume [1739-40] (1976) *Abstract of a Book Lately Published Entitled* "A Treatise of Human Nature".

a new classification of the passions. McIntryre (2006) already nicely argued Hume is engaging with the treatment of the passions given by his contemporaries, but neither Mandeville nor Hutcheson were mentioned in her survey. So, Hume's general criticism is that the workings of the passions have not been fully exposed yet. His characterisation when saying "None of the direct affections seem to merit our particular attention" (T. 439), leads us to think that the mechanism underlying the direct passions is not unknown or unfamiliar to his contemporaries and is simple enough. Yet the indirect passions require a social component that had not yet been studied. Pride is the indirect passion Hume uses as exemplary. Exemplary insofar pride aimed to show the workings of the indirect passions as well as being a propensity of our human nature.

Hume read Hutcheson and Mandeville around the same time, before writing the *Treatise*, in the early 1730s. Likewise, Hutcheson read Hume's *Treatise* and Hume edited it bearing in mind Hutcheson's remarks4. On the other hand, Mandeville did not live to read the *Treatise*. However, Mandeville's insistence on pride underlying our social interactions inspired Hume's first known essay, on modern honour5. Specifically, Hume owes his adherence to Mandeville to the fact that he makes pride derive from society's conventions. But Hume's apple doesn't fall far from Hutcheson's tree either, for he makes pride what I have termed a "social moral sense". This means that pride has a social root but nevertheless mimics the moral sense for it helps distinguish between what is right and wrong.

2. Mandevillean traces

The influence of our passions is an undeniable feature of human nature for Mandeville and Hume. The former already anticipated Hume's infamous "reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions" (T. 414) when he said that "All Human Creatures are sway'd and wholly govern'd by their Passions" and even those that follow their reason ultimately are "compell'd so to do because of some passion or other, that sets them to Work" (1732: 31).

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4 As he promised in his letter written to Francis Hutcheson on September 17th, 1739: p. 32.

5 The transcription has only been published in John P. Wright's (2012) "Hume on the origin of 'modern honour'" with an Appendix of the transcription of Hume's 'Essay on Chivalry': pp. 187-209.

There is an apparent tension between the viciousness of pride and its utility in Mandeville's Part I of *The Fable*. This book sought to establish two ideas. First, that the happiness we desire is wealth and power, glory and worldly greatness. That type of well-being is linked to the passions of avarice, profuseness, pride, envy, and ambition, all of which are vices. Essentially, Mandeville is saying that we crave to satisfy our corrupt nature. Second, he defends the idea that in order to live in society our passions suffer a transformation; they are redirected by politicians in order to fit into society. He famously argued that there is no possibility of virtuous actions or motivations without self-denial. Since our primary inclinations drive us to what is deemed vicious, virtue is necessarily the rejection of our own nature. This caused an uproar during the 1720s. Only his later work, Part II, resolved this tension by allowing self-liking (pride's internal manifestation) to be gratified by external approval (honour). This binds our selfish nature into a social contract.

In Book III, Hume twice explicitly criticised a "standard" reading of Mandeville's posture in *The Fable* (a reading that concentrates on what is said in Part I). Hume takes advantage of this vulgar reading of Mandeville to make his point more salient. The first instance of battering is when Hume discusses the possibility of distinguishing between virtue and vice. He specifically uses Mandeville's vocabulary *(my emphasis)*:

> [S]ome philosophers have represented all moral distinctions as the effect of *artifice* and education, when *skilful politicians* endeavour'd to restrain the turbulent passions of men, and make them operate to the *public good*, by the notions of *honour and shame*. This system, however, is not consistent with experience (T. 578).

Clearly, Mandeville had taken the matter too far. In the face of it, Hume does allow naturally generated moral distinctions between virtue and vice. At another point, Hume says that representations of selfishness accounting for the origin of artificial virtues such as justice are exaggerated, since those "descriptions, which certain philosophers... form of mankind… are as wide of nature as any accounts of *monsters*, which we meet with in *fables* ..." (T. 486, *my emphasis*). So, fables overdo it. He might also be alluding to Hobbes' *Leviathan*. In any case, Hume calls for a more nuanced approach: it is hard to find a person who loves himself or herself less than other people, but it is equally rare to encounter somebody "in whom all the kind affections, taken together, do not over-balance all the selfish" (T. 486). This is a consequence of Hume's middle way.

The quest for a middle way by offering a balanced view on the traits of human nature allows Hume to adopt ideas he learned from Mandeville. Hume knew that there was more to Mandeville than his first part of *The Fable*. Following his steps, Hume was not afraid to expose the "hideous"6 parts of our anatomy in morals either. Hume offered a range of passions that depicted our inclinations. Amongst these passions, coincidently, was pride.

Mandeville explained that it is tricky to discover the colours of human nature for they are well mixed. Despite the challenge, Mandeville was indeed interested in tracing the motives behind the passions. He uses a metaphor to illustrate the difficulty: "it must be an Artist that can unravel all the various Colours and their Proportions". In the same manner, the passions may be discovered when they are well defined, and occur one at a time. However, "it is very difficult to trace every Motive of those Actions that are the Result of a mixture of Passions" (Part I of *The Fable*: p. 84). In the same vein, Hume aspires to discern the perfect, and often indistinguishable: "[I]mpressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union; and like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself…" (T. 366). Therefore, they share a common purpose, one that Hutcheson was not working on. Instead Hutcheson was preoccupied with painting virtue with warm colors7.

Coming back to pride, Part II of *The Fable* develops the idea of pride that is hidden by politeness –self-liking– in civil society. Mandeville thought that too many people were confusing self-liking with pride. He emphasised that self-liking is a passion distinct from self-love, in the face of theories proposed by moralists confusing the two. Mandeville himself had confused self-love and self-liking in the past, in Part I of *The Fable* for instance. Self-love, says Mandeville, is a basic instinct found in human nature that ensures we survive. Self-liking is a variation of self-love that has evolved in civil society, it is hiding one's regard for oneself. Last, pride is only an outward manifestation of self-liking, that is, a consequence of showing one's self-liking –in public–, meaning it is against exercising polite behaviour.

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6 Hume's letter to Hutcheson from the 17th of September 1739, NLS MS. 23151 f. 55. Hume originally wrote: 'Where you pull off the Skin, & display all the minute Parts, there appears something trivial if not hideous, even in the noblest Attitudes'. He deleted the words `if not hideous (but did not make them illegible). This remark was originally pointed out by Tolonen (2008: 32).

7 See above mentioned letter: p. 32.

Later on, Mandeville's *Origin of Honour* shows how self-liking is made explicit by the concept of medieval honour. He begins this study by pointing out that honour is born from a passion that has no name yet, and he coins this passion self-liking (1732: 2). So, honour's source is not pride but self-liking. Mandeville reiterates his idea that honour is an invention of politicians to keep us "close to" "Promises and Engagements, when all other Ties prov'd ineffectual" (1732: 30). In fact, this strategy was a necessary one in the Middle Ages to regulate the passions of those who wouldn't succumb to religion, or as Mandeville puts it, to 'influence Men, whom Religion had no Power over" (1732: 17). Admitting people are honourable is a "compliment" and expresses an "Agreement with them in their Sentiments concerning the Esteem and Value they have for themselves" (1732: 9).

The phrase 'modern Honour', which appears in the title of Hume's essay, is used by Mandeville to stress the difference between the principle of 'modern Honour' and 'genuine virtue'. Hume follows Mandeville's usage when he couples chivalry and modern honour in the title of his essay, and draws a contrast between modern honour in this wide sense and virtue among the ancients. This contrast between the conceptions of honour for ancients and moderns must have made it clear to Hume that the conception of honour varies from society to society, and it, therefore, mutes. Hume also realizes honour is gendered, which is why he dedicates a section to chastity in Book II.

Hume's short account of how the notion of chastity is formed from education, voluntary convictions, and the interest of society is parallel to his earlier analysis of modern honour. In the same way men adhere to the social norm by behaving the way society expects them to, courageously, when it comes to modern honour, and politely in civil society; women are "imposed a due restraint" (T. 570) by attaching shame to their infidelity. This is similar to Mandeville's analysis in *A Modest Defense of Public Stews,* where the origin of praising chastity as a virtue is examined and its causes traced. In a nutshell, "all young women have strong notions of honour carefully inculcated into them from their infancy" (1724: p. 21) by teaching them to hate indecency.

In Book II of the *Treatise* Hume continues to discuss what relation causes the most pride, namely, property. In this context, he mentions the 'artificial virtues' for the first time. He goes on to contrast those philosophers that believe justice is a natural virtue to those that don't. For the latter "honour, and custom, and civil laws supply the place of natural conscience, and produce, in some degree,

the same effects. (T. 309). Hume and Mandeville belong to this group. If justice is artificial, namely a convention, then it is not regulated by natural conscience, within. Instead, justice is served because civil laws, custom and honour are in place. Hume will establish in Book III that justice is indeed an artificial virtue. Therefore, honour too must be an artificial virtue.

If honour, custom and civil law substitute conscience to the same effect, the regulation of our actions shifts to the external realm. Mandeville had already exposed this before, in Remark R of *the Fable*. First, by declaring honour albeit 'signifying a virtue' is imaginary, an invention of moralists and politicians to tie men to their commitments. Moreover, honour is built upon self-liking and pride, just as religion is built upon humility (1729: 222). The opposition between honour and Christianity is what he goes onto develop in *Origin of Honour*.

In addition to these remarks in the *Treatise*, Hume also discusses pride in later work. In his second enquiry, *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, Hume criticises those who confuse pride with self-love. He mentions La Rochefoucauld and many other French writers (1741: note SS). He might feel entitled to this criticism since he knew of a more nuanced taxonomy.

In 1770, when editing *Essays and Treatises in Several Subjects*, Hume changed the name of the essay "Of the Dignity of Human Nature" to "Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature". This small change in the title is an acknowledgment of the fact that Hume speaks of both the dignity and the meanness of human nature, which reflects Hume's effort to provide a balanced account of human nature. On top of this, in 1748 Hume eliminated a paragraph from the original text of the same essay. Interestingly, the paragraph Hume erased said that it "had been prov'd beyond Question by several great Moralists of the present Age, that the social Passions are by far the most powerful of any, and that even all the other Passions receive from them their chief Force and Influence" (1987: 620). The paragraph written by Hume to substitute the earlier draft argued that even a certain "species of self-love" can have a great influence over human actions "and even greater, on many occasions, than that which remains in its original shape and form" (1987: 85). Hutcheson's benevolence was downgraded in favour of a variation of self-love. One is left wondering which one exactly. However, Hume believed that human nature is balanced: it is worthy of honour and respect *and* lacks dignity, and generosity.

Therefore, the Mandevillean trace found in Hume is twofold. First, both share a view of honour as an artificial virtue. This is founded on honour's ability to imitate the effects of "natural conscience". Honour, together with custom and civil law are the basis for an artificial (simply contrary to natural) system of morals. Pride lies as a basis of the system. Hume claimed that "vanity is rather to be esteem'd a social passion, and a bond of union among men" (T. 491). This is quite Mandevillean because vanity (in many passages used interchangeably with pride) brings us into society instead of alienating us from it. So, the second Mandevillean mark in Hume is seeing pride as a glue for society.

3. Hutchesonian concessions

Against Mandeville, Hutcheson shared with the ancients an ambition to offer a recipe for personal government that could limit the power of the selfish passions. In his *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions with Illustrations on the Moral Sense*, Hutcheson distinguished between five external senses and five internal senses. Each internal sense corresponds to a type of pleasure. After writing about pleasures of the imagination born from the sense of beauty and the social pleasures of the public sense, he goes into the pleasures of the sense of honour, excited by observing good actions, regardless of their public nature. This "makes the Approbation, or Gratitude of others, for any good Actions we have done, the necessary occasion of pleasure" (1728: 18). The opposite, dislike or condemnation for a given action, is sensed by shame. It is noteworthy that the actions observed will produce pleasure or pain regardless of their outcome.

The last, but certainly not the least important of Hutcheson's senses is the moral sense. In order to not allow for incongruences between what the sense of honour and the moral sense would perceive, Hutcheson gradually aligned their pleasures. Whereas Mandeville needed the help of self-deception to rechanell self-liking into shame and honour, Hutcheson trusted our ability to restrain our selfish passions through the moral sense and its' "uniformity" to the sense of honour as well as a "general propension of soul to wish the universal propensity and happiness of the whole system" (2007: p. 32). Moreover, the Irish philosopher favoured the passions that were naturally sociable, such as different forms of benevolence; love of family; and love of company.

Hutcheson was concerned with Mandeville's scandalous opinions; he made changes to his writing to counterbalance them. First, in his modifications of the second edition of the *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria*, he made "a sense of Honour and Shame" and "natural sense of honour and fame" work alongside the moral sense in approving or condemning our conduct. In addition to changes in section XIII in Book I, Chapter I "Of Human Nature and its Parts" of the *Compendiaria,* Hutcheson added two new sections to the chapter, namely sections XV and XVI. He admits a variety in the types of goods we are attracted to, even including external goods, such as honours, power, and wealth. Nevertheless, he insists that amongst the distinct tendencies of the will, it is "manifest that there's some natural sense of right and wrong" (2007: p. 35).

Similarly, *A System of Moral Philosophy* also insists upon a sense of honour and shame, with a chapter entitled: "The senses of Honour and Shame explain'd. The universal Influence of the Moral Sense, and that of Honour; and their Uniformity". Hutcheson criticised social validation as a mechanism for obtaining honour, instead he saw it as a consequence: other's approve of our appropriate actions because it is first approved by the moral sense. He had already applied this to his normative assessment of pride: "to be proud or ashamed, are Words without any meaning, if we take away a moral Sense" (2002: p. 100)8.

The clash between Hutcheson and Mandeville must have been a catalyst, a motivation to search for a different explanation that could transcend the ones given hitherto. Despite his aforementioned criticism of Mandeville, Hume would not agree with Hutcheson either in making pride and honour depend on the moral sense. This can be proved on two accounts. First, Hume rejects the natural law theorists and Hutcheson's idea that what is natural is virtuous. Second, he points out the causes of pride are more than virtuous actions.

Concerning the idea that what is natural is virtuous, Hume rejects the systems that believe it "unphilosophical" on more than one front. In a sense, virtue is unnatural because it is unusual. In another sense, given all actions are performed "with a certain design and intention" (T. 475), virtue, and the merit we associate it with, is artificial. In conclusion, the same page reads that both vice and virtue are "equally artificial, and out of nature". Hume adds that he will sometimes oppose natural to civil or moral, making it more and more clear

[8] On a more fleshed out explanation on Hutcheson's sense of honour see Barrenechea Domínguez (2021).

that virtue can be dependent on civility and morality (Hume understands this broadly as politics). Hume is carving the way to allow pride to derive from society's conventions, against Hutcheson's marriage between the sense of honour and the moral sense.

Hume denounces the poor state of moral philosophy and surveys the opinions of certain philosophers, often juxtaposing them to his own and enhancing their differences to sound more novel. Hume is aware that pride is seen as a vice, and humility as a virtue. He, on the other hand, allows pride to be close to virtue albeit not a virtue in itself.

> There may, perhaps, be some, who being accustom'd to the style of *the schools and pulpit,* and having never considered human nature in any other light, than that in which *they* place it, may here be surpriz'd to hear me talk of virtue as exciting pride, with they look upon as a vice; and of vice as producing humility, which they take have been taught to consider as a virtue (T. 297, *my emphasis*).

Although pride is motivated by a desire to satisfy the opinion we have of ourselves, it is not a vice. It was not his intention to evaluate whether the motivation for pride is more rooted in interested motives than in disinterested ones: he dropped this approach, and instead concentrated on the empirical analysis of pride. His definition of virtue and vice leads him to conclude that the two are "equivalent, with regard to our mental qualities" (T. 575).

One might be tempted to think that pride is a virtue for Hume, and that is why it is at the heart of the *Treatise*, as Baier (1987: p. 145, 147, 187, 206-212) and J. Taylor (2019: pp. 142-8) have but I doubt Hume would admit pride is a virtue, albeit he would have no problem whatsoever admitting it is not a vice. In fact, that could very much be the case, namely, that Hume wanted to prove pride is not a vice. Similarly, and equally important, Hume aims to prove humility is not a virtue either, as the next section will explain. That being said, being virtuous or possessing virtue is a reason for feeling pride, namely, a cause of pride:

> [N]o person is ever prais'd by another for any quality, which wou'd not, if real, produce of itself, a pride in the person possest of it. The elogiums either turn upon his power, or riches, or family, or virtue; all of which are subjects of vanity (T. 320).

The subjects of vanity or pride, since Hume is using them interchangeably, range from riches to virtue. Hume is expanding pride's scope beyond what Hutcheson would have allowed. The mechanism underlying the indirect passion of pride is not completed until we confirm what is being praised in society: "If nature produc'd immediately the passion of pride or humility, it wou'd be compleated in itself, and wou'd require no farther addition or encrease from any other affection" (T. 305-6). Unlike the direct passions, produced immediately, pride and love are necessarily social.

Hume has little interest (T. 439) in those passions that were central to the Stoics and Hutcheson (the passions Hume calls direct). They aren't his focus because their mechanism was well known. Instead, the indirect passions' complex mechanism needs to be elucidated because, as anticipated earlier, these are *his* innovations. Hume addresses the need of bringing a complex mechanism into view in opposition to those who, on the one hand, reduce all passions to self-love (Mandeville) or, on the other hand, offer a simplistic view of the passions as mere desires that obey the moral sense (Hutcheson).

All in all, Hume can be read as responding to the clash between Mandeville and Hutcheson. They disagreed on the effects of honour and shame in society. Moreover, they had produced extremely useful characterizations of the passions for Hume yet these needed to be expanded upon to make for a truer picture of human nature. The next section will delve into Hume's own contribution and what this paper argues is a response to disagreements with Mandeville and Hutcheson.

4. Hume's synthesis

Hume saw himself as putting forward a remedy for the poor state of the moral philosophy of his time. It was, in fact, "in the same condition as natural" philosophy before the discoveries Copernicus made in astronomy (T. 282). The indirect passions are based on ideas, such as possession (comparison of what one has with what others have or do not have), that enforce the direct passions. Hume believed that moral philosophers had a hard time understanding the causes of pride before his own account of indirect passions.

As it is becoming clear, pride and humility, particularly pride, play a prominent role in Hume's system by representing the complexity of the workings of the passions. Hume dedicates more time to its analysis than he does to any other passion. From the outset, Hume begins his analysis of the passions with pride and humility. Then, he dedicates the whole of Part I of Book II, "Of the Passions", to pride and humility. Moreover, pride is referred to once and again throughout the rest of Book II: he keeps speaking about pride and humility even in the Part II –the title announces more on love and hatred– of the aforementioned book. That is, the Scottish philosopher brings up pride again and again when he is allegedly elucidating love and hatred. Last but not least, Book III, Part III ("Of the other virtues and vices"), Section II, "Of greatness of mind" revisits the topic once more. It has been pointed out (G. Taylor, 1985) that it is curious Hume used humility as the antagonist of pride, instead of speaking about shame. This is because Hume reserved shame to oppose honour. He insists, we have a great propensity to pride, followed by the claim that our propensity to pride is much greater than to humility. It is worth pointing out that pride and vanity are used interchangeably in the *Treatise* on most occasions. Hume is not scared to equate pride with vanity (T. 291).

Initially, Hume's definition of pride is that it is an emotion born upon perceiving something as pleasant, and relating this with ourselves (T. 287). But the function pride plays in society is paramount: pride is strengthened in society and it strengthens the ties of society. The social aspect of pride is clear when Hume comments on the necessary foundation of such a passion on the "opinions and sentiments of others" (T. 316). In order for pride to arise, the person susceptible of feeling it must think he is related to something that makes others feel pleasure, and pride is reinforced when validated in the eyes of others: "We fancy ourselves more happy, as well as more virtuous or beautiful, when we appear so to others" (T. 293) and the opinions and sentiments of others are essential in the birth of pride (T. 316). The idea we form of ourselves is measured by comparison – let it be contrasting the virtue, beauty, or riches that others possess with our own. The ancillary value that other views furnish us with transforms the view we have ourselves, allowing for an evaluation of our own person.

One of Hume's contributions to understanding pride is that this passion is rooted in property and riches, instead of in the sole pursuit of what was considered by many as virtue. This expanded the scope of virtue significantly. The author of *A Treatise*'s thesis was that pride and humility arise not from these qualities alone of the mind, which, "according to the vulgar systems of ethicks,

have been comprehended as parts of moral duty, but from any other that has a connexion with pleasure and uneasiness" (T. 297). This is precisely what we should take as Hume's subversion to the previous systems of philosophy. Hume's subversive understanding of pride consists in his belief that virtue is more than moral excellence. The causes of the passions are natural (but not original); in surveying them we observe that the similar causes give rise to pride and humility in all ages and nations. However, the causes of the pride and humility are not adapted to these passions by a "particular provision, and primary constitution of men" (T. 281) and woman: so they vary. It was Hume's project to make the causes of pride and humility evident.

> Every valuable quality of the mind… all these are the causes of pride; and their opposites of humility. Nor are these passions confin'd to the mind, but extend their view to the body likewise... *But this is not all.* The passions looking farther, comprehend whatever objects are in the least ally'd or related to us. Our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths; any of these may become a cause either of pride or of humility (T. 279, *my emphasi*s).

The list of the causes of pride is considerably extensive. Hume is clear, riches and power render a person "considerable and important in the world" (T. 616). The rich and powerful are esteemed, although the esteem that they give place to is different and far from that produced by a virtuous character. Hume does not explain why this is the case, it is in his words "inexplicable", and simply observes that experience informs us of this "variation of feelings" (T. 617).

Pride and humility are never fully satiated; they are capable of being excited by whatever has the slightest relation to ourselves. This picture of the causes of pride is quite different to any normative claim on pride. Hume's science of human nature is here fully displayed. Beside the enumerated causes of pride and humility, Hume points out that there is "a secondary cause" or reinforcement of pride "in the opinions of others, which has an equal influence on the affections" (T. 316). As I have mentioned earlier, confirmation of our reasons to feel pride enhances pride.

Therefore, it can be said that the causes at work in the indirect passions *would* be unfamiliar to Hume's audience at the time. The effect of desire on the will was accounted for in previous and contemporary works, but the indirect passions go a step further in analysing the phenomenon that relates to the will.

Hence, Hume believes there is a need to discover the nature of these passions and expose them. The indirect passions of love and hatred, for instance, Hume treats in a particular manner, by making them exclusively person directed. Even when love was identified as the primary passion, which it often was for philosophers at that time and before, its different forms were accounted for by its direction toward different objects. Love, in this sense, was a generic form of desire, not the person-directed indirect passion we find in Hume.

I believe Hume's strategy with pride, i.e. to reject that it is all vicious, is the same he followed regarding luxury. Hume, likewise, divided luxury into vicious and harmless. He aimed to correct "both extremes": those that "praise vicious luxury is advantageous to society", and whoever "blames even the most innocent luxury" (1987: p. 269).9 When Hume admits there is such a thing as harmless pride he is establishing that pride is not vice in all its forms.

There are two principles of authority that judge our own worth and character –sympathy, which renders others' sentiments present to us, and reasoning, which makes us take their judgment into account–. Besides these principles, our judgments, of our own worth and character, are in each case linked to passion. Sympathy plays an important role in describing the mechanism that operates the passions. More specifically, however, Hume observes pride and humility arise from praise and blame, reputation and infamy (T. 320). Praise and blame, reputation and infamy, are sympathy dependent.

Pride is important insofar it serves to confirm our worth – let it be moral or not. That worth goes beyond the morally virtuous is a discovery Hume was happy to come across. Our love of fame is further proof that the opinions of others are essential on account of confirmation of the positive ideas we form of ourselves. In fact, people "always consider the sentiments of others in their judgment of themselves" (T. 303), said Hume. Our love of fame is a desire for reputation (as the origin of the word *fama*, report, in Latin, suggests) and recognition of our qualities. Love of fame is the moral principle which moves us towards satiating our pride.

In the section entitled "Greatness of Mind" of Book II of *A Treatise*, Hume explained that men have a "universal propensity" to over-value themselves, and

[9] The essay named "Of Luxury" (1754), changed to "Of the Refinement in the Arts" in 1760.

that there is a "*prejudice* against self-applause" (T. 598). Because of the natural aversion we feel towards displays of pride, he recommended "some disguise in this particular is absolutely requisite" (T. 598). But, in reality, said Hume, whoever is acquainted with practice in the world, would admit that humility is only required externally. Pride "must be vicious" because "it causes uneasiness" derived from a "disagreeable comparison" (T. 596). In any case, "good-breeding and decency" require that we avoid showing signs of pride to others, because it produces uneasiness. In fact, says Hume, expressions of pride and haughtiness are displeasing, because they shock our own pride.

On the contrary, Hume observed, "a genuine and hearty pride, or self-esteem, if well conceal'd and well founded, is essential to the character of a man of honour" (T. 599). The requisites for pride to be good are first, that it is well hidden; and second, that it is based on reasons and not on chimeras. Hume explained that attitudes that express humility, that is, seeing others being humble, creates sympathy readily. Moreover, the appeal to our pride, activates sympathy and makes us compare ourselves with the pride holder, causing us to feel humility. While the observation of humility in others is pleasing, feeling humility ourselves is painful.

In a nutshell, the requisites for good pride are that it must be hidden, it must be based on reasons (not chimera), and it must be in conformity to our social status. In fact, it is *necessary* to feel the "passion of pride" in conformity to our social status, and "regulate our actions accordingly" (T. 599). Pride is as natural to Hume as was the moral sense to Hutcheson. What has been called "*heroic virtue*", said Hume, is nothing but a "steady and well-establish'd pride and self-esteem" (T. 599), or partakes of that passion. Hume's sense of pride evoked Aristotle's notion of magnanimity and shunned conceptions of pride that are excessive and blinding.

Hume included modesty in his list of virtues. As pride is a due sense of our own force, modesty is "a just sense of our weakness" (T. 592), or lack of value. Observing modesty in others is welcome, but feeling modesty in oneself it "produces often uneasiness" (T. 597). But modesty is recognition of the limits of one's grounds for pride. Hume spoke about modesty as a "quality immediately agreeable to others". Modesty is agreeable insofar it does not hurt our pride. Modesty is not humility, that disagreeable, debilitating passion. Humility is painful dwelling on undesirable features of oneself, features one would prefer to hide, and is seen by Hume in a negative light, far from the facilitator of knowledge Augustine of

Hippo, and his doctrine, proposed. Naturally, the opposite of humility, pride, was not seen as guilt or sin by Hume.

That a certain degree of "generous pride or self-value" is a requisite for a healthy evaluation of oneself is also found in Section VII of the *Enquiry*: "Of qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves" (E. 253). These qualities are valued for their immediate pleasure, which they bring to the person who possesses them. They are not connected to views of utility or of beneficial consequences; but, Hume stated, this sentiment of approbation arises from views of a public or private utility. This is further proof that our sentiments are regulated by mirroring other people and their attitude. Furthermore, the notions of right and wrong are made sense of by surveying in the face of others' opinions:

> This constant habit of surveying ourselves, as it were, in reflection, keeps alive all the sentiments of right and wrong, and begets, in noble natures, a certain reverence for themselves as well as others; which is the surest guardian of every virtue… (E. 276).

This survey keeps us in check. Moreover, it is a keeper or preserver of virtue. Hume said that the system of morals we are best familiar with is the one that seeks the support of our insecure judgment on the correspondent approbation of mankind. Our interest with a good reputation is founded on the importance of maintaining a good opinion of ourselves, namely keeping our pride. "To this end, we find it necessary to prop our tottering judgement on the correspondent approbation of mankind" (E. 276). We need our internal insecure nature to be reinforced externally.

This is proof that our sentiments are regulated adhering to the conventional standards of honour, and by mirroring other people and their attitudes. In addition, the notions of right and wrong are made sense of by surveying in the face of others' opinions. Our interest with a good reputation is founded on the importance of maintaining a good opinion of ourselves, namely keeping our pride.

These passages illustrate that the love of fame is a ruling principle in morality and because our pride is fragile, it needs to be strengthened by others. The absence of self-value or "generous pride" means we are missing an essential part of our make-up. Hume compared the fundamental need of self-value to the need of having a nose or eyes. An original propensity to love oneself, or have self-esteem, "genuine and hearty pride", "if well conceal'd and well founded, is essential to

the character of a man of honour", and as he reiterated, having pride is quite necessary. In a footnote on the same page, he emphasised his point by adding that "Where a man has no sense of value in himself, we are not likely to have any higher esteem of him". So, a sense of value in oneself affects other people's projection of one's value too, and *vice versa*.

On the other hand, in the *Enquiry* Hume denounces the "monkish virtues" for they do not have any value in society: they serve not to "advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company" (E. 270). Self-denial, humility, silence and solitude, amongst others are not Humean virtues.

Hume re-wrote parts of Book II the *Treatise* into a text he named *Dissertation on the Passions*, two decades after the original text. In fresh sections Hume emphasizes the need for others' opinions in forming opinions of oneself further. As written in the *Treatise*, there is "a secondary cause" or reinforcement of pride "in the opinions of others, which has an equal influence on the affections" (T. 316), in fact, confirmation of our reasons to feel pride enhances pride. To that end, Hume added the whole paragraph that emphasizes that of all our opinions, "the frailest, and most easily shaken by the contradiction and opposition of others" (DoP: p. 14) is the opinion we form of ourselves, particularly when positive. It is impossible to not take into account society when it comes to supporting these, and really, any opinion.

We are anxious about opinions that go against our favour. We worry about what others think of us, and this is indeed a motivation for governing ourselves towards what is worthy of approval in the eyes of others. This phenomenon is crucial to understanding human nature. We are afflicted by the difficulty to be partial towards ourselves; it makes us "dread a mistake" (DoP: p. 14). Thus, it is important to compare our opinions of ourselves with the opinions others hold of ourselves. Only others are in a prudent distance, and therefore, in an appropriate position to judge us.

5. Conclusions

Prescriptive readings on Hume's use of pride have linked it to his notion of humanity, utility, and benevolence. All terms were emphasized more intensely during Hume's later work. Such readings trust Hume intended his philosophy to be useful for an individual's government of his or her passions. However, this perspective fails to see Hume's necessarily social understanding of the curbing of passions: regulation of our actions takes place thanks to rank and keeping our pride in check.

In this article, Mandeville and Hutcheson's views on pride were elucidated in order to shed light on Hume's. They each reached different conclusions: while Mandeville made a distinction between the different sorts of pride, depending on their social stadia, Hutcheson concentrated on pride born from virtuous and praiseworthy motivations. Last, Hume spoke about pride's importance in shaping healthy ideas of the self that would in any and all cases, fit in within society.

To sum up, the relation between pride and honour in Hume's corpus is bidirectional; pride is a consequence of being honoured, while our need to satiate our pride, or be well regarded, makes us act honourably. Hume spelled out the importance of ideas of honour and the passion of pride in regulating our actions, especially in accordance with the place we occupy in society, and the conventions that come with that.

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