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REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE GEOGRAFÍA E HISTORIA

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DE ESPAÑA (1970-1986)

NATALIA URIGÜEN LÓPEZ DE SANDALIANO Y
ANTONIO MUÑOZ SÁNCHEZ (COORDS.)

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DOSSIER

LA REPÚBLICA FEDERAL DE ALEMANIA Y LA
EUROPEIZACIÓN DE ESPAÑA (1970-1986)

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE
EUROPEANIZATION OF SPAIN (1970-1986)

NATALIA URIGÜEN LÓPEZ DE SANDALIANO Y
ANTONIO MUÑOZ SÁNCHEZ (COORDS.)

LIMBERING UP SISTER PARTIES' EUROPEANIZATION: TRANSNATIONAL SOCIALIST NETWORKS IN THE PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY AND ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

PONIENDO EN MARCHA LA EUROPEIZACIÓN DE PARTIDOS HERMANOS: LAS REDES SOCIALISTAS TRANSNACIONALES EN LAS TRANSICIONES PORTUGUESA Y ESPAÑOLA A LA DEMOCRACIA Y LA ADHESIÓN A LA COMUNIDAD EUROPEA

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Abstract

This article addresses the role of transnational socialist networks in the transition from dictatorship to parliamentary democracy in Portugal and Spain and the accession of both Iberian countries to the European Community (EC). Firstly, it maps the transnational networks of western European socialist parties and reconstructs the links established with the Portuguese and Spanish socialists, especially with the Portuguese Socialist Party (Partido Socialista: PS) and the Spanish Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español: PSOE). Secondly, it identifies functions and strategies the transnational socialist networks developed

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to influence the Portuguese and Spanish democratic transition and the run-up process to EC southern enlargement. By doing so, it demonstrates the impact that transnational socialist networks had on the programmatic development of both Iberian socialist parties in guiding them towards the EC socialist parties' ideological profile. This helped the socialist parties to agree common positions on EC southern enlargement and to ease the accession negotiations.

Keywords

EU enlargement; Europeanization; democratic transition; socialist parties; transnational networks.

Resumen

Este artículo aborda el papel de las redes socialistas transnacionales en la transición de la dictadura a la democracia parlamentaria en España y Portugal, así como la adhesión de ambos países ibéricos a la Comunidad Europea (CE). En primer lugar explora las redes transnacionales de los partidos socialistas de Europa occidental y reconstruye los vínculos establecidos con los socialistas portugueses y españoles, en particular con el Partido Socialista Portugués (PS) y el Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE). En segundo lugar identifica las funciones y estrategias que las redes socialistas transnacionales desarrollaron para influir en la transición democrática portuguesa y española y el proceso de preparación para la ampliación hacia el sur por parte de la CE. Al hacerlo demuestra que las redes socialistas transnacionales impactaron en el desarrollo programático de ambos partidos socialistas ibéricos tomando como modelo el perfil ideológico de los partidos socialistas de la CE. Esto ayudó a los partidos socialistas a acordar posiciones comunes sobre la ampliación hacia el sur de la CE y a facilitar las negociaciones de adhesión.

Palabras clave

EU ampliación; europeización; transición democrática; partidos socialistas; redes transnacionales

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1. EUROPEANIZATION AS A PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING AND DEVELOPING COOPERATION MECHANISMS ON THE EUROPEAN LEVEL AND THE CONVERGENCE TOWARDS SHARED POLITICAL COMMITMENTS

Advocating theoretically informed approaches to engage with the policy and impact of European Union (EU) enlargements, Haakon A. Ikononou, Aurélie Andry and Rebekka Byberg have recently called for a new research agenda to explore the longevity and complexity of EU accession rounds from an historical perspective. They rightly argue that the predominant approach in the EU historiography of enlargements has mainly focused on single states and national governments in single rounds of enlargements especially in the 1960s and 1970s, negotiating formal conditions with the then European Community (EC). As a consequence of this state-centric perspective, three aspects have not been analysed systematically so far: (i) how enlargement has developed over time as a polity and practice, (ii) how enlargements have shaped the EU as a polity, and (iii) how enlargement was, and is, much more than a simple question of membership or non-membership, but rather a complex and continuous interaction with many possible endings².

In fact, political science research on the EU's eastern enlargement with twelve new member states in 2004/07 has for the first time taken an alternative perspective. It has shifted towards looking at the role and impact of other institutional and societal actors instead of nation states and their governments. For example, sociological-institutionalist inspired research in the area of comparative political science and constructivist oriented studies in International Relations have probed the conditions by which informal entities such as values or ideas of Europe may spill over into new territories. Moreover, this kind of political science research has raised questions on the socialisation of political elites and the habitualization of EU-compatible standards and political preferences³. In general, this political science literature grasps enlargement as a wide process of Europeanization.

While discussion about and the use of the term Europeanization has increased in recent times, some historians have criticised its narrow use in political science, being mostly focused on governance changes in the EU and its (new) member states. They understand Europeanization not only as a variety of political processes, but also as cultural, social and economic processes that lead to strong European structures and connections. On the basis of this broad definition, vastly different phenomena ranging from intellectual debates and discourses on Europe, to forms of Europeanization triggered by styles of music and the making of European

2. IKONOMO, A. Haakon, ANDRY, Aurélie and BYBERG, Rebekka: «Introduction», in idem. (eds): *European Enlargements across Rounds and Beyond Borders*. Abingdon/New York, Routledge, 2017, pp. 1-16.

3. See, e.g., SCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank and SEDELMEIER, Ulrich (eds): *The Politics of European Enlargement – Theoretical Approaches*. Abingdon/New York, Routledge, 2005.

identity through the memory of war and exhibitions in museums have been researched from an historical perspective⁴. The research on these processes of Europeanization has also addressed the role of different actors such as scientists, intellectuals, novelists, museum directors or International Organisations. These studies have expanded the political science understandings of Europeanization and have fruitfully employed an expanded use of the term for historical research. However, they have not developed further the political science definitions for historical research on EU enlargements, but have added new definitions of Europeanization. As one consequence of this, the roles of various actors in EU enlargements as a wide process of Europeanization have been neglected.

This article fills this research lacuna using the example of the role of transnational socialist networks in the Portuguese and Spanish transitions to democracy and the accession of both Iberian countries to the EC⁵. Western European socialists closely monitored the transitions from dictatorship to parliamentary democracy in Portugal and Spain in the mid-1970s. Based on their desire to support democrats and socialists fighting underground or from exile against dictatorship in their home countries, they committed themselves to supporting both socialist parties in Portugal and Spain: the Portuguese Socialist Party (Partido Socialista: Portuguese PS) and the Spanish Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español: PSOE). They were motivated by an activist idea of their role of transnational «fraternity». Using partly institutionalised transnational networks, the European socialists sought to facilitate democratic transition in Portugal and Spain by, firstly, providing support to the Portuguese PS and the PSOE and, secondly, influencing EC southern enlargement policy at an early stage. Crucially, this article examines the role of transnational networks of socialist parties during the phase of change in political-system and the following political transition at a time when the prospect of later EC accession, and possible material or other benefits associated with it, did yet not play an important role⁶.

For the purposes of this article, Europeanization means, firstly, a process of strengthening and developing cooperation mechanisms on the European level in

4. See HIRSCHHAUSEN, Ulrike von and PATEL, Kiran Klaus: «Europeanization in History: An Introduction», in CONWAY, Martin and PATEL, Kiran Klaus (eds): *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century. Historical Approaches*. Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2010, pp. 1-18; KAISER, Wolfram, KRANKENHAGEN, Stefan and POEHLS, Kerstin: *Exhibiting Europe in Museums. Transnational Networks, Collections, Narratives, and Representation*. New York, Berghahn, 2014.

5. The article draws on previous research by the author on the role of transnational socialist networks in the Portuguese and Spanish transitions to democracy and EC accession, especially SALM, Christian: *Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s. European Community Development Aid and Southern Enlargement*. Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2016, pp. 94-149.

6. The role of (transnational) networks in European policy-making has been researched for various policy fields in recent time. See especially GEHLER, Michael, KAISER, Wolfram and LEUCHT, Brigitte (eds): *Netzwerke im europäischen Mehrebenensystem. Von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Networks in European Multi-Level Governance. From 1945 to the Present*. Vienna, Böhlau Verlag, 2009. For an introduction and overview on transnational history research and political science policy network analysis at the example of political parties and European integration history see SALM, Christian: «Come Together: Transnationale Geschichtsschreibung und politikwissenschaftliche Netzwerkforschung am Beispiel politischer Parteien und europäischer Integration», *Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen*, 46 (2011), pp. 131-151.

the form of transnational networks notable for being multi-functional. Secondly, it captures the convergence towards shared political commitments reflected in common ideologies, programmatic positions and policy objectives. In addressing these two dimensions of Europeanization, and in contrast to Robert Ladrech's basic framework for studying the Europeanization of political parties⁷, this article deals with Europeanization as a conflict-rich social process of convergence and integration in an historical perspective; and as such with enlargement as a complex interaction and far more than a simple matter of membership or non-membership, dealt with by national governments.

The article has two main sections. In the first section, I map the main transnational networks of the European socialists engaged in the Portuguese and Spanish transition to democracy and EC southern enlargement policy. I discuss those transnational networks of the European socialists that formed around the Socialist International (SI), the Confederation of the Socialist Parties in the EC, and bilateral relations of western European socialist parties. In the second section, I discuss the functions and activities these transnational socialist networks developed in order to influence the transitions to democracy and EC southern enlargement policy. In the conclusion, I provide an assessment of the impact of these transnational socialist networks.

2. MAPPING TRANSNATIONAL SOCIALIST NETWORKS IN THE PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND SOUTHERN ENLARGEMENT POLICY

The PSOE was a founding member of the SI⁸. In the form of temporary commissions for Spanish affairs, the SI officially supported the PSOE from the time of its refounding in 1951. Thus, their transnational cooperation was based on deep historical connections⁹. The Portuguese socialists received support from the SI after the liberation movement Portuguese Socialist Action (Acção Socialista Portuguêsa: ASP) was affiliated as an official member of the network in early 1972¹⁰.

With the dictatorial Franco and Salazar regimes still in power, the SI sent fact-finding missions to Portugal and Spain. In this period, all SI fact-finding missions

7. LADRECH, Robert: «Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis», *Party Politics*, 15 (2002), pp. 389-403.

8. For an introduction into the PSOE's history see, e.g., KENNEDY, Paul: «The Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE)», in: HANLEY, David and LOUGHLIN, John (eds): *Spanish Political Parties*. Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2006, pp. 46-73.

9. See, e.g., ORTUÑO ANAYA, Pilar: *European Socialists and Spain: The Transition to Democracy, 1959-77*. Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002, p. 9.

10. See, e.g., EISFELD, Rainer: *Sozialistischer Pluralismus in Europa. Ansätze und Scheitern am Beispiel Portugals*. Cologne, Wissenschaft und Politik, 1984, p. 48. For a broader analysis of the relations of the Portuguese PS with the European socialist parties see ANTUNES SABLOSKY, Juliet: *PS e a transição para a democracia. Relações com os partidos socialistas Europeus*. Tradução António Cruz Belo. Lisbon, Editorial Notícias, 2000.

to Portugal and Spain consisted mainly of representatives of western European socialist parties. The representatives were partly recruited from a tight network of socialist international secretaries and secretary-generals¹¹.

Furthermore, the SI established special committees for Portugal and Spain in the first half of the 1970s. These committees constituted small network entities within the broader SI network. They consisted of only a few members, mainly the international secretaries and experts on Portuguese or Spanish politics. The small number of members allowed for close cooperation on an informal basis. In both committees, the western European SI member parties involved were mainly those that had also been represented in the fact-finding missions. In the presence of Mario Soares, the leader of the Portuguese socialists, at the first meeting of the SI Portugal committee in London in March 1972 it was decided to invite the ASP to become a member of the committee¹².

In March 1974, the SI bureau created the SI Spain committee. The SI bureau had previously intervened in the power struggle of the two PSOE groups – the PSOE *renovado* with a Marxist character and based within Spain and the PSOE *histórico* with a moderate character and in exile in France – by recognising the PSOE *renovado* as the only representative of the Spanish socialists in January 1974. In political terms, this decision was taken because of the support of the Spanish General Union of Workers (Unión General de Trabajadores: UGT), historically affiliated with the PSOE, for the PSOE *renovado*. The SI bureau assumed that both organisations would together form a strong left-wing force within the Spanish process of democratisation¹³.

In fact, the PSOE was represented neither in the SI party leaders' meetings nor in SI bureau meetings in the first half of the 1970s. This was mainly due to the split of the PSOE into the PSOE *renovado* and PSOE *histórico*. Moreover, the young activists of the PSOE *renovado* around Felipe González had not yet developed close contacts to the western European socialist parties. Members of the PSOE *renovado* were thus not closely involved in the socialist cooperation through the various transnational networks. González and his colleagues started to participate regularly in SI meetings only after the recognition of the PSOE *renovado* as the only Spanish socialist party represented in the SI. As an official SI member, González could foster contacts with high-ranking western European socialist politicians. Still largely unknown to many high-ranking western European socialists on a personal level, González took part for the first time in a SI party leaders' meeting in February 1975.

11. See, e.g., the SI Fact Finding Mission to Portugal in October 1969, British Labour Party. Press & Publicity, Statement by Commission of SI, 24 October 1969, International Institute for Social History (IISH) Amsterdam, Socialist International Archives (SIA), 809.

12. Procès-Verbal de la Réunion du Bureau de l'Internationale Socialiste, London, 5 March 1972, Réunion du Bureau 2/72, N. 7/72, Fondazione di Studi Storici Filippo Turati (FdSFT) Florence, Fondo: Partito socialista italiano (Psi), Serie 11: Sezione Internazionale (SI), Sottoserie 3: Internazionale socialista (Is), 27.

13. For a detailed analyses on the role of the SI in the conflict between the PSOE *histórico* and the PSOE *renovado* see, ORTUÑO ANAYA, Pilar: *op. cit.*, pp. 24-33.

In contrast to González, Soares was acquainted with the most important socialist politicians in Western Europe due to his regular participation in SI bureau meetings and SI party leaders' meetings since the end of the 1960s¹⁴. For example, on the invitation of Olof Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister, Soares took part in the SI meeting in Harpsund/Sweden of July 1969. Here he met for the first time in a personal and highly informal setting the leaders of the major central and northern European socialist parties¹⁵. In the wake of the Portuguese transition in 1974/75, Soares, at that time Foreign Minister of the Portuguese transitional government, used his SI contacts to warn the socialist party leaders of the danger of a takeover of power by the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português: PCP) with the support of extreme left-wing military force and the catastrophic economic problems of the country¹⁶.

On the basis of this threat, SI party leaders took the decision to install in the framework of the SI a high-level network for supporting the Portuguese transition to democracy. The initiator for the establishment of this network was Willy Brandt, the German Chancellor¹⁷. It rested upon the informal and confidential cooperation and consultation among a small group of western European socialist party leaders. These leaders did not create new official bureaus and avoided public interest in their transnational work¹⁸. The members of this high-ranking informal network were Brandt, Palme, Bruno Kreisky (the Austrian Chancellor), François Mitterrand (the leader of the French Socialist Party; Parti socialiste: PS), Joop den Uyl (Dutch Prime Minister), and Harold Wilson (Prime Minister of the United Kingdom)¹⁹. Thus, the socialist party leaders of the three major countries within the EC – France, Germany and Britain – participated in the network. It was agreed to call the network the Committee of Friendship and Solidarity for Democracy and Socialism in Portugal (CFSDSP)²⁰. The network was supposed to coordinate the support of all forms of democratic development in Portugal and to maintain contact with the Portuguese socialists²¹. Moreover, the network made use of contacts with governments and

14. See, e.g., FONSECA, Anna Mónica: «Western Germany and the Portuguese Transition to Democracy», IRPI Working Paper 40, 2008.

15. JANITSCHKEK, Hans: *Mário Soares: Portrait of a Hero*. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985, p. 28.

16. Vermerk Dingels, Betr.: Treffen der sozialdemokratischen Regierungschefs in Stockholm am 2.8.1975, 15 August 1975, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdSD) Bonn, Helmut Schmidt Archiv (HSA), 1/HSA006241.

17. See, e.g., MERSEBURGER, Peter: *Willy Brandt 1913-1992, Visionär und Realist*. Stuttgart/Munich, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2002, p. 748f.

18. BRANDT, Willy: *Begegnungen und Einsichten. Die Jahre 1960-1975*. Hamburg, Hoffmann und Campe, 1976, p. 631.

19. See KAISER, Wolfram and SALM, Christian: „Transition und Europäisierung in Spanien und Portugal. Sozial- und christdemokratische Netzwerke im Übergang von der Diktatur zur parlamentarischen Demokratie«, *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 49 (2009), pp. 259-282, here p. 263; FONSECA, Anna Mónica: „The Federal Republic of Germany and the Portuguese Transition to Democracy (1974-1976)«, *Journal of European Integration History*, 15 (2009), pp. 35-56, here p. 49.

20. Aufzeichnung Veronika Isenberg, Betr.: Das Treffen des Portugalkomitees am 5. September 1975 in London, 8 September 1975, AdSD, SPD-Parteivorstand (SPD-PV), 11610.

21. Aufzeichnung Dingels, Betr.: Konferenz der sozialdemokratischen Regierungschefs und Vorsitzenden in Stockholm am 2.8.1975 auf Einladung von Olof Palme, 4 September 1975, AdSD, SPD-PV, 11490.

parliaments in EC member states and with EC institutions in order to influence western European and EC relations with Portugal.

Within the EC political arena, the Socialist Group in the European Parliament along with the Confederation of the Socialist Parties in the EC, created in 1974 as the successor organisation of the Liaison Bureau of the Socialist Parties in the EC, took on a vital role as mediators in the relations between Portugal and Spain with the Community's institutions.²² Crucially, although both the Socialist Group and the Confederation considered themselves to be the representative bodies of the socialists in the EC, they did not act as independent external actors during the transitions in Portugal and Spain. The SI remained the most important transnational network of the western European socialist parties for defining socialist policies on support for the transitions and on aspects of EC foreign relations towards Spain and Portugal throughout the 1970s.

Nevertheless, the first contacts between the Portuguese and Spanish socialists and the Socialist Group and the Confederation's predecessor organisation the Liaison Bureau dated back to the early 1970s. ASP and PSOE representatives attended the eighth congress of the EC socialist parties in Brussels in June 1971²³. The Socialist Group and the Confederation further expanded these contacts by undertaking fact-finding missions to Spain and Portugal during the initial phases of transition in both countries. For example, together with the Confederation, the Socialist Group sent a fact-finding mission to Portugal in June 1974²⁴. The highest representatives of socialist transnational cooperation on the EC level led the fact-finding mission. These included at that time two members of the German Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands: SPD): Ludwig Fellermaier, chairman the Socialist Group, and Wilhelm Dröscher, chairman of the Confederation. With the growing prospect of democratisation in Spain, the Socialist Group sent a fact-finding mission there in early 1976. The principle aim of both missions was to gather information on the Portuguese and Spanish political situation and to initiate closer contacts with the socialist activists²⁵.

In the transnational socialist networks, two western European socialist parties in particular played an important role in cooperating with the Portuguese PS and the PSOE: the German SPD and the French PS.

The German SPD held a dominant position in the socialist transnational cooperation in the context of Iberian transitions due to the extensive activities in

22. For an introduction into the history of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament and the Confederation of the Socialist Parties in the EC see HIX, Simon and LESSE, Urs: *Shaping a Vision. A History of the European Socialists*. Brussels, Party of European Socialists, 2002.

23. Meeting of Bureau of Socialist Parties of the EC, Brussels, 2 February 1973, IISH, SIA, 595.

24. Note à la attention des membres du groupe socialiste, Concerne: rapport sur la mission d'une délégation du groupe socialiste au Portugal du 13 au 17 juin 1974, Luxembourg, 1 July 1974, PS/GS/122/74, Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), Group socialiste du Parlement européen (GSPE), 57.

25. European Parliament, Socialist Group, Luxembourg, 3 June 1976, Report by the secretariat on the fact-finding visit to Spain by a delegation from the Socialist Group (from 30 April to 4 May 1976), IISH, SIA, 813.

Portugal and Spain of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: FES), a political foundation closely linked to the SPD²⁶. For example, the foundation had contacts with the Portuguese socialists from the mid-1960s on²⁷. In April 1973, the FES organised a secret meeting in Bad Münstereifel/West Germany for Portuguese socialists working towards overthrowing the dictatorship in their home country and ASP activists living in exile. Crucially, at this meeting the Portuguese PS was formally founded. In this respect, the FES and SPD contributed significantly to the establishment of the Portuguese PS²⁸.

In the case of the Spanish socialists, the FES established relations with PSOE members living in exile in France from the late 1950s on. In the mid-1960s, these contacts were extended to other Spanish socialists. As a consequence, the FES relation with the PSOE was difficult due to this long retained multipath strategy, which was designed to preserve the achievements of the FES work in Spain regardless of the conflicts of the Spanish socialists among themselves. Hence, the foundation maintained its contacts with all of the socialist groups in Spain until well into the 1970s²⁹.

Only some time after the SI decision to recognise the PSOE *renovado* as the only Spanish socialist party did it become apparent that the FES would cooperate with González as its exclusive partner in Spain. Crucially, the SPD and FES's cooperation with the PSOE was facilitated by the landmark decision of Brandt and his close political friends, Kreisky and Palme, at the SPD party congress in Mannheim in November 1975, to support only González and his PSOE *renovado*. This decision enabled a deepening of transnational cooperation and an intensification of networking. Moreover, it provided the necessary basis of trust that had lacked because of the contacts the SPD had maintained with the PSOE *histórico* and other smaller regional Spanish socialist groups³⁰. Prior to that decision, Brandt and González had only met a few times.

Likewise, Brandt and Soares knew each other vaguely before the Carnation Revolution in April 1974 - they had met, though only rarely, in the framework of SI meetings³¹. Only one week after the coup in Portugal, Brandt and Soares met for a private talk on the new Portuguese political situation in Bonn on 3

26. For a broader view on the role of the FES in transnational socialist party cooperation, including the FES's activities in Spain and Portugal, see SCHILDBERG, Cécilie, Wegbereiter transnationaler Parteienkooperation? Die Rolle der parteinahen Stiftungen», in: MITTAG, Jürgen (ed.): *Politische Parteien und europäische Integration. Entwicklung und Perspektiven transnationaler Parteienkooperation in Europa*. Essen, Klartext Verlag, 2006, pp. 451-575.

27. Aktennotiz [Esters-] Sabiel, Betr.: Portugal, 1 October 1974, AdsD, SPD-PV, 11484.

28. See, e.g., PRIDHAM, Geoffrey: «The Politics of the European Community. Transnational Networks and Democratic Transitions in Southern Europe», in: idem. (ed.): *Encouraging Democracy. The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe*. Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1991, pp. 212-245, here p. 240.

29. See, e.g., MUÑOZ SÁNCHEZ, Antonio: «La Fundación Ebert y el socialismo español de la dictadura a la democracia», *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, 29 (2007), pp. 257-278, here pp. 259-270.

30. Sachbericht Dieter Koneiecki über eine Sondierungsreise nach Spanien im Auftrag der FES vom 17.11. bis 14.12.1975, 13 December 1975, AdsD, Nachlass Bruno Friedrich (NBF), 1/BFAA001539.

31. See BRANDT, Willy: *op. cit.*, p. 629.

May 1974³². Soares used the meeting to express great interest in establishing a direct informal contact with the SPD chairman in order to allow at this highest party level a constant and confidential exchange of views and information with regard to the future of the Portuguese transition³³. Furthermore, Soares pointed to the strong role of the PCP based on an efficient organisation and ample financial resources³⁴. Thus, the change in the political situation in Portugal in April 1974 brought a new dimension to the relations and cooperation of the SPD and Portuguese PS³⁵. Both parties extended the networking among each other substantially. With the purpose of contributing to democratic consolidation in Portugal and supporting the Portuguese PS, the FES opened an office in Lisbon in spring 1977³⁶.

In contrast to the SPD, the French PS had actually ensured the survival of the PSOE as a political organisation in exile in Toulouse/France. However, although the French socialists helped the PSOE *histórico* to stay alive in exile, during the PSOE's split the French PS sided with the PSOE *renovado* at an early stage. Two reasons accounted for this decision. Firstly, as several authors have argued³⁷, the French socialists perceived the transformation and renovation of the PSOE through González as a process that the French PS had itself undergone under the leadership of Mitterrand. Secondly, the French PS's decision to cooperate with the PSOE *renovado* revealed a strategic interest based on domestic policy. The programmatic orientation of the PSOE *renovado* as a Marxist mass party meant it had better prospects for a collaboration with the Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista de España: PCE), which suited the French PS's policy of building an alliance with the French Communist Party (Parti communiste français: PCF).

Spain's ambitions for EC accession after democratisation intensified the bilateral exchange between the PSOE and the French PS. Several informal meetings with high-ranking representatives of both parties were held in order to discuss the technical and political impacts of southern EC enlargement for the Mediterranean countries³⁸. However, at the same time the French PS

32. See, e.g., BRANDT, Willy: *op. cit.*, p. 629; FONSECA, Anna Mónica: *op. cit.*, p. 39.

33. Kurzaufzeichnung Dingels, Betr.: Bemerkungen des portugiesischen Außenminister bei der Unterredung mit dem Parteivorsitzenden, 22 May 1975, AdSD, SPD-PV, 11490.

34. Isenberg to Friedrich, 10 May 1974, Bericht Isenberg, Betr.: Gespräche, die der Vorsitzende der Sozialistischen Partei Portugals, Mario Soares am 3. Mai in Bonn führte, AdSD, NBF, 1/BFAA001537.

35. Aufzeichnung Dingels, Betr.: Internationale Parteibeziehungen der SPD, July 1974, AdSD, Nachlass Egon Bahr (NEB), 419 A, 1/EBAA001092.

36. See MÜHLEN, Patrick von zur: *Die internationale Arbeit der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Von den Anfängen bis zum Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts*. Bonn, Dietz, 2007, p. 207.

37. This argument has been made by MARTÍNEZ COBO, José and MARTÍNEZ COBO, Carlos: *La segunda renovación. Intrahistoria del PSOE*, vol. IV. Barcelona, Plaza y Janés, 1991, p. 179; MATEOS LÓPEZ, Abdón: «Europa en la política de presencia internacional del socialismo en el exilio», in *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie V, Historia Contemporánea*, 2 (1989), pp. 339-358, here p. 353.

38. E.g., Réunion PSOE-PS sur l'élargissement de la CEE, Toulouse, 12 Septembre 1978, Centre d'archives socialistes (CdAS) Paris, Fonds Robert Pontillon (FRP), 8 FP 7/173.

was concerned to protect French domestic interests by demanding a reform of the EC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the reinforcement of the EC regional policy and the facilitating of greater public interventions to protect living standards. The Spanish socialists felt aggrieved by this policy, which then created difficulties in the relations between the two parties and later in the EC accession negotiations³⁹.

The French PS also enabled Soares to direct from Paris the political activities of the Portuguese socialists until his return to Portugal. Soares had established a close relationship with Mitterrand and the French PS international secretary, Robert Pontillon, through meetings within the framework of the SI and on a bilateral basis⁴⁰. In October 1973, before the Carnation Revolution, the French PS and the Portuguese PS officially established their relationship. The close relations between both parties were additionally demonstrated when Mitterrand visited Soares in Portugal shortly after the coup in July 1974⁴¹. Consequently, there was no doubt that the French PS sided with the Portuguese PS in the transition, while its domestic alliance partner, the PCF, backed the pro-Soviet PCP.

However, the French PS worked for a left-wing union in Portugal in order not to hamper the French leftist unity with the PCF. On numerous occasions, the French PS leadership called on the Portuguese PS to form a popular front with the communists⁴². Also in Spain, the French PS worked for a socialist-communist union in form of a merger of the PCE and the PSOE⁴³.

The central and northern European socialist parties were against these initiatives of the French PS. Collaboration between socialist and communist parties in the southern European countries developed into a politically sensitive issue that had the potential to affect seriously the transnational cooperation in the network of the SI and the socialist transnational political networks on the EC level. For example, the German SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt heavily criticised Mitterrand's initiatives and clearly warned of the effects of a schematic transfer of domestic political arrangements to neighbouring countries. Schmidt's view was that if coalitions including the communists in EC and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries were to be formed, these countries might not be able to honour the foreign policy commitments to which they were contractually bound. Hence, Schmidt emphasised that the SPD would oppose any unilateral adoption of Mitterrand's concept⁴⁴.

39. FEATHERSTONE, Kevin: *Socialist Parties and European Integration. A Comparative History*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, p. 123.

40. Mitterrand to Soares, n.d., CdAS, FRP, 8 FP 7/178; Soares to Pontillon, 16 July 1976, CdAS, Fonds Secrétariat aux relations internationales (FSRI), 450 Ri 5 Portugal; Pontillon to Soares, 28 February 1977, CdAS, FSRI, 450 Ri 5 Portugal.

41. Réunion avec la direction du Parti Socialiste Portugaise. Vendredi 5 Juillet 1974, CdAS, FRP, 8 FP 7/178.

42. Résolution voté à l'unanimité par le comité directeur des 4 et 5 Octobre 1975, CdAS, FSRI, 450 Ri 2 Portugal; Résolution du comité directeur sur le Portugal. 30 & 31 Janvier 1976, CdAS, FSRI, 450 Ri 2 Portugal.

43. Comité directeur des 6 et 7 décembre 1975, Espagne, CdAS, FSRI, 425 Ri 2 Espagne.

44. Vermerk Dingels zur Information des Präsidiums, Betr.: Konferenz der sozialdemokratischen Parteivorsitzenden

There was no real compromise in sight that would have changed the position of the French PS or of the central and northern European socialist parties around the SPD. Ultimately, given the SI rules there was a minimum consensus that the final decision on domestic policy issues would always be reserved for the party concerned. Thus, in contrast to the central and northern European socialist parties, the socialist parties from the southern European countries were allowed to draw individual assessments on alliances with communist parties according to the specific political conditions in their home countries⁴⁵. In fact, with the exception of González, Mitterrand did not find widespread support for his socialist-communist alliance policy.

Nevertheless, these developments in the socialist transnational party cooperation laid the necessary foundations for the establishment of a new network unit in the context of the Confederation for dealing explicitly with EC southern enlargement policy. The Portuguese PS had suggested creating such a network unit in the form of a working group. The Confederation quickly responded to the Portuguese PS suggestion by requesting its member parties to name two members to represent their party in the envisaged working group⁴⁶. The working group was constituted in September 1978⁴⁷. Besides the Portuguese PS and the PSOE, all EC socialist parties except for the British Labour Party sent delegates to the first working group meeting in Lisbon⁴⁸. The appointed delegates were the international secretaries or members of the international departments of the EC socialist parties and medium-ranking politicians with an expertise in EC policy. In the initial working phase, the working group showed a high frequency of interaction. It met four times in a period of a little bit more than half a year in Lisbon, Madrid, Brussels and Dublin. The objective of all of these meetings was to examine the economic and social problems of EC enlargement for both the EC member states and the applicant countries⁴⁹.

und Regierungschefs Europas am 18. und 19.1.1976 in Helsingoer [sic]/Dänemark, Bonn, 20 January 1976, AdsD, NEB, 1/EBAA001092.

45. Einigung auf gemeinsame Wahlplattform. Zusammenkunft der europäischen Sozialdemokraten im dänischen Helsingör [sic], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 January 1976.

46. Karel van Miert im Auftrag des Bunds der Sozialdemokratischen Parteien in der EG an die Mitgliedsparteien, Juli 1978, AdsD, SPD-PV, 11467; Bund der Sozialdemokratischen Parteien in der EG an die Mitgliedsparteien, Betr.: Arbeitsgruppe Erweiterung, 19 April 1978; AdsD, SPD-PV, 11467.

47. Bund der Sozialdemokratischen Parteien in der EG, Informationsdokument, Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe Erweiterung, 5 October 1979, AdsD, SPD-PV, 11467.

48. Besides the PSOE and the Portuguese PS, this included in detail the French PS, the SPD, the Belgium Socialist Party, the Danish Social Democrats' Party, the Dutch Labour Party, the Irish Labour Party, the Italian Socialist Party, and the Luxembourgish Socialist Workers' Party.

49. 19 and 20 September in Lisbon, 17 and 18 November in Madrid, 21 December 1978 in Brussels, 5 May 1979 in Dublin. Bund der Sozialdemokratischen Parteien in der EG, Informationsdokument, Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe Erweiterung, 5 October 1979, AdsD, SPD-PV, 11467.

3. FUNCTIONS AND STRATEGIES OF TRANSNATIONAL SOCIALIST NETWORKS

These partly overlapping transnational socialist networks had five main functions in the transition from dictatorship to parliamentary democracy in Portugal and Spain and in the run-up to the EC southern enlargement: monitoring the political developments in Portugal and Spain and the situation of the socialist parties in both countries and exchanging information and views; identifying suitable partners and integrating them into the socialist transnational party cooperation; providing various strategies of support for the Portuguese PS and the PSOE; convincing both Iberian socialist parties to develop a party profile similar to that of the EC based socialist parties; and coordinating the policies of the socialist parties.

The first main function of the socialist transnational networking lay in enabling the parties to explore and to monitor the political situation on the Iberian Peninsula. Through their transnational networks, the socialist parties broadly exchanged information on developments in Portugal and Spain. The principal task of the SI fact-finding missions was to talk to Portuguese and Spanish socialist politicians and thereby gain an overview of the political situation in both countries. Based on the results of the SI fact-finding missions, the SI bureau often produced larger reports that were circulated to the SI member parties⁵⁰.

Likewise, reports by González and Soares presented at SI party leaders' meetings provided the western European socialists with first-hand information on the political developments in both Iberian countries as well as on the Portuguese PS and PSOE's situation. Furthermore, first-hand information by Portuguese and Spanish leading socialists was given to the western European sister parties at meetings of the SI Portugal and Spain committees or of the SI bureau, whose network-like framework of transnational party cooperation enabled Portuguese and Spanish socialists to freely report on and discuss the role of their parties in the transitions. These concerned confidential issues such as their opinion on the communist parties' role in the transitions, financial and material support needed by both parties and their policies on EC accession⁵¹.

The second main function of the transnational socialist networks or bilateral relations was to identify suitable Portuguese and Spanish partners already during the dictatorships and the early stages of the transitions. Moreover, their transnational networking helped the socialist parties to integrate new partners into their transnational cooperation, also on the level of the EC. In the case of Spain,

50. L'Internationale de 1969 à 1971, Rapport du Secrétaire Général à la Conférence du Conseil général de l'Internationale Socialiste, à Helsinki du 25 au 27 mai 1971, SI Circulaire No. 18/71, 2 June 1971, CdAS, FSRI, 60 Ri (BP) 2, IS, Conférence du Conseil générale - Helsinki.

51. For example, Tito de Morais presented to the SI Portugal Committee a detailed list of types of aid urgently required by the Portuguese PS. Camera dei Deputati, To members of the Bureau. Assistance requested by Portuguese PS, 7 June 1974, CdAS, FSRI, 60 Ri (BP) 81, IS, Comité Portugal.

maintaining contacts to many different Spanish socialist politicians was of great use for the western European socialist parties for gaining insight into the programmatic and ideological orientation, the organisational strength, the number of members and the political prospects in a future democratic system of all existing Spanish socialist groups. In particular, the bilateral party contacts and the SI fact-finding missions served to identify suitable partners⁵². Given the PSOE's split in the early 1970s, transnational networking with the Spanish socialists became even more important for the western European socialist parties for deciding with which PSOE group institutionalised relations should be retained and expanded.

In the case of Portugal, the local PS was for some time the only suitable partner for transnational cooperation for the western European socialist parties. Only with the foundation of the Democratic People's Party (Partido Popular Democrático: PPD) in 1974, which later changed its name into Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata: PSD), did another Portuguese political force arise that felt connected to the European socialist tradition. The envisaged membership of the PPD/PSD in the SI did not materialise, however⁵³.

The third main function of the socialist transnational party networking consisted of various strategies of support for the Portuguese PS and the PSOE to help both parties to assume a central position in the transitions and to appear as a credible political force in European politics. In total, seven central strategies of support for the Iberian sister parties were provided via the transnational networks of the western European socialist parties.

The first strategy was what could be called comprehensive moral support. Generally, based on their democratic principles, the western European socialists considered themselves obliged to contribute to the success of the Iberian transitions to parliamentary democracy through the exertion of constant moral influence. Given the politically open situation in southern Europe in the mid-1970s, the western European socialist parties adopted the strong position that they should assist the Spanish and Portuguese socialists to stand up for a democratic systems. For example, when in the summer of 1975 the political crisis of the emerging Portuguese new democratic system was reflected in the Portuguese PS's withdrawal from the transitional government, the SI reacted with a public statement - which was clearly aimed at exerting moral influence - at its bureau meeting in Dublin in July 1975. The SI member parties here declared that: *'We reaffirm our solidarity with the Socialist Party of Portugal and our full support for the democratic revolution.*

52. Aufzeichnung Isenberg, Betr.: Besuch einer Delegation der SI in Spanien vom 14.-18. Januar 1976, 21 January 1976, AdsD, SPD-PV, 11610.

53. For a short overview on the history of the PPD/PSD in course of the Portuguese transition in the second half of the 1970s, see, e.g., KOHLER, Beate: *Politischer Umbruch in Südeuropa. Portugal, Griechenland, Spanien auf dem Weg zur Demokratie*. Bonn, Europa Union, 1981, pp. 83-89.

*Only through democratic socialism can Portugal avoid the three dangers of a right-wing coup, a Communist or military dictatorship.*⁵⁴

Secondly, via their transnational network connections the western European socialist parties channelled extensive financial and material resources to the Portuguese PS and the PSOE. In the first place, the SI secretariat attempted to coordinate the SI member parties' financial and material aid that was urgently needed by the two Iberian sister parties⁵⁵. For example, after the Portuguese PS had requested support from the SI bureau in summer 1975, the SI secretariat sent a detailed list of equipment and financial aid required by the Portuguese socialists to the western European SI member parties. In order to give financial support to the PSOE, the SI bureau decided in October 1975 to establish a SI Spanish Solidarity Fund, to which the SI member parties were asked to contribute. The amount of the Spanish Solidarity Fund remained low, however⁵⁶. The socialist parties also individually organised substantial material and financial aid for the Portuguese PS and the PSOE. In particular, the larger central and northern European socialist parties extensively transmitted various resources via informal channels to Portugal and Spain⁵⁷.

Fourthly, based on extensive material and financial aid, the transnational political network cooperation of the western European socialist parties enabled them to support the Portuguese PS and the PSOE to build up efficient party structures. Here, the SPD and the FES proved to be the most supportive. One of the FES principle tasks was to improve the organisational power of the Portuguese socialists. For example, the FES developed a model of a local association for providing an example for other emerging organisational units of the Portuguese PS⁵⁸.

The FES also supported the PSOE, improving its organisational structure in the regional and local party associations. In particular, the contacts and cooperation between the PSOE leadership and its regional and local associations were in several cases insufficient. Thus, the FES action plan for developing an efficient organisational PSOE party structure consisted in the establishment of 27 regional and local party associations and training for the party staff⁵⁹.

54. Bureau report to congress 1976, 21 May 1976, CdAS, FSRI, 60 Ri (WB) 2, SI.

55. In the case of financial and material aid for the Portuguese PS, see Balcomb to Campino, 14 June 1974, IISH, SIA, 779.

56. Aufzeichnung Isenberg, Betr.: Sitzung des Spanien Komitees der SI am 16.11.1975 in Amsterdam, 20 November 1975, AdsD, NBF, 1/BFAA001538.

57. Today, it is not possible to reconstruct how much money the western European socialist parties transmitted to the Spanish and Portuguese socialists. It is assumed that the SPD and FES have transmitted ten to fifteen million Deutsche Mark to the Portuguese PS only. See. e.g., PINTO-DUSCHINSKY, Michael: «Foreign Political Aid: The German Political Foundations and Their US Counterparts», *International Affairs*, 67 (1991), pp. 33-63, here p. 46.

58. Dingels to Wehrmeyer, Betr.: Deine Reise nach Portugal, 17 July 1974, AdsD, NBF, 1/BFAA001535.

59. Sachbericht Konecki über die vorbereitenden Maßnahmen zur Eröffnung der Vertretung der FES in Madrid, n.d., AdsD, NBF, 1/BFAA001540. On the extensive support by the FES for the PSOE during the transition, see also MUÑOZ SÁNCHEZ, Antonio: *El amigo alemán. El SPD y el PSOE de la dictadura a la democracia*. Barcelona, RBA Libros, 2012, pp. 217-277.

The fifth central strategy of support was to assist the Portuguese PS and the PSOE in running successful election campaigns. The western European socialist parties contributed to this mainly by sending delegations to political events that formed an important part of the Portuguese and Spanish socialists' election campaigns. For example, the bureau of the Confederation and the chairman of the Socialist Group, Fellermaier, advocated sending a delegation of the Confederation to Portugal to support the Portuguese PS in the run-up to the election of the constitutional assembly in April 1975⁶⁰. About a year later, the Portuguese PS was again at the centre of attention of a major international meeting of the western European socialist party leaders, on this occasion held in Oporto. Indeed, the meeting was an electoral manoeuvre initiated by Soares, who was facing a mounting threat from the PPD and the Social Democrat Centre (Partido do Centro Democrático Social), which were expected to win the elections for the legislative assembly in April 1976. Besides the CFSDSP members, Brandt, Mitterrand, Kreisky, Palme and den Uyl, other western European socialist party leaders included in the meeting were, for example, González and the socialist Norwegian Prime Minister Odvar Nordli⁶¹.

Kicking off its campaign for the first free parliamentary election in Spain in July 1977 after more than forty years, the PSOE organised a rally in cooperation with the Confederation and the Socialist Group in Madrid in April 1977. With this joint event, the PSOE aimed at demonstrating its special attachment to the EC socialist parties. Leading EC socialist politicians participated in the event. As part of it, a colloquium was organised that addressed the topic of Spain's future in the EC⁶².

Sixthly, through transnational networking, the western European socialist parties supported the Portuguese PS and the PSOE in establishing international contacts. This concerned in particular contacts in Europe and especially contacts to the European institutions. The network of the socialist international secretaries and secretary-generals was often used for forming such contacts. For example, the SI Portugal committee and SI secretariat assisted the ASP in developing contacts with the Council of Europe.

Moreover, the international secretaries supported the Portuguese PS and the PSOE leaders in making contacts with high-ranking members of the European Commission. For example, when in 1975 the situation in Portugal became more polarised with the threat of a right-wing or communist coup, Tom McNally, who in 1974 had resigned as international secretary of the British Labour Party and become an advisor in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, endeavoured to

60. Bericht über die Sitzung des Bundes der Sozialdemokratischen Parteien am 14.2.1975, n.d., AdSD, NEB, 419 A, 1/EBAA001092.

61. Top Europe Socialists meet in Portugal as tensions rise, *International Herald Tribune*, 15 March 1976.

62. Protokollnotiz über die Gemeinsame Sitzung des Fraktionsvorstandes der Sozialistischen Fraktion im EP, des Bundes der Sozialdemokratischen Parteien in der EG und der PSOE am 16.2.1977 in Brüssel, n.d., AdSD, NBF, 1/BFAA001541.

develop an informal contact between Soares and the British socialist Commissioner, George Thomson⁶³. In this way, Soares was able to extend his contacts to leading members of the European Commission.

The seventh strategy of support was to help the party leaders of the Portuguese PS and the PSOE to enhance their political prestige and to expand their political room for manoeuvre. In Spain, for example, the opposition was formally excluded from political participation during the transition until shortly before the election to the parliamentary assembly in mid-1977, when opposition parties were legalised⁶⁴. Against this background, Brandt's support for González reached its political climax when the SPD international secretary Dingels was instructed to organise a trip for González to West Germany, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries with the aim of making him more familiar with the political conceptions of the socialist parties in these western and northern European countries.

The intensive exchange between the Spanish and Portuguese socialists with the western European sister parties through the partly overlapping transnational networks or via bilateral contacts facilitated the programmatic reorientation of the Portuguese PS and the PSOE. This fourth main function consisted of regular informal interventions to convince the Portuguese PS and the PSOE to develop a western European social democratic party profile. This programmatic profile presented a reformist doctrinal position without Marxist determinism. Its *acquis communautaire* included such basic elements – exemplified by the SPD's Bad Godesberg Programme of 1959, for example – as freedom, justice, and solidarity in a parliamentary democratic system, the toleration of private property, strong welfare structures and as much free economic competition as possible with only as much planning as necessary⁶⁵. However, especially with the French PS, individual parties did adopt a more radical programmatic position – chiefly in the area of economic policy – by demanding strong economic planning⁶⁶. Furthermore, and of course with the exception of the French PS, the socialist parties' push for a western European social democratic party profile of the Iberian socialist parties was aimed at forcing back the communists' influence in Portugal and Spain.

Especially in relation with Portugal's successful transition to parliamentary democracy and the country's path to EC membership, the western European socialists attached great importance to strengthening the Portuguese PS's self-image as a strong independent socialist power with a social democratic party profile. In this way, the Portuguese socialists would be pushed to distance itself

63. McNally to Soares, 7 October 1975, Bodleian Library Oxford, James Callaghan Papers, 128.

64. See, e.g., KOHLER, Beate: *op. cit.*, p. 268.

65. See the original German version of the Godesberg Programme in: DOWE, Dieter and Klotzenbach, Kurt: *Programmatische Dokumente der Deutschen Sozialdemokratie*. Bonn, Dietz, 4th edition, 2004, pp. 324-345.

66. For an overview on the French PS's economic policy in the 1970s (also with a view to the French PS's demands for an economic policy on the EC level), see, e.g., GUÉROT, Ulrike: *Die PS und Europa. Eine Untersuchung der europapolitischen Programmatik der französischen Sozialisten 1971-1995*. Bochum, Universitätsverlag Brockmeyer, 1996, pp. 108-113.

programmatically from the Stalinist-minted PCP. At the same time, most western European socialists hoped that the Portuguese PS would give up plans to build an alliance with the PCP following the French PS model, which were high on the agenda in the beginning of the Portuguese transition. Thus, with the exception of the French PS, at bilateral and transnational meetings on various party levels the western European socialists gave advice to their Portuguese friends as to how their party could develop a distinct western European social democratic profile.

It was above all the SPD that led the way in this endeavour⁶⁷. In informal talks, Brandt and other high-ranking SPD representatives introduced leading Portuguese PS members to the programmatic history of the SPD in order to demonstrate a clear path from a Marxist party to a western European social democratic catch-all party⁶⁸. Furthermore, together with its western European socialist partners, the SPD tried to convince the Portuguese socialists that a western European social democratic party profile similar to that of the SPD Godesberg Programme would help to improve the internal stability of the party and would be the most promising strategic option for future elections.

In the case of the Spanish socialists, Pilar Ortuña Anaya has pointed out that the SPD concentrated its attention on the PSOE in order to strengthen the party against the threat of the rival PCE⁶⁹. It was precisely for that reason that the SPD and the FES supported the PSOE *histórico* over a longer period of time⁷⁰. Not surprisingly, the SPD and the FES detected that there were strong divergences between their own programmatic orientation and that of the PSOE *renovado*, given that the majority of the group around González ideologically regarded themselves as Marxists⁷¹. Moreover, the PSOE *renovado* was open to cooperating with the PCE. After Brandt had decided to support González, the SPD backed by most western European SI member parties used their intensive transfer of financial and moral resources in order to induce the PSOE to overcome further temptations for such cooperation. The intensive informal exchange of González via bilateral contacts and transnational networks with the three leading representatives of European social democracy at the time – Brandt, Palme and Kreisky – promoted his realignment towards the programmatic identity of the social democratic parties in central and northern Europe.

The fifth main function of the transnational socialist networks was to coordinate socialist policies on the relations of Spain and Portugal with the western European

67. See also ROTHER, Bernd: *Der verhinderte Übergang zum Sozialismus. Die Sozialistische Partei Portugals im Zentrum der Macht (1974-1978)*. Frankfurt a. M., Materialis, 1985, p. 96.

68. Vermerk Dingels für Brandt, Betr.: Empfehlungen für die Gespräche bei den Unterredungen mit Soares und dem Vorstand der Sozialistischen Partei Portugals, 18 October 1974, AdsD, SPD-PV, 11484.

69. ORTUÑA ANAYA, Pilar: *op. cit.*, p. 176.

70. Dingels to Dr. Dietrich Schilling, Bundeskanzleramt, 11 August 1972, AdsD, Willy Brandt Archiv (WBA), A8, 28.

71. Papier Koniecki über die PSOE vor der Sitzung der SI in Madrid vom 14.-16.10.1977, Madrid, 14 October 1977, AdsD, NBF, 1/BFAA001541.

countries and the EC. In 1975, for example the transnational socialist networks reacted quickly when Portugal's miserable economic situation threatened the consolidation of its emerging democratic system. The SI published a statement appealing to all member parties, and especially to socialist parties in government, to give financial assistance to the Portuguese government to help solve their grave economic crisis and, further, to contribute to development schemes and to try to improve the trade position of Portugal⁷². Coordinating lobbying for economic support for Portugal was also high on the agenda of the CFSDSP. Its practical activities encompassed influencing governments, parliaments and public opinion in relation to technical and economic aid and helping Portugal to improve its trade relations with the western European countries⁷³.

With the new democratic regimes in Spain and Portugal well on their way towards consolidation and both countries making formal applications for EC membership in late 1977, the European socialists continued to lobby the EC institutions for quick accession negotiations. The coordination of their lobby work was based on the common declaration of the EC socialist party leaders and heads of state and government adopted at their meeting in Brussels in June 1978. The declaration stated: '*We European Socialists welcome the reestablishment of democracy in [...] Spain and Portugal; we strongly support the accession of these countries to the Community.*'⁷⁴ The socialists in government in the EC member states took the lead in making the case for accession for Portugal and Spain at the Council of Ministers and the European Council. Similarly, the Socialist Group submitted various resolutions in the EP for contributing to the EC southern enlargement⁷⁵.

Finally, the working group on EC southern enlargement set up in the Confederation's framework functioned as a transnational network in an attempt to bring about a convergence of the partly differing positions of the socialist parties in relation to EC southern enlargement and the coordination of common policies. For example, the French PS's policy of striving to safeguard French agricultural products by demanding a total reform of the CAP and long transitions periods had created a negative impact on the socialist transnational cooperation in the context of EC southern enlargement⁷⁶. However, a joint report of all members of the working group was approved after four meetings. This report confirmed the rapprochement of the socialist parties on various aspects of EC southern

72. Socialist International Statement on Portugal, n.d., CdAS, FSRI, 450 Ri 4, Portugal, position des organisations socialistes internationales 1975.

73. Working Paper concerning the Portugal Committee, 27 August 1975, printed in: MATEUS, Rui: *Contos Proibidos: memórias de um PS desconhecido*. Lisbon, Dom Quixote, 1996, pp. 384-386.

74. Resolution adopted by the Working Party on Enlargement of the Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community, Madrid, 18 November 1978, AdsD, SPD-PV, 11467.

75. E.g., Sozialistische Fraktion, Europäisches Parlament, Pressemitteilung, Brussels, 12 September 1980, AdsD, SPD-PV, 11467.

76. Union des PS de la CEE. Groupe de travail «Élargissement». Compte-rendu de la réunion du 5/5/79 (Dublin) (Gérard Fuchs), n.d., CdAS, FSRI, 50 Ri, UPSCE, groupe de travail, «Élargissement de la CEE», 1979.

enlargement policy such as agricultural policy, social policy, industrial policy, regional policy, economic policy, and institutional aspects in the context of enlargement⁷⁷.

4. PROGRAMMATIC EUROPEANIZATION TO EASE ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS

For the western European socialists, the impact on two domains was of particular importance for contributing to the successful transitions from dictatorship to parliamentary democracy in Portugal and Spain. Firstly, their cooperation in and through their transnational networks was geared in the first instance towards stabilising the new emerging Portuguese and Spanish democratic party systems and, secondly, towards preparing the EC membership of both countries at an early stage of the transitions.

On the one hand, stabilising the party systems mainly involved pushing the Portuguese PS and the PSOE to develop in the direction of a strong catch-all party with a western European social democratic profile, and, on the other hand, forcing back the influence of the communists in the two countries. Both strategic objectives were mutually constitutive. A programmatic Europeanization, which was intended to overcome the classic Marxist tradition, would also to help both Iberian socialist parties not to succumb to the advances of the communists aimed at building political coalitions or a popular front. On the basis of a western European social democratic profile, the Portuguese PS's and PSOE's success in elections would automatically push the communists into the defence on the left side of both countries' party landscape. Moreover, given a Portuguese PS and PSOE election success, the central and northern European socialists anticipated that both parties would further adjust their ideological profile to the programmes of the EC socialist parties. However, they were concerned that in the case of the Portuguese PS and the PSOE faring badly in elections and only being as strong as the communists, tendencies for coalitions similar to the French PS model could prevail⁷⁸.

It was for this reason that mainly the central and northern European socialist parties transferred financial and material aid to the Portuguese PS and the PSOE to support them in establishing stable party organisations and running successful elections. Furthermore, based on the network-like informal cooperation, especially the SPD and the FES were able to decisively contribute to the structural

77. Bund der Sozialdemokratischen Parteien in der EG, Informationsdokument, Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe Erweiterung, 5 October 1979, AdsD, SPD-PV, 11467.

78. Vermerk Friedrich, Betr.: Informationsbesuch in Portugal vom 29. Juli bis 2. August 1974, n.d., AdsD, NBF, 1/BFAA001535.

development of the Portuguese PS and the PSOE party organisations. Hence, like the party structures of the SPD, the Portuguese PS was built up on a decentralised structure. This structure enabled the Portuguese PS to strengthen its anchoring on the local and regional level, which in turn contributed to the organisational consolidation of the party. Following the advice of the FES, the PSOE also developed a federal organisational structure similar to that of the SPD. As envisaged in the FES action plan, the PSOE worked to establish strong regional organisations. These were given a broad autonomy. Moreover, as the highest party institution, the PSOE national committee was based on a strong federal structure⁷⁹.

The political room to manoeuvre that the western European socialist provided to the Spanish and Portuguese socialists by including Portuguese PS and PSOE representatives in meetings of the SI or the Confederation and sending fact-finding mission and high-ranking party members to both countries, considerably facilitated the public relation work of the two Iberian parties⁸⁰. More importantly, although the PSOE was formally excluded from political decision-making in the early stages of the transition because of its illegal status, the then Spanish transitional government of Adolfo Suárez asked the PSOE to give its opinion on all kinds of domestic and foreign policy issues. This de facto recognition as a major political force was due to the PSOE's close relations to its western European sister parties through their transnational networks.

Based on support for garnering political leeway and financial and material aid for establishing good-working party organisations, informal interventions were aimed at convincing the Portuguese PS and PSOE to adjust their ideological and programmatic orientation to the ideological *acquis* of the SI member parties and, more importantly, to the EC-based socialist parties organised in the Confederation. For this purpose, the western European socialists entered into a close transnational cooperation with the party elites, in particular with González and Soares. As a result, in October 1977, González named the social democratic profile of the Scandinavian countries as the most suitable for the PSOE⁸¹. In May 1978, González announced that he would seek to have the party delete the term Marxist from its constitution⁸². Crucially, the involvement of González in the transnational networks of the western European socialist parties helped him to distinguish himself from the far left within the PSOE that opposed his programmatic course. Likewise, Soares also increasingly took a clear social democratic position. Moreover, his early and constant involvement in the transnational socialist networks socialised

79. See, e.g., KOHLER, Beate: *op. cit.*, p. 79f.

80. Aufzeichnung Isenberg, Betr.: Besuch einer Delegation der SI in Spanien vom 14.-18. Januar 1976, 21 January 1976, AdSD, SPD-PV, 11610.

81. Analyse Konecki über die PSOE vor der Sitzung der SI in Madrid vom 14.-16.10.1977, 14 October 1977, AdSD, NBF, 1/BFAA001541.

82. See, e.g., FEATHERSTONE, Kevin, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

Soares into the positive EC understanding of the core European socialists. Soares then pushed the Portuguese PS to develop a strong European and EC orientation⁸³.

This programmatic Europeanization helped the socialist parties at a later point to agree on common positions on EC southern enlargement and to ease formal accession negotiations in which high-ranking socialist politicians eventually played an important role.

The development towards a social democratic party profile enabled both Iberian socialist parties to adopt a clear and reliable political position in the period of transition and to build stable relations within the socialist transnational political networks. At a time when the Portuguese PS and the PSOE saw their central task as the consolidation of the new democratic systems in their countries, they sought to retain the transnational solidarity and support of the western European socialist parties rather than to alarm them⁸⁴. Nevertheless, despite the comprehensive support, for both parties it was pivotal not to be accused by competing domestic forces of being influenced in their political decision-making by the western European socialist parties⁸⁵. The informal discrete cooperation in and through the transnational networks allowed the public perception of the Portuguese PS and the PSOE as national independent parties to be preserved.

Moreover, the western European socialists decisively helped the PSOE and the Portuguese PS to take political responsibility in the EC accession negotiations. However, this was based on the programmatic development of both Iberian socialist parties towards the EC socialist parties' ideological profile. The common position on EC southern enlargement not only immensely simplified the Portuguese PS and the PSOE's cooperation with the EC socialist parties, but also allowed them to form together an important and powerful actor in the EC accession negotiations. In fact, the transnational cooperation in and through the transnational socialist networks enabled the Portuguese PS and PSOE to contribute directly to the preparation of the accession negotiations. Furthermore, based on contacts to the EC institutions, which were widely developed through the transnational socialist networks, the Portuguese PS and PSOE had a say in the drafting of EC southern enlargement policy. Against this background, through the support of the transnational socialist networks, both the Portuguese PS and the PSOE contributed significantly to their countries' accession to the EC in 1986.

Finally, as this article shows, linking the historical method of multi-archival research to the concept of Europeanization helps to capture more precisely the

83. See, e.g., FEATHERSTONE, Kevin: «Socialist parties in southern Europe and the enlarged European Community», in GALLAGHER, Tom and WILLIAMS, Allan M. (eds): *Southern European socialism. Parties, elections and the challenges of government*. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1987, pp. 247-270, here p. 254.

84. For the PSOE see, GILLESPIE, Richard: *The Spanish Socialist Party. A History of Factionalism*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 372.

85. Papier Koniecki über die PSOE vor der Sitzung der SI in Madrid vom 14.-16.10.1977, Madrid, 14 October 1977, AdSD, NBF, 1/BFAA001541.

development of socialist party cooperation on the European level in the form of transnational networks and programmatic positions and objectives. Based on such an approach, future historical research on political parties in European integration could investigate, for example, the role of transnational socialist networks in the eastern European countries transitions to democracy and these countries' accessions to the EU. Political scientists like Dorota Dakowska have already begun to research the role of western European parties and their affiliated foundation in influencing the formation and evolution of new political parties in the eastern European countries before EU accession.⁸⁶ However, precisely how the western European socialist parties - and other party families - used functions of transnational networks for Europeanizing the eastern European political parties' programmatic positions and objectives and thus for contributing to the eastern enlargement remains a research topic of the EU's development to be studied.

86. DAKOWSKA, Dorota: «Networking of Political Foundations. The Catalytic Effects of Transition and the European Union's Eastern Enlargement, in: GEHLER, Michael, KAISER, Wolfram and LEUCHT, Brigitte (eds), *Netzwerke im europäischen Mehrebenensystem. Von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Networks in European Multi-Level Governance. From 1945 to the Present*. Vienna, Böhlau Verlag, 2009, pp. 185-200.

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