IN SEARCH FOR THE EUROPEAN ABODE:

HEIDEGGER AND THE HUMAN BEING AS ΔΕΙΝΟΝ

A LA BÚSQUEDA DEL HOGAR EN EUROPÁ:

HEIDEGGER Y EL SER HUMANO COMO ΔΕΙΝΟΝ

Georgios Karakasis
Doctor en Filosofía (EHU/UPV)
Geokarakasis7@yahoo.com

Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyse from an ontological point of view the challenges, economic and existential, that Europe has been facing the last years as a result of the economic crisis and the incoming human waves of the refugees as a result of the conflicts in the Arab world. Namely, founding our argumentation on the interpretation of the human being as δεινόν, uncanny, made by Martin Heidegger we would like to show that the ontological core of the turbulent situation we are currently living in can be found in the concept of homelessness as the lack of our abode in Europe. Finally, presenting the political and ideologically intense matrix of the modern European political scene we aim at highlighting the importance of redefining what homelessness and co-belonging mean to us, Europeans and Europe as a whole.

Keywords: δεινόν, Europe, abode, Heidegger.

Resumen: El presente artículo tiene por objetivo analizar desde un punto de vista ontológico los retos económicos y existenciales que Europa afronta durante los últimos años, a consecuencia de la crisis económica y de la masiva oleada de refugiados derivada de los conflictos en el mundo Árabe. Cimentando nuestra argumentación en la interpretación de Martin Heidegger del ser humano como δεινόν, asombroso, tratamos de demostrar que el núcleo ontológico de la situación turbulenta que actualmente vivimos puede hallarse en el evento de la ausencia de hogar, en tanto que carencia de una morada propia en Europa. Por último, presentamos la política e ideológicamente convulsa matriz del esquema político europeo moderno, a fin de subrayar la relevancia de redefinir, por una parte, el significado de familiaridad y coexistencia para nosotros, los europeos, y, por otra, Europa en tanto que totalidad.

Palabras clave: δεινόν, Europa, hogar, Heidegger.
INTRODUCTION

Western society, mainly in Europe, has been recently passing through one of the most critical periods after the WW2: the baneful effects of the Arab Spring at a large scale, the economic crisis per se, the influx of the human waves of uprooted refugees into European Union’s member States’ territories searching for an abode, the emergence and impending fall of the ISIS accompanied by continuous terrorist attacks committed by zealots in the most brutal way against innocent people in great cities of Europe, the impotence of strong European powers to effectively protect their citizens’ life from the afore mentioned cruel acts, the civil war in Ukraine, the protean (in)flexibility of Turkey’s foreign policy in its relationships with the USA, Russia, Syria, Israel, Iran and the European Union vis a vis the latter’s expectations from Turkey on the refugees’ issue, the exit of the Great Britain from the European Union are some of the critical issues Europe has to be confronted with and which constitute, among others, one of the most one of the most important challenges up to date; a challenge that may reshape the way we think not only of European Union but of what Europe means in the modern globalized world.

The goal of this paper is to present an ontological analysis of a subject that we consider crucial for the philosophical understanding of this current crisis, namely the issue of “homelessness”; homelessness is to be approached as the constant struggle of the human being to find his abode in the modern globalized world where the only constant factor seems to be the constant change. In this maelstrom of political, economic and national(istic) changes the human being has to redefine his place in the world, his role in it and his way of feeling homely in it. The proper understanding of what feeling (un)homely today is, could possibly become a firm philosophical and ontological ground upon which a new concept of belonging and co-belonging would once again flourish, or at least fight its way to the surface of the modern political and economic reality.

Our work is going to be principally based on the thought of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger- especially in his interpretation of the human being as the “uncanny (δεινόν)” , the famous definition made by Sophocles in his play Antigone, in the renowned “Ode to Man”; an interpretation that has been at length developed in his Introduction to Metaphysics and his analysis of the poem of

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Friedrich Hölderlin, *The Ister*. Martin Heidegger, in his profound work on the human being as δεινόν has given us the ontologically required concepts to perceive the human being as a being in ceaseless activity of home-searching and home-making. An activity which is both ontological and ontic since it is tied to the violent struggle of the human being against the way the world is presented to him in a twofold way: as a meaning and as an ontic reality. Heidegger, in his analysis of the “Ode to Man” makes us really wonder whether our natural state of being is a being at the abode or in the constant struggle to find it, chaining us this way, to incessantly act and react desperately searching for something which is far less than sure, if graspable at all, namely the abode. We are insisting on the importance of this very particular approach towards the human being since it springs from the core of its implication which is no other than the negative in its essence center of the human being as such; negative due to the fact that what characterizes us as human being(s) is not a sum of qualities and traits, but, as Heidegger thoughtfully puts it forward, our lack of the abode, our lack of the place we would be able to call home. This lack, far from being a mere absence or a simple gap in our mood, constitutes a deep and radical way of being in and against the world. The human activity, seen in this perspective, is becoming a struggle, a struggle to fill what was a priori given as a lack; a lack, nevertheless, from which our own most necessity of fulfilment comes forth as a personal demand for action and thought.

Thus, in the first part of our work we will focus on the interpretation made of the human being as δεινόν by Martin Heidegger. More specifically, we will try to show the importance that bears for us the feeling of the lack of our abode, the feeling of uncanniness. This feeling, this sense of lack that runs through our whole existence, is the call of action; a call that once heard and grasped cannot be unheard nor left behind in oblivion. It’s the call for our innermost necessity of belonging to a world which is already given to us as a complete whole waiting for our proper integration in it. Nevertheless, human being as δεινόν, far from accepting the world and the political/social status quo he finds himself in as unchangeable and definitive, he struggles to change them and make them bend to his own will and to his own necessity of seeing the world in a way that would be considered homely. This is the struggle for the abode, a struggle that once started is becoming the way of existing in this world.
In the second part we will see the importance of the daring decision, of the τολμάν, of the human being to change everything in his path so as to pave the way for the coming of the homely; a daring that risks everything that seems familiar or even homely-like in his search for what would be the originally and unalterably homely for him. Τολμάν is the decision/sacrifice that the quest for the abode asks for as the necessary condition for the beginning of the seeking; of a seeking that may possibly lead to the total alienation of the human being from his own world.

Finally, in the last part, we will present some of the current turbulent situations-political, economic and ethnic, among others, that modern European society is currently facing, aiming at proving the necessity of redefining the cruciality of the homeliness and homelessness, and at scrutinizing how our philosophical stance towards the latter could eventually influence the future of (co)belonging to Europe.

THE HUMAN BEING AS THE UNCANNY: HEIDEGGER’S INTERPRETATION OF ΔΕΙΝΟΝ

German philosopher’s interpretation/translation of the human being as uncanny comes from the famous “Ode to Man” of the play Antigone. In this Ode, where the historically progressive development/struggle of human being is illustriously described, we find the characterization of human being as πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κοῦδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει. (332)

In accordance with the translation made by Heidegger: “manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing/Uncannier than man bestirs itself, rising up beyond him” (Heidegger, 2014a: 163).

Heidegger analyses the human being and his activity as δεινόν both in the Introduction to Metaphysics and The Ister. In his work The Ister Heidegger comments how δεινόν is to be interpreted/understood:

To summarize, we can more or less delimit the range of meaning of the δεινόν as follows. It means three things: the fearful. the powerful, the inhabitual. Each time it can be determined in opposing ways: the fearful as that which frightens. and as that which is worthy of honor; the powerful as that which looms over us, and as that which is merely violent; the inhabitual as the extraordinary, and as that which is skilled in everything. (Heidegger, 1996: 77-79)
Making an analysis of the different interpretations that Heidegger attributes to the human being as δεινόν we could say that according to the German philosopher the characteristic of being δεινόν entails the following:

1) Δεινόν as fearful.
   a) Fearful as something provoking fear like our everyday fears, the habitual fear.
   b) Fearful as something provoking awe (δέος) and as something that calls for reverence.
2) Δεινόν as powerful.
   a) Powerful as something that looms over us, close to us and at the same time threatening, making it thus worthy of honor.
   b) Powerful as actively violent, frightful.
3) Δεινόν as inhabitual.
   a) Inhabitual as beyond the habitual, as someone skilled in everything.
   b) Inhabitual as extraordinary, as unhomely.

We see, thus, that three are the main traits that distinguish the human being: powerful, fearful and inhabitual/uncanny. The ongoing synthesis of those three is what makes of human being the bearer of the ontological destiny of δεινόν since he finds himself trapped and a priori set in a situation/schema where he can only fight from the first moment of becoming conscious of his own uncanniness. So, struggle is not only an activity, like if the human being were able to choose when he struggles or not; struggle is his way of being and existing in a world where he has been thrown without having a say in it. The world is accessible to us; a battlefield where each step we make is an effort to reattribute the meaning to it so as to become able to perceive and grasp the newly attributed meaning as a familiar concept, an ontological abode for our thought and action. Gregory Fried summarizes in an insightful way this human being’s state of being when saying:

On the one hand, for Heidegger, the deinon (conventionally translated as the terrible, the awesome, the wondrous or strange) is the "overwhelming sway" (das überwältigende Walten) of Being itself that throws Dasein into its Being-in-the-world within a horizon of history and place that Dasein cannot choose. On the other hand, human
Dasein is itself deinon, both because Dasein is exposed to this overwhelming sway of Being and because Dasein wields violence (gewalt-tätig ist) in confronting the horizons of sense and meaning given by Being, challenging Being with new interpretations. The deinon seems to describe an aspect of the Kehre between Being and Dasein: the terrible violence with which Being and Dasein confront each other in the polemos (Fried, 2000: 143).

From the above mentioned we can understand that as human being(s) we only are as struggle(rs) since our struggle is the effort of giving meaning to a world which is also trying to impose on us its own variety of meanings and sense. The possibility of making the pure potentiality of meaning attributing the actuality of the meaning giving/imposing struggle on the world and on the Being is what makes of human being δεινόν. This struggle of ours, this necessity to change the meaning of the world so as to make it fit into our own meaningful schema is what makes human being so great, so fearful and so desperate to find his abode in the world. The confrontation of the Dasein with Being is the confrontation of the human being against the whole world so as to reshape it and change it with the aim of managing to make it its abode. Thus, from the first moment we do realize that this world is a not-yet abode, we understand that what motivates us into acting is nothing more than a sense of lack. Our possibility of filling and fulfilling does only rise from our realizing the cruciality of the element of lack in our thought and in our way of being. Hence, not being at home, being uncanny, is not a mere attribute, which grouped with all the other ones constitute(s) the sum of what could cumulatively be called human being; what is really wondrous with the human being is his possibility of actualizing what is only potentially thought. We are a priori given a limited amount of possibilities for acting in the world, but we are also a priori given the gift of the pure potentiality of manifesting our non-conformity with act-provoking thoughts. Potentiality and actuality find the peak of their brilliance in the human being as δεινόν.

The importance of this lack and of the feeling of lack in general is also very important for our proper understanding the cruciality of the human being’s home-seeking struggle as well as the great risks it entails. The fact that we are opposing ourselves to the overwhelming sway of Being when striving to attribute meaning to the world does not take for granted that we do understand that the call of feeling unhomely comes from the Being itself. The feeling of lack may- and does-make us act as if the existential struggle of finding our abode rested solely upon
the acquisition of new things/tools and their (over)exploitation. The materialistic aspect of the modern society is greatly contributing to our misunderstanding what the unhomely actually signifies for us and how we can struggle to overcome it. This dangerous and misleading aspect of our abode finding struggle is highlighted and stressed by Heidegger as well, who is making an interesting and important connection with both the verb πέλειν and the reason this verb has been preferred in the definition of the human being in the Ode to Man:

The ode thus gives expression to a human relation to Being that is rooted in the interpretation of Being captured for Heidegger in the word πέλειν, a pre-Socratic word for “to be” that Heidegger relates to the neighbour (pelas), whose dwelling near is marked by a constant coming and going, and to the sea (pelagos), that “does not flow away, but remains and rest in its waves”; πέλειν indicates “the concealed presence of stillness and rest in the unconcealed constant presencing and absencing, and that means, in the appearing of change.....[It] does not mean the empty presence of what merely exists, but remaining, which is precisely what I is in journeying and flowing” (GA 53, 88). Being has its defining and orienting force precisely in what is present only as absence and concealment. The human ways of being unsettling, then, will be determined according to the relation of this absence, according to whether one mistakes it for mere negativity and thus forgets Being and loses the historical situatedness and orientation that it grants or whether one maintains a relation to this absence and takes it up as essentially defining (Pearsom Geiman, 2001: 175).

The concealment of course of Being is not a mere “tactical” move as if the Being were treated like a subject avoiding to be fully grasped by the man as its object. The concealing is a safeguarding, a protection of the clearing which would give the space for the unconcealment of the beings. The lack that the human being is feeling when not reaching his abode is not an ontic gap that could be filled with the calculatively produced things of the ceaseless technological advancement. Trying to find the abode in the excess of calculation, production and value assignment/production can only lead to an essential failure, a failure of the essence because it is through this relation that our co-belonging with the Being becomes one of a distorted form, since Being will hide itself, not as a safeguarding concealment but as the essence of the eventual dominance of the technological world in a human society. A dominance which is not marked by the power of the machines over the human beings but by the retreat of the human being to the technological way of being in this “fallen from Grace” co-(not) belonging with Being. In his lecture The Principle of Identity Heidegger says with respect to that:
Is it that Being itself is faced with the challenge of letting beings appear within the horizon of what is calculable? Indeed. And not only this. To the same degree that Being is challenged, man, too, is challenged, that is, forced to secure all being that are his concern as the substance for his planning and calculating; and to carry this manipulation on past all bounds (Heidegger, 2002: 35)

What can be deduced from everything said so far is that Being, through the feeling of the human being’s homelessness, is actually calling to action the Dasein so that may both start seeking his abode but also, and most importantly, try to reach the inner depth of this feeling of lack, understanding eventually his own co-belonging with the Being. Our struggle, thus, to find our abode is not a fight against the Being nor is it a mere gap-filling ontic and ontological activity. It is the act of opening space for the clearing of the un concealing of the beings in Being, while Being, as Φύσις, protectively hides itself in the same act of un concealing the beings. The way how Being, as Φύσις, marvelously manages to hide itself in the act of un concealing is beautifully depicted in the following passage of Dahlstrom:

There are at least two (complementary) ways we might interpret this interpretation of Φύσις as fire:

(1) insofar as a fire, e.g., a campfire, provides light to see one another in the midst of the darkness, we may ignore the fire in order to attend to the presences and absences it makes possible;

(2) insofar as, gazing at a fire, we see the coals and embers glowing and darkening in a regular rhythm, taking on different shapes before disappearing into the flames, we see not the fire itself but something on fire; in this sense, the fire may be said to conceal itself in the process (Dahlstrom, 2011: 145).

Summarizing, human being as δεινόν is destined to struggle in this world so as to make attainable the finding of his own abode. Even though he is firstly urged by his feeling of lack to act in this way, in the process we see that this lack, this negative aspect of homelessness is nothing less than the violent calling of the overwhelming of Being against δεινόν. So, the latter, responds to that calling of Being through his own casting into doubt the way he perceives the world and the meaning he has been attributing to it till the moment of the dire response to Being. All the above is set into march by δεινόν’s magnificent and
frightening capacity of believing that he can transform his will into actuality even against the established order of the world/society he lives in. What is given to him a priori as a seeming obligation to accept and follow, a posteriori, becomes the fuel for his self-imposed necessity of feeling unhomely and then seeking his abode. This necessity, though, is not to be apprehended as a unilateral action/feeling on the part of the human being as subject; since the human being can only be through his relation to the Being, his necessity of responding is the unique possibility of the human being to be in an essential attunement to the Being.

ΔΕΙΝΟΝ AND TOAMAN: DARING TO SEEK FOR THE ABODE

Once δεινόν becomes conscious of the fact that his abode is nowhere yet to be found in his world, the violent act of opening paths starts taking place. Human being, having become fully aware of his been “thrown” in this world, decides to unleash his activity intending to find ways that could eventually lead him to what would consider the most familial place, his home. The “thrownness” of the human being is depicted in the following passage:

Our being-in-the-world is a "thrownness," a Geworfenheit. There is nothing mystical or metaphysical about this proposition. It is a primordial banality which metaphysical speculation has long overlooked. The world into which we are thrown, without personal choice, with no previous knowledge (pace Plato), was there before us and will be there after us (Steiner, 1991: 87).

This is the schema into which the human being has to strive; the a priori given reality, the deepest feeling of the lack of the abode along with the innermost necessity of changing the world and the place of itself in it. What is quintessential for our understanding of the controversial essence of the human being is that δεινόν’s struggle to find his abode is not a simple call of appropriation on the part of the Being; it also expresses the undeniable fact that there is an abode to be sought for after all. The human being starts struggling to find his home because he considers that there is an absolute necessity, that of the existence of the latter. Feeling (un)homely is not a contingent element but, on the contrary, the direst affirmation of the human’s being violent rupture of what he feels as
home even though he may have never come to know it or live in it. Human being’s path -seeking and paving in the world is to be considered, thus, as an unconcealing activity, as the ceaseless effort to bring into light and keep steadfast there what he considers to be belonging to his most personal possibility of reaching his ownness in the world.

The journey, hence, of the human being as δεινόν in the world springs from his realizing the necessity of changing the given world and its meaning. He is urged by his need to find the homely; everything that stands in his way is to be brought down or used as means for the accomplishment of the higher goal. The given world becomes the actualization of the creative potentiality of the human being, with all the risks that this may entail. The world is not a playground but a battlefield, a matrix of already established meaning and sense and this whole is given to the human being as an example to follow and develop. But there are cases when human being as δεινόν challenges the way the world has been given to him and takes up the role of the creator; a creator who might have to smash what is already given so as to prepare the ground for the seed of his forthcoming homeliness.

The challenge that δεινόν has committed himself to is a one-way decision; no turning back could it ever be possible. This does not reside on the simple fear of the consequences that the challenging of the given world could probably provoke; the impossibility is deeply ground on the decision of the human being to step back from the calling of the Being towards it, a call expressed and formed in the feeling of homelessness. Remaining deaf to the call, once the latter has been heard of and conceived as Being’s call, is impossible since it expresses the innermost necessity of the human being to be the receiver of the call since what made the call’s grasping possible was the necessity of the human being as δεινόν to hear it, to understand it and finally to answer to it. A stepping back from this call would not mean a stepping back just from our idea of Being, be it what it is, but a retreat from our need of feeling whole, complete and most importantly our own in the world. The call to find the abode was made feasible by our necessity to hear it; this necessity which expresses the need of the human being to feel rooted in this world and to find meaning in his being rooted cannot be avoided nor forgotten because what is at stake, in this case, is the self-fulfilment of the human being and the unconcealing of his abode in the world.
The decision of the δεινόν to rise against the given world and fight its way till he manages to find his abode is included in its entirety in the ancient Greek word τολμάν. This word appears in the Ode to Man in a really important passage:

ψύπολις ἁπολις ὀτῷ τῷ μὴ καλὸν 370
ξύνεστι τὸλμας χάριν. μὴ ὑμ η χαρές παρέστιος
gένοιτο μήτ’ ἵσον φρονων οὕς τάδ’ ἔρδει.

Rising high over the site, losing the site
Is he for whom what is not, is, always,
For the sake of daring.
Let him not become a companion at my hearth,
nor let my knowing share the delusions
of the one who works such deeds.

(Heidegger, 2014a: 165)

The way Heidegger perceives τολμάν, this daring of the human being, can be well understood in the following interpretation made by Gregory Fried:

Lines 370-371 read in full: “hupsipolis apolis hotoo to mee” kalon / xunesti tolmas kharin.” A conventional translation might read: “Hupsipolis apolis is that man who, out of audacity, consorts with evil.” But for Heidegger, tolma (which he translates as Wagnis—audacity, daring, venturing, risk-taking) defines the uncanniness, the homelessness, of the apolis figure who exposes himself to the overwhelming violence of the powers of Being. In tolma, the apolis one ventures into the ontological uncertainty beyond everyday Being-in-the-world, bursting, hupsipolis, out of the encircling boundaries of sense and meaning. The condemnation of the chorus (“μη’ εμοι παρέστιος/ γένοιτο μη’ ἵσον φρονων οὑς τάδ’ ἔρδει”) only confirms the homeless one’s creative overstepping of the limits of conventional morality in the polis, his bold, de-constructive rupturing of the world’s jointure. “The violent one, the creative one who sets forth into the unsaid, who breaks into the unthought, who compels what has never happened and makes appear what is unseen—this violent one stands at all times in daring (tolma, Antigone 371)” (EM, 123), (Fried, 2000: 144-145).

From the above passages it becomes clear how ἁπολις is to be understood; ἁπολις in the sense of a person who has no site, because the feeling of his homelessness has driven him to the rejection of the acceptance of the meaning of the given world, and who embarks upon un concealing what he believes that his
abode would be. This is the ultimate daring that only the human being is capable of. The constructive deconstruction of δεινόν is the highest expression of his being in the world; a being which is a constant struggle. Δεινόν is always struggling since the struggle is his way of redefining the sense and the meaning of the ontological, political and social matrix he has found himself thrown into. The struggle is the only way human being can answer to the calling of the Being; only through the struggle can the unconcealment take place having, though, no guarantee that this would surely happen. The τολμάν of the human being is daring exactly because it guarantees nothing but one thing: that the necessity of finding his abode is the necessity of δεινόν to be what he believes about his being capable of creating his own destiny, even in front of the greatest peril of losing himself in this seeking.

So far, we have dealt with, at first, the essence of the human being as δεινόν, as the uncanny who is searching for the abode in the world. Then we have stressed the importance of the negativity of this lack; a negativity that is not a simple gap in his life bound to be filled in with material production but as a calling for action on the part of the overwhelming sway of Being. This lack is nothing more than a call for actualizing the potentiality of the human being as δεινόν, as the seeker and founder/finder of the abode in this world. Finally, we saw how human being during this search is living in struggle; a struggle that is not a mere elective unleashing of his violent activity but a constant state of being, his own way of being in this world after having received the call of his appropriation by the Being.

EUROPE IN DISTRESS: FEELING UNHOMELY IN OUR HOME

The question that would rise here is if and how all the above could affect modern Western society; more precisely how Heidegger’s thought could lend a help to us in finding out the roots of the crisis we are going through as briefly described in the first pages. In our opinion, the philosophical approach of Heidegger—especially in the parts that have been presented so far—is of great weight taking into account that each of us living in the European Union needs—not so much as a kind of a personal moral guide—to live separately or in common with the others during the crisis, to firmly believe that Europe now, more than
ever, is in the dire need of (re)defining what abode means for the sake of its people and for Europe as a whole.

The economic crisis has generated a sense of turmoil in the continent. The emphasis has been laid on the imposition of austerity economic programs with the purpose of taming the situation. The problem is that the cost to be paid as a result of the obligation to obey to the letter the strict measures—when applying them—is probably more severe than what the crisis by itself could ever engender. Countries hit hard by the crisis, such as Greece and Italy, have witnessed the birth of radical/populist parties that are changing the normality of the political scene as we have known it so far. In Greece, Golden Dawn—a political party whose ideology ranges from its clear neo-nazi sources to a more modern mainstream nationalist ideology—entered the Greek parliament, after the last elections, (September 2015) as the third political power despite accusations against many of its leading members for the killing of a leftist rapper (September 2013). This case, brought up on trial, is still pending. In addition to the rising of the extreme form of nationalism, the pressure by the European Union on Greece to respect the engagements of the strict program, led to a referendum proclaimed by the former leftist coalition—and now government of SYRIZA—in June 2015; even though the result of this referendum was a denial to accept the harsh provisions of the Troika2 demands, Prime Minister, Alexis Tspiras, in order to avoid the potential danger of a social revolt and the bleak impact of an eventual closure of the banks, went back on the pre-electoral promises of his party and accepted the rough terms of the third memorandum in toto. Although the figures of economy seem to be improved, at least from a logistics point of view, the cost of the everyday life’s deterioration and the Greek society’s mistrust of the European Union, the Greek political parties, the institution of the Parliament and the mass media, has been rising vertically. In Italy, the Eurosceptic political party/movement Five Stars of Beppe Grillo, comedian and political activist, has become the absolute expression of the distrust of the Italian society’s discontent of the traditional political parties. In France, Marie Lepen has managed to remain a major figure in the right wing political spectrum of Europe and one of the leaders of the anti-

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1 The head of Golden Dawn has assumed only the political responsibility of the murder.
2 Troika is the unofficial name for the decision group constituted by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF.
European Union coalition of political parties and movements. The United Kingdom has decided by means of a referendum, conducted in June 2016, that it should part ways with the European Union, greatly thanks to a strong campaign orchestrated by the former leader of the Eurosceptic UKIP, Nigel Farange. Finally, in Germany, the only country in the European Union that has probably profited, instead of losing, from this crisis—according to figures that came out in July 2017 it seems that it has gained 1.3 billion from the loans given to Greece in the last decade—has taken place one of the most radical changes in the political matrix of the country; it is the first time after the WW2 that an extreme-right wing party, AfD, not only has entered the parliament but what is more, has succeeded in becoming the third political force. Its main agenda was based on the incoming waves of refugees and the potential threat of their presence to the national identity’s safeguard. It is interesting to note that, in the case of Germany, the role of economy cannot be invoked anymore as a sufficient alibi for those who blinded by the logistics are not treating serious political issues concerning the present and the future of European nations as Europe’s destiny deserves.

Apart from the economic crisis, in the past years we have witnessed a growing aggressive military activity around the European territory. Russia has integrated Crimea whereas a civil war in Ukraine has led to the formation of a tense ideological political spectrum with the rise of the power of extreme nationalist elements such as the political parties of the Right Sector and Svoboda. As regards the extreme right ideological Azov Battalion it became a regiment of the Ukrainian National Guard. Turkey has experienced a failed military coup against Erdogan (July 2016) which resulted to a political and religious “hunt of witches” ending up to the imprisonment of thousands of political activists, military personnel and journalists among others. Due to these internal developments the relationship of Turkey with the European Union has been worsening jeopardizing, thus, positive perspectives concerning the critical refugees’ issue settlement. The Syrian territory has become, in the last years, the core of the battles in the Middle

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East, since Russian, Western, USA, Islamist, extreme Islamist and neo-fascist forces have been participating in this struggle, one way or the other.

Finally, territories of European states have been the most preferred target of uproarious terrorist attacks in the last years. Berlin, Barcelona, Brussels, Paris, London are only some of the cities that have suffered human losses during these cruel attacks whose motives seem to be more and more difficult to analyse or limit their appeal to the radical elements of both the Muslim and European societies.

The above mentioned are putting forward the importance of the quest for what the European abode is or should be, but they are also highlighting the need of linking this quest for the abode with the search of our own European identity in a modern globalized world. The issue of the identity, at least in our opinion, should be seen as the search for the European origin and what this latter does mean. Of course, in this paper there is no space to properly examine it. We believe, however, that by setting forth the issue of the traces connecting the origin, the identity and the search for the abode, we are addressing a matter that should be further analysed due to its special gravity for fathoming what our belonging to Europe means. Hence, one way the origin should be approached—as presented by Heidegger in his analysis of Friedrich Hölderlin’s poem Rhine—is the following:

What the poet hears, and the way in which he hears in this hearing, first unfolds itself as beyng and brings itself to word in such standing firm, to the word that henceforth stands within the people. This word shelters within it the truth concerning the origin. Yet just as the origin that has merely sprung forth is not the origin, neither is the merely fettered origin. Rather, the entire essence of the origin is the fettered origin in its springing forth. Yet the springing forth itself first comes to be what it is as the river runs its entire course; it is not limited to the beginning of its course. The entire course of the river itself belongs to the origin. The origin is fully apprehended only as the fettered origin in its springing forth as having sprung forth (Heidegger, 2014b: 184).

Nevertheless, the springing forth of the origin needs a locale, a place from which everything could eventually originate. This locale, is no other than the abode, ontically seen, in our case, as the European soil, and ontologically as everything that Europe means to us: the course of the currents of philosophy,
Europeans’ political and religious thought as actualized in the bloody struggles and the skirmishes among the European nations themselves along with the up-rising of uncanny political ideologies founded on the extreme manifestations of this uncanniness are some of the important elements that have been shaping our identity as Europeans for centuries. Consequently, we do firmly believe that the idea of our identity, of our origin is closely tied to our abode in Europe, an abode which is seen both as the ground of our history getting materialized and of our ideas becoming realized and actualized. This whole process of getting back to our origin is the same act of unconcealing what Europe was, what it has come to be and what it/we may become. Thus, the quest for the abode is tightly linked to the search of our European identity, to our seeking who we are by tracing back the path to the origin. The existential and ontological act of unconcealing our abode goes hand to hand with the act of uncovering. our own origin in the modern globalized world.

However, the European Union in its effort to unconceal its abode in the world has lost its way in the maze-like institutions and their economic figures. Trying to find out its abode solely in the strict respect of scrupulously scheduled economic programs and institutions, more and more people are not feeling at home in the European Union. That’s why, for them, the economic crisis is being felt as an existential one. Whilst, after the WW2 the abode was correctly sought for in the peaceful co-existence, today we seem to be lacking this ideological and existential core that could unite us in our European co-belonging. The emphasis, especially during the crisis, has been laid on the institutions and their machine-like functioning. Nevertheless, institutions, abstract as they are, are never in need of an abode. The people whom they are supposed to be representing, however, not only are they necessitous of knowing what homely is, but they would not be hesitant to reach the extremes, in their strong will, just to take even a distorted glimpse of it. Europe’s struggle against the crisis has failed because instead of unconcealing an abode for its people, it has unconcealed its own darker sides as this can be seen in the rising of the extreme forces. What should be done next is to avoid repeating the same mistakes, namely treating these counter-effects as an alien feature to what Europe really is. This rise of extremism is an obscure but in the European continent’s historical course deeply rooted phenomenon and as such it must be treated. The extremist incarnates the capacity of
the human being to reach the extremes in his strenuous endeavour to find out where the abode is. Instead of resorting to moralizing criticisms or casting all the blame on the voters and supporters of those political parties/movements we should prove to them–lost in their own futile seeking of the abode–that the need for an abode in the European soil does exist and that this should not be based on the fear/hatred for the foreign(er) element as a person but on the strong will to understand what we share mostly as our own. Only through a struggle to find our abode as a personal moral necessity/quest and not as a frivolous reaction to the supposed threat of what we consider alien would Europe ever be able not merely to find its abode, but, most importantly, to comprehend that what it really needs is an abode. Remembering Heidegger:

The appropriation of one’s own is only as the encounter and guest-like dialogue with the foreign. Being a locality. being the essential locale of the homely, is a journeying into that which is not directly bestowed upon one’s own essence but must be learned in journeying (Heidegger, 1996: 177-178).

REFERENCES


