TOWARD A PHENOMENOLOGY OF “MORE”

HACIA UNA FENOMENOLOGÍA DE "MÁS"

Elizabeth A. Behnke
Study Project in Phenomenology of the Body, Washington
sppb@openaccess.org

Abstract: This essay will move toward a phenomenology of “more” in ten steps. 1st, situates the investigation within the tradition of Husserlian phenomenological practice, then 2nd draws upon Husserl’s own experience of doing phenomenology. 3rd considers some initial aspects of the structure of the lived experience of “more” and 4th is about the number series, while 5th addresses the primal experience of time, space, and movement. 6th focuses on the phenomenological notion of horizons, then 7th turns to the related question of transcendence. 8th takes a critical look at a particular conceptual model sometime used in thinking about the experience of “more”; 9th briefly brings out one of the ethical implications of this critique; and finally, 10th highlights some of the ways in which the research documented here is itself still incomplete and demands “more”.

Keywords: Husserl. Horizon. Transcendence. Apperception. Number series.

Resumen: Este ensayo se moverá hacia una fenomenología de "más" en diez pasos. El primero, sitúa la investigación dentro de la tradición de la práctica fenomenológica husserliana; luego, el segundo se basa en la propia experiencia de Husserl de hacer fenomenología; el tercero considera algunos aspectos iniciales de la estructura de la experiencia vivida de "más" y el cuarto es sobre la serie numérica, mientras que el quinto aborda la experiencia primordial de tiempo, espacio y movimiento. El sexto se centra en la noción fenomenológica de horizontes; después el séptimo pasa a la cuestión relacionada con la trascendencia. El octavo echa una mirada crítica a un modelo conceptual particular usado en algún momento para pensar sobre la experiencia de "más"; el noveno destaca brevemente una de las implicaciones éticas de esta crítica; y, finalmente, el décimo resalta algunas de las formas en las que la investigación aquí documentada todavía está incompleta y exige "más".


1. BEGINNING A PHENOMENOLOGICAL JOURNEY

To those familiar with the history of the phenomenological tradition, it may well seem that Husserl’s vision of phenomenology as a cooperative venture, a

---

1 One of Lester Embree’s interests was fostering international cooperation among phenomenologists; I have accordingly based this contribution to his memorial volume on a lecture I delivered at the Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo (Morelia, Mexico) in 2012. But in addition, I have attempted to honor another principle dear to his heart: namely, that “phenomenology” is not merely a matter of commentaries on texts or arguments about philosophical positions, but demands fresh descriptions and analyses based on the living evidence of the phenomena/experiences themselves.
communal journey along a shared path, was doomed to failure. Not only was his work often misunderstood (cf., e.g., Zirión 2003), but such figures as Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and others all left Husserl’s path to go their own way, although many who turned away from what they saw as Husserl’s philosophical commitments continued to make use of his phenomenological findings, even if they gave these findings a different philosophical interpretation. Nevertheless, for some of us, the best way to follow Husserl is to take up the full range of his phenomenological methods in order to carry out phenomenological investigations of our own, which may involve not only confirming, correcting, or building upon his results, but bringing his methods to bear on new themes, guided in each case by our own experiential engagement with the matters in question. Thus there is indeed a sense in which we can still speak of Husserlian phenomenological practice as a living tradition of “resolute cooperation” among fellow researchers.

And this was truly important for Husserl. It is well known that he considered himself a lifelong beginner (cf. 5/161), and he was fully aware that the field of phenomenological work that he brought to light was immense, calling for much further exploration beyond what he himself would ever be able to accomplish. He therefore extends an open invitation to us to join him in this labor and to carry on the tradition he inaugurated. However, this is not merely a matter of appropriating certain terminology or vaguely alluding to certain ideas (cf. 14/335; 34/312). Instead, it means genuinely doing phenomenology for ourselves—putting phenomenological methods into actual practice in order to investigate experiencing, that which is experienced, and the fundamental correlation between them (6/§46; cf. 17/§98).

---

2 See 19-1/16f. All citations in this form refer to volumes of the Husserliana series (Husserl 1950ff), with page number or section number(s) following the slash. Volumes from the Briefwechsel (Husserl 1994, BW) and Husserliana Materialien (Husserl 2001ff, HM) will follow the same convention, with the volume number preceded by the abbreviation indicated, while Erfahrung und Urteil (Husserl 1939) will use the abbreviation EU. Citations from Husserl are illustrative rather than exhaustive.

3 See, e.g., 1/98; HM7/95, and cf. BW4/22, where in a letter to Dorion Cairns (21.III.1930), Husserl writes, “Das Leben sagt man ist kurz, die Kunst lang. Die philosophische ‘Kunst’ ist allerdings unendlich und angesichts der Unendlichkeit, die doch Lebensaufgabe geworden ist, […] is man immer Anfänger und Kind, wie lange man leben mag”.


Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 7, 2018
Now as we know, Husserl himself returned to the ongoing project of phenomenological investigation as a daily practice, producing literally thousands of pages of research manuscripts in which he works out specific phenomenological themes. Over the years, these investigations have become increasingly available to fellow researchers all over the world as more and more of this material has been published. In fact, the journey documented in this essay—the journey toward a Husserlian phenomenology of “more”—began when I noticed a particular remark that occurs in a research manuscript from 1929, where Husserl uses the word “more” in a certain sentence, then immediately refers to the need to inquire into “what this empty-formal talk of ‘more’ may mean.” I shall eventually return to this passage in order to examine his remark in the context in which he makes it. At this point, however, let us consider a curious circumstance. The remark in question, which is a remark about the use of the word “more”, is itself an example of the lived experience of “more”: Husserl is recognizing that what he has just said isn’t enough; more needs to be said, because there’s something in need of further elucidation. And he has this experience over and over again in his daily writing practice. We might describe the kind of “more” that comes to the fore here as a motivating “more” that can become experientially palpable (not just to Husserl, but to any phenomenologist) whenever the matters themselves seem to demand something from us—namely, more phenomenological work. Let us accordingly begin by considering some examples from Husserl’s own experience, focusing not merely on the word “more”, but on the lived experience of “more needs to be done here”, whatever words may be used to express this experience.

2. The matters themselves motivate “more”

Imagine Husserl sitting at his desk, working on a description. He has been writing for some time, and perhaps he pauses to consider what he has just said—and the next sentence he writes indicates that there is still more to be done (see, e.g., 14/528; 39/14; cf. HM8/28; 39/386, 451). Perhaps he says something about the origin of the “more,” as when he notes that “reflection” already tells

---

5 It is well known that Husserl explicitly considered his Nachlass to be part of his philosophical/scientific legacy; see Luft 2004, and cf., e.g., BW5/151f, where in a letter to Natorp (1.11.1922), Husserl speaks of being unable to complete a systematic work, adding (152), “Vielleicht arbeite ich, mit aller menschlich möglichen Anspannung der Kräfte, nur für meinen Nachlass”.

6 “[…] so muss nun erst gefragt werden, was diese leer-formale Rede vom ‘mehr’ bedeuten darf” (39/290).
us “more” than what has just been said (39/365), or perhaps he realizes that he
needs to carry out specific supplementary studies (34/194; cf. 39/379) in order
to “do justice to” the phenomena (39/398). He frequently acknowledges that
what he has written is “unsatisfactory” (39/848) or “insufficient” (39/433),
noting, for instance, that it is too “hasty” and merely indicates “themes” for
further work (39/398 n.2). Sometimes he asks himself what needs to be done
next (39/421), perhaps referring to the “remarkable questions” raised by his
meditations (39/477), and declaring that this “has to be researched” (39/295;
cf. 388) or writing “to be worked out” in the margin (see, e.g., 34/563; 39/820,
and cf. 29/xxxiv n.6); in some cases, he also indicates the difficulty of actually
carrying out the required investigations (39/431; cf. 532, and see also 32/146).
From time to time, he comments that what is needed is another distinction
(39/297; cf. 396), and he often sees the need for a more precise description
(39/379). Sometimes he is able to carry this out immediately—the next sentence
begins “More precisely”: (39/386, 433, 436, 472), and the analysis proceeds.
Throughout, however, he is driven by the need to attain full clarity about the
matters he is investigating (39/394, 419, 431, 532; cf. 21/244), and this motif
is already emphasized in a diary entry from 25 September 1906, where he insists
in the strongest possible terms that he cannot live without clarity (24/445; cf.
21/469). As he goes on to say in these 1906 “Personal Notes”, however, it is not
enough just to know the guiding principles and the methods that would lead
toward this goal; “we must also actually carry out the work. We must walk the
paths themselves. We must solve individual problems step by step” (24/445; cf.
20-1/273, 286), even if, as he says, our initial steps only anticipate and
predelineate the results that our further meditations will eventually yield—results
demonstrating that this is indeed a path upon which one can proceed (34/291)7.
For as he also indicates, the first steps we take in attempting to articulate a
complex, concrete whole may be “abstractions” from this “mute” and still
unknown whole, yet they are not severed from it: we may need “more” work to

7 The metaphor of a path recurs in Husserl’s thinking. See, e.g., 8/169; cf. 1/48, where it is charac-
terized as a path we can take together, and HM6/6, where it is noted that the path takes patient and
constant work. See also Husserl’s description of it as a path of “thorny investigations” (17/251) and his
observation that once an initial pathway of investigation opens up a realm of inquiry, “other paths are
possible” (17/11), so that other researchers can enrich and correct the first researcher’s findings (20-
1/325; 3-1/224; 5/161f). Finally, cf. 15/419, where Husserl acknowledges that the goal may not lie at the
end of the path, but in the journey itself.

Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 7, 2018
reach this concrete whole, but we are still guided by it every step of the way, even before it is fully there for us to see (34/296; cf. 39/439, 477f).

All of this suggests an extraordinary picture of a man who sees phenomenological practice as both motivated by the insufficiency of what has been accomplished so far—what we have already done points to “more” that we need to do—and guided in advance by this “more,” which is not only a “more”—in-the-making, but a particular “more” moving along a particular dimension of experience (here in our example, the lived experience of actually doing phenomenological work). In other words, phenomenological work is remarkably similar to artistic creation. For example, a sculptor who is modeling a head may succeed in shaping one feature, but this still “requires” the production of further parts of a whole that is still in becoming (39/381), and each new part that comes to completion continues to call for “more” until the work is done. In phenomenology, however, even a description that seems to be relatively complete will still imply further themes to be described, and the process begins all over again; there is always more phenomenological work for us to do.

Now we are, of course, still at the beginning of our journey toward a phenomenology of “more”. But even at these early stages, we can already discern the outlines of the type of experience we are investigating and begin to thematize these emerging structures, a task to which I shall now turn.

3. Preliminary Structural Features of “More”

The first point to note is that the word “more” itself needs more: like the word “this”, it functions as an occasional expression whose fulfilling sense will depend upon the context (think, for example, of a tiny child enthusiastically demanding “more”—whether the child wants to eat another banana or hear another bedtime story will depend on the circumstances). Thus the very notion of “more” implies the question, “more what?” and the schematic answer, “more of this”. I will term this experiential structure “this/more”, and we can immediately see that this pattern expresses an invariant that can be discerned across innumerable variants. For instance, in my brief survey of Husserl’s

8 The process is actually more complex than this, since a newly achieved part may retroactively transform the whole that is guiding the production of its parts; cf. 23/18.

Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico, 7, 2018
experiences of “more” being needed, I did not indicate the very different contentual contexts from which I took my examples. Instead, I took these and other cases precisely as examples “of” more phenomenological work, even though in each concrete situation, a more specific “more” was indeed required by the particular “this” that implied it and called for it. But even if we stay within a single context, we may well find that the “this/more” pattern can be an iterative operation: I fulfill the first “more” with further description, then I see that “this” new description too requires “more”. In addition, the reiteration of the performance of going on to say still “more” points to a correlative capability that I can count on every time I carry out, for instance, “more” reflection, “more” description, “more” analysis.

To sum up our progress so far, we have identified a basic “this/more” structure that can be exemplified in many different ways; we have recognized that when we move from “this” to “more”, the latter can then become a new “this” calling for a further “more”; and we have realized that the “more” can refer to bringing our own capabilities into play “once again”, as well as to something “more” lying on the side of the matters we are experiencing. I should also highlight two further themes that have already begun to emerge (themes that will return in various contexts below): namely, the notion of “motivation” and the theme of “wholeness”. At this point, we are certainly far from claiming that we have found “the” essential structure of “more”, and we cannot even assume in advance that the lived experience of “more” will always take the same form. But we have at least discovered some possible descriptive dimensions of the experience. It is now time to turn to a very different sort of example.

4. “AND ONE MORE” AS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NUMBER SERIES

In the natural attitude, the series of whole numbers is simply available, ready-made, already there for children who are beginning to learn arithmetic, and for the rest of us as well. But for the pre-phenomenological Husserl, what is

---

9 This section cannot hope to do justice to the many issues arising with regard to Husserl’s pre-phenomenological work on arithmetic; see not only Husserlana 12, 21, and 22, but Husserl 2005, along with Ierna 2005, 2006. I have also considered some of Husserl’s early phenomenological work on logic (see Husserlana 24, as well as Husserlana Materialien 2, 6), but here too, I am only touching upon a few of the themes most relevant to the present essay; a full investigation of how these themes play out in the Logical Investigations (Husserlana 18, 19-1, 19-2, and see also 20-1, 20-2) is obviously outside the scope of this investigation.
of interest is searching out what he called, under the influence of Carl Stumpf, the “psychological origin” of the concept of number. And under the influence of Karl Weierstrass, Husserl approaches the problem in terms of numbers as multiplicities of unities (or “units”) achieved by counting (Ierna 2005, 3). The principle is simple: we can start with any number we please and add one more (see, e.g., Husserl 2005, 300/301; 12/489), proceeding unidirectionally and without limit (ib.,12/220; cf. Ierna 2005, 20)‒theoretically, to infinity, in a peculiar “and so on” such that we need not actually keep on counting forever, but can stop at any arbitrary point (Husserl 2005, 288): all that matters is that we grasp the principle of a well-ordered series that proceeds from \( n \) to \( n + 1 \), and “since the law of formation of our series is unambiguous, always only the same formation can result” (Husserl 2005, 302/303). In short, the number series is produced according to what I have termed a “this/more” structure, or more precisely, through an iterative procedure of augmentation, each time involving “this” number and “one” [unit] “more”.

But more is required here. Husserl not only emphasizes the importance of the operation designated with the word “and”—then further elaborated in the notion of “collective combination”—but highlights a specific kind of formalizing abstraction according to which anything whatsoever can become “something” to be counted. This abstraction disregards the particular contents of the items, so that each item is now merely seen as “something”, and our interest is directed solely upon linking this “and” this “and” this, and so on, in thought (12/79; cf., e.g., 80, 84, 117, 335ff). For instance, my soul and a triangle = 2 (12/142); the planet Jupiter, a contradiction, and an angel = 3 (12/145); a feeling, an angel, the moon, and Italy = 4 (12/16, 298); God, the Devil, immortality, a contradiction, and a piece of Swiss cheese = 5 (Husserl 2005, 282/283). All that

---

10 See 12/129ff for the special problems involved in understanding 0 and 1 as “numbers” through this procedure.
11 24/436; cf. 12/226. Note that with the notion of a “series”, the whole numbers are not all directly connected with one another, but only with the previous number and the next number—21/85, 158. This can be termed a principle of immediate adjacency, and we shall return to this principle in §5 below.
12 Cf. 12/336ff. However, strictly speaking—as Ierna 2005, 15, points out—numbers are produced via counting and quantities via collecting.
13 Cf., e.g., 21/66, 159; HM2/32, 35, and see also HM6/82ff, where Husserl contrasts the notion of “something”, as an empty shell or hull without a material-contextual core, with the notion of “this”, in which the full signification is provided by the context, but is not expressed. He concludes that “this” and “something” are neither equivalent nor completely separable, and that they are woven together in the notion of “a certain...”, where something determinate is thought in an indeterminate fashion (HM6/86).
matters is that each item is noticed in its own right as a specific, separate something (12/57).

Yet this raises the question of what counts as—and is literally to be counted as—an “item”. Husserl points out that each such item is both identical with itself and different from the other items; then, by carrying out number abstraction, these “unities” can be treated as “units”, so that each is considered merely as “one”\(^{14}\). Underlying this formalizing abstraction, however, is our customary comportment in everyday life: Husserl notes that as a rule, we count things, in the narrow sense, and he goes on to specify that what he means are more or less sharply bounded wholes that stand out from their surroundings by virtue of the intimate inner coherence of their parts (12/154, 207). In other words, he is appealing to what we now usually term Gestalt-coherence. And this is hardly surprising, given that Husserl himself was one of the very first researchers\(^{15}\) to describe this notion on the basis, as he says, of “the testimony of experience” (12/203). Moreover, in the course of turning to experience, he comes up with a key distinction between two different kinds of wholeness, each characterized by a different kind of “more”.

Now one thing that sets Husserl’s thinking in motion here is that when we experience a multiplicity (Vielheit), the question of “how many” (Wieviel?) may arise, motivating the operation of enumeration and leading to an answer in terms of a numerical amount (12/15). But how is it that we can experience a “multiplicity” in the first place? For example, we look up at the sky and see “many” stars, or we look around and see a “group” of people, and Husserl wants to know how it is that we can grasp such groups in an instant without actually needing to count their members (12/196ff). His answer is that what we notice is a configuration that “leaps out at us immediately” (12/205), so that the “Gestalt moment” provides a framework within which we can then (if we like) apprehend now this and now that element (Husserl 2005, 298/299). In addition, however,

\(^{14}\) 12/49, 319; cf. 152ff on various sense of the notion of “unit” or “unity.”

\(^{15}\) See Husserl 2005, 298/299, where Husserl uses the notion of “Gestalt” and “Gestalt moment” in a lecture course from Winter Semester 1889/90. In 12/210f.n.1 he points out that his own work on what he also terms “figural moments” (see 12/203ff, and cf. 205n.1 on the terminological choice) predates Christian Ehrenfels, “Über Gestaltqualitäten,” Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 14 (1890) 249-292 (a work to which he did not have access in preparing his 1891 Philosophie der Arithmetik), suggesting that both of them had been influenced by Ernst Mach, Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1886); Ierna 2005, 19 n.61, 34, supplies relevant page numbers in Mach (43ff, 104, 128), while Ierna 2006, 80, reminds us that Husserl also turned to Stumpf’s notion of fusion (Verschmelzung); see also 20-1/295.
even when it is not a case of a multiplicity of similar items all given simultaneously, and instantaneously seen as a group (a flock of birds, a heap of apples, a row of trees, a herd of cows, and so on)\textsuperscript{16} each of the “things” belonging to the multiplicity is (as we have already seen) itself an item—a whole that is itself, as we say, “more than the sum of its parts” in what for Husserl is a very specific sense. And it is here that the two different kinds of “more” will come into play.

On the one hand, we can consider, for instance, various parts and properties of a rose, making, as it were, a mental list of the features we have noticed and considering these features as a \textit{totality}. On the other hand, when we consider the rose itself as a \textit{whole}, we find that the relations linking the parts of the rose are presented “as, so to speak, a certain ‘more’” in contrast to a mere totality of noticed items, and these relations make the rose a unity\textsuperscript{17}; it is not a mere \textit{collectivum}, but a “complexity” (\textit{Vielfachheit}) that is more than a “multiplicity” (\textit{Vielheit}) of separate parts, even if a subsequent analysis does indeed thematize “a multiplicity of parts noticeable in their own right” within the whole that unifies them (12/204; cf. 21/85). In other words, the whole is more than the moments that we can then go on to discern in it. Such moments can “offer different degrees of resistance” to being singled out, and some “cannot be independently apprehended at all”\textsuperscript{18}. In any case, however, the “more” that belongs to a whole in the Gestalt sense is integral to the “whole” itself. Or in Husserl’s own words, “it is inaccurate to say: a whole consists only and alone in its parts. In all cases where we have and speak of a whole, there must rather always be present something \textit{more} over and above the single parts, indeed precisely that which makes the whole a whole and which would have to be noticed to allow us to speak of a whole: i.e., the connection among the parts” (Husserl 2005, 284/285).

But in the same lecture, Husserl then immediately goes on to speak of the operation of collective combination into a \textit{totality}, which involves a very different “more”. Here we are not just noticing separate items at different moments of

\textsuperscript{16} See, e.g., 12/203f, 210, 212; cf. 39/Text Nr. 42, Beilage XXXVIII, for later approaches to issues of unity and of plurality (whether it is a plurality of “same” or of merely “similar” items).

\textsuperscript{17} 12/72, 332; cf. 18, where Husserl writes, “so ist doch über die Einzelinhalte hinaus etwas da”, using the phrase “over and above” rather than speaking of “das Mehr” as he does in the other citation from \textit{Philosophie der Arithmetik} (12/72, based on the corresponding passage—12/332—in his \textit{Habilitationsschrift}, the first chapter of which appeared in 1887).

\textsuperscript{18} 12/210. Husserl eventually elaborates the kinds of distinctions he is concerned with here by contrasting parts as “pieces” with parts as “moments” (see the Third Logical Investigation, especially, e.g., 19-1/272ff); see also 22/92 for the 1894 version.
time. Instead, through the iterative operation signaled by the word “and”, we are collecting these items, keeping those already gathered in grasp while combining them with the next one and the next (and so on) into a progressively larger number of items, all thought together as a totality. Thus when we reach the “sum total” (Inbegriff) through the operation of collective combination, the whole is, quite precisely, the “sum” of its parts: it is not solely a matter of the separate somethings we have counted; rather, what has made them into a “totality” is precisely the act of collective combination we have carried out. In this case, then, first we produce formalized “units” by abstractively disregarding the contents of each item, then we collect them into a whole that is only “more” than the parts (taken separately in their own right) by virtue of being a “sum total”. And although the items we are counting may indeed have initially appeared to us as a multiplicity of similar items, as with a herd of cows, it can also be the case that the items we have reduced to sheer “somethings” (the angel, the piece of cheese, and so on) are completely indifferent to the operations that bring them together. In the case of the Gestalt whole, however, if we do indeed focus on a particular feature, it is not a separate object for its own sake, ripped out of its whole, but is highlighted as a part within the whole, for “part” and “whole” are correlative concepts that “draw their meaning” from the very relation between whole and part (see 24/286f); here “abstraction” is not a matter of “formalization,” but of “explication” (cf. Husserl 1940–1941, 28). And for “this” part to be a part at all, it must already bear within itself an essential reference to a “more” of which it is always already a moment or member.

This distinction between a formalization into abstract “units” that can subsequently be collected into a totality, on the one hand, and the Gestalt-coherence of wholes within which various moments can be distinguished, on the other hand, will return in other guises below. Now, however, it is time to turn to some further fundamental dimensions that are organized, each in its own way, in terms of a “this/more” structure.

5. The Primal “This/More” of Immediate Adjacency

As I have shown elsewhere, primal temporalization, primal motility, and primal spatialization all display a “this/more” structure19. To understand this, we

---

19 See Behnke 2009a, 204ff, for more details and references to Husserl’s texts.
must shift our focus from the ready-made world to deeper structures of constituting transcendental life.

For example, we are all familiar with what we take to be the “objective” time of clocks and calendars, or the “natural”, cyclical time of day and night, of the moon and the tides, of the changing seasons. However, Husserl was interested in the deep roots of temporal experience in a primal self-temporalization that is the origin of the living present itself. Here, of course, the notion of the “living present” (lebendige Gegenwart) does not refer to an isolated and point-like “now-moment”, but to a living “now” that is inseparable from the “just-past” and the “just-coming”. Each just-past is in turn linked with the just-just-past, and this with the one before that, and so on, in a chain of “retentions” that still effectively haunt the present before they too sink back into a “past” reachable only through “recollection”. One familiar example of retention is the experience of listening to someone speak: the words at the beginning of the sentence remain retentionally alive in us, without requiring any special effort of “memory”, until we get to the end of the sentence in question. Conversely, the “protention” of the most immediately just-coming future predelineates what is just about to happen, and typically does so according to a “this/more” structure where what is predelineated as most immediately coming is “more of the same”. In other words, the current “this”–for example, seeing a particular color–motivates the immediate anticipation of “more” experience of the same color. Now it may happen (and it frequently does happen) that the protention is disappointed rather than being fulfilled. But the protention of “more” can also be understood at different degrees of contextual specificity, so that what is protended is “more” color (of whatever shade) or “more” sensory experience (in whatever sensory field), or perhaps all that is protended is that “something will happen”. But all protentions, no matter what their content, will follow a fundamental pattern of protending “more time” at the leading edge of “this” living present. Like the active iterative operation that most originally produces the series of whole numbers, then, this ongoing passive, primal temporalization proceeds by a principle of immediate adjacency, for what comes next is always the very next number or the very next now in a process that runs off in a single direction (toward ever larger numbers or an ever-opening future); such possibilities as counting backwards, or looking back at a past moment of time, presuppose that the primal (and irreversible) sequence (the number series or the stream of ever-new nows) is already available to us.
Now primal motility also displays a fundamental “this/more” structure: it lies in the very essence of “motility” per se that whatever kinaesthetic possibilities are currently being enacted, “more” actualization of kinaesthetic possibilities is always protended, whether in the form of ongoingly maintaining a particular kinaesthetic configuration or moving into a new one. Moreover, each kinaesthetic constellation predelineates a “halo” of immediately adjacent moves that I can make “from here”, from “this” configuration. However, unlike the ceaseless welling-up of “more time” at the leading edge of each living present, here the possibilities are multidimensional, for I can move in many directions, and I can reverse the movement as well, all within a bounded yet iterable system of possibilities. Finally, although in the natural attitude, we normally take space for granted as a ready-made expanse through which to move, it is primal motility that opens a primal, multi-dimensional space for us in the first place: “this” here is surrounded by its halo of “more” possible here’s that are immediately adjacent to the current here, whereas reaching a further “there” requires traversing a series of further immediately adjacent here’s, following one path or another until the desired “there” becomes a “here”.

But let us return from the deep structures of primal temporalization, primal motility, and primal spatialization to what they make possible at the more familiar level of lived time, lived space, and lived movement in the world of everyday life. How is the lived experience of “more” most palpable and pervasive here?

6. The “more” of explorable horizons

By now the notion of the horizon is a familiar one to phenomenologists; thus I shall only review some basic structures, beginning with the notion of the “inner horizon”. This refers to the possibility of explicating what is already given, bringing “more” features of “this” object to itself-givenness or to greater clarity—

---

20 The kinaesthetic system can be seen as finite, yet open-endlessly available; moreover, there may indeed be limits to how far I can reach, but within these limits lie many possibilities of further kinaesthetic discrimination. Thus each specific kinaesthetic system is characterized in terms of “limits” and “leeway”, as is the kinaesthetic system as a whole.

21 Cf. the reference to the “multidimensional field” as the “first field of space-constitution” in 34/559; cf. also the reference to the “multidimensional continuum” of the entire co-present horizon in 11/428. Husserl initially addresses the role of kinaesthesis in this regard in his pre-phenomenological works (see, e.g., 22/275ff, 416ff), and provides detailed analyses in his 1907 Dingvorlesung (see 16/IV., V., VI. Abschnitt).

in other words, beginning with the lived experience of a whole and going on to appreciate the determinations proper to it, precisely as moments-of an articulated whole seen as such (rather than as a sum of atomistic, self-sufficient parts). This may often be governed by a “telos toward optimality”, although as Ihde (1977, 37) points out, the conditions appropriate for the optimal experience of something may well vary with the context: from a Cartesian perspective, we attain the optimal view of a tree on a bright, sunny day when we can most clearly see its physical-material features; for a Druid (or a shaman from another tradition), the tree should be seen on, say, a windy night with clouds sailing across the pale light of a crescent moon, or on a foggy morning with the wind mysteriously moving its branches, for it is then that its potent magical powers are most fully revealed. But in either case, what motivates the explication of the object is a drive toward acquiring knowledge (whether practical or theoretical), and this is an aim that can only be fulfilled by the experiential evidence proper to this type of object. In addition, however, the desire to find out “more” about the object is already guided by certain lines of implication proper to an object “of this type”. Thus the “more” that we are seeking is already shaped along the lines of apperceptive typicality, thereby motivating the actualization of certain capabilities rather than others. For example, I see a box with a lid and I open the lid to look inside, for even though I’ve never seen this particular box before, I already apperceive it “as” a box, and thus as offering familiar possibilities for exploration.

And such apperceptive familiarity also plays a role in the exploration of the external horizon. The object I’ve been examining sits “among” other objects, “in” a room “within” a building “on” a certain street, and so on, all according to a familiar iterative style (see, e.g., 15/198f; 11/428f): from this standpoint, here, I have a certain near-field in view, but a “next” near-field is already implied (see, e.g., 17/441; 29/141); then as I move farther, “more” is revealed and a new sector of the world (cf. 39/27) becomes my current near-field, with still further

23 Note that optimality is typically relative and morphological, rather than exact—what matters is, e.g., being “close enough” to decipher the inscription on the monument, not one’s precise measurable distance from it. Cf. also 39/424, where Husserl indicates that the view from a roof or tower, or though a telescope, always points to the normal near-sphere and the naked eye.

24 Thus both the Cartesian’s tree and the Druid’s tree offer appropriate experiential evidence, given the different interests at stake in constituting the type of “object” in question (res extensa within a material universe governed by causal laws on the one hand, crystallization of potency within a magical universe governed by magical resonances on the other).
fields ordered in concentric circles all around the current core of my world\textsuperscript{25}. But in addition, as I explore these unfolding fields, I experience various types of objects with different degrees of apperceptive familiarity (for example, in unfamiliar territory, I may not know whether or not this building is the school, but I do recognize it as “a” building)\textsuperscript{26}. Moreover, whether we are speaking of the explorability of inner or of outer horizons, the “more” to be revealed is correlative to my own capabilities—not only to my kinaesthetic capability, but also to my ability to focus my attention, fine-tune my sensibilities, and open myself up to what the world has to offer, for such abilities are what allow me to actualize what is apperceptively predelineated (cf., e.g., 39/440 n.1). Thus the teleological pull toward bringing “more” to itself-givenness rests upon my I-can (see, e.g., 17/447f), or more precisely, upon the “‘I can and do, but I can also do otherwise than I am doing’”, so that I have some freedom to vary which appearances are currently given to me, despite the fact that “this ‘freedom’, like every other, is always open to possible hindrances” (1/82). At the same time, the very need to bring “more” into view than is currently visible to me is a necessary consequence of my situatedness. What accordingly stands in correlation to an experiencer who is characterized in terms of situated motility is a world that is characterized in terms of both perspectivity and horizonality—a world I am always in the process of acquiring, a world that is thus in constant movement, in ongoing becoming (15/201; cf., e.g., 39/436f). But there is still another aspect of the “more” of apperception that we have not yet considered.

7. THE APPERCEPTION OF WHOLESNESS AND THE STRUCTURE OF TRANSCENDENCE

We have already come across the theme of wholeness as Gestalt-coherence. And although Husserl does indeed refer to the example of a rose as being more than the sum of its petals, leaves, and stem, his other examples (like those of many Gestalt psychologists) are often flat patterns—for example, in the lectures from Winter Semester 1889-1890 he refers to a configuration of dots on the blackboard (Husserl 2005, 298/299), while in the 1891 Philosophy of Arithmetic he speaks of focusing now on the white squares of a chessboard, now on the

\textsuperscript{25} See, e.g., 29/86; 39/379 (and cf. 326), but see also Geniusas 2012, 181, on the notion of the world-horizon (Welthorizont) as a horizon that is not organized around an intuitively given “core”.

\textsuperscript{26} See, e.g., 39/429: “der Typus allgemeiner oder minder allgemein sein kann”.

Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 7, 2018
black ones (12/213), and so on. However, by the time of the 1929 Paris Lectures that we know as the *Cartesian Meditations* and of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (published in 1929), Husserl has not only made the breakthrough to phenomenology that occurred in 1900-1901 with his *Logical Investigations*, but has turned his attention to the depth of our three-dimensional world in his 1907 lectures on the perception of things in space. Moreover, by 1929 he has been seriously engaged for nearly a decade with a phenomenology of the passive syntheses that stand in contrast to the kinds of active syntheses that are at stake whenever we carry out mathematical operations or form logical judgments\(^{27}\).

But in addition, although Husserl is certainly concerned with the problem of transcendence in his earlier phenomenological investigations (see, e.g., 3-1/§§149ff), what I want to highlight here is a contrast between his pre-phenomenological work, where a pregiven object is taken as simply standing there before me as a whole, and his later work, where he is fully focused on the transcendent object *as given through “appearances” or adumbrations*\(^{28}\). This is famously expressed at the beginning of the lectures on passive synthesis, where Husserl says, “External perception is a constant pretension to accomplish something that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to accomplish” (11/3; cf., e.g., 17/258, 288; 6/167). And this is because there is always “more” to a transcendent spatial thing than what is literally given in direct experience. In phenomenology, we typically see intentionality—being directed toward something, being conscious—“of” it—as being the main feature of conscious life, but for Husserl, the interplay between actuality and potentiality is crucial as well. What is actually given is not only experienced as “one side” of the object, but is informed by the consciousness of further potential views. Thus it is accompanied by horizontal anticipations that are not arbitrary, but are motivated by the current view, inviting further experience (drawing nearer to the object, walking around it, etc.) in order to confirm that what I am experiencing (the thing) is indeed “more” than the side I am actually seeing (1/18f; cf. 23ff).

Now as I have already indicated, Husserl’s account of the explorability of both inner and outer horizons is indeed a correlational account, since this

---

\(^{27}\) On multiplicities, identities, and wholes from the latter perspective, cf., e.g., 31/Beilage VII (96ff), VIII (98ff); cf. 44ff, 70ff.

\(^{28}\) Another way of putting this is that appearances require apperception to be appearances—“of” something. Cf. Aguirre 1970, 178; Behnke 2011, 85, and the sources cited there. However, see also 22/110f for an early (1894) statement of the problem at stake here.
“explorability” stands in correlation to the experiencer’s capabilities; I have expressed this by saying that situated motility stands in correlation to perspectivity and horizontality. But in that account, the very unity of the pregiven things-to-be-explored was not yet addressed. Now, however, it is possible to point out that these “pregiven” unities stand as correlates to a “pregiving” consciousness that “is indeed [...] a meaning of what is meant in it [Meinung seines Gemeinten]”—yet “at any moment, this something meant [dieses Vermeintes] is more [...] than what is meant at that moment ’explicitly’” (1/84).

We can flesh out this quote from §20 of the Cartesian Meditations with a parallel passage from §94 of Formal and Transcendental Logic, where Husserl denies that experience is something like a window that opens upon a world of ready-made things (17/239). Instead, it is “the performance in which for me, the experiencer, experienced being ‘is there’, and is there as what it is”, so if something is given as “it itself” yet is also given as “more than what is actually itself grasped”, then the object is “transcendent” (17/240). Or to cite §45 of the Crisis, when I see the surface of the thing (now from this side, now from that), “this implies that, while the surface is immediately given, I mean more than it offers” (6/160)—namely, the full concrete thing. Hence the distinction between what is genuinely “presented” and the “more” that is merely “appresented” is the very signature of transcendence (39/411), and we are continually carrying out a transcendent apperception (17/259) made possible by our capability for ongoingly “meaning-more” (Mehrmeinung)—a capability that remains anonymous for life in the ready—made world and is only retrieved from this anonymity by phenomenological analysis, which does not merely explicate the object, but penetrates into the constitutive performances that are its correlate (1/84f, and cf., e.g., 17/185; 39/470; HM8/298f). There is, however, still more to say about these performances, and now it is time not only to return to the quotation that initially motivated this investigation, but also to make some critical remarks about a particular way of addressing certain types of “more”.

8. THE TRUTH AND THE PROBLEM OF ITERATIVE APPERCEPTION

For Husserl, consciousness is always in “living becoming”, and correlatively, the world is in “constant genesis” as ever new apperceptions of new types of
objects open up possibilities for further experiences in the same style (see, e.g., 1/141; 39/448). Thus we come to recognize “more” types of objects, and our world is correspondingly enriched. However, it is always possible for something already familiar to us to receive a further apperceptive sense in which still “more” is added to “this” particular experience, so that an object gains, as we say, a new “stratum” of sense. To take some of Husserl’s own examples, we already apprehend items like a “violin” or a “book” as “more” than the sheerly physical materials of which they are made—but as he tells us, a new significance, with its own “affective value”, is added when we realize that this violin was once played by Joachim (a famous violinist in Husserl’s time), or that this book is from Kant’s own library (39/428). Moreover, such an apperceptive enrichment can be reiterated, producing yet another layer of significance: suppose, for example, that I am visiting a museum in Freiburg, and I see an exhibit where both a violin and a book are displayed on a table; then, however, when I learn that I am looking at Joachim’s violin and Kant’s book, the exhibit acquires yet another stratum for me: these must be the very objects that Husserl himself used in his example! and therefore they mean “even more” to me. But this “meaning-more” begins to open up possibilities of a different sort of “more” than the “meaning-more” I spoke of in the previous section, which referred to more appearances of the same object from different sides.

Here we must be careful to observe a number of distinctions. In the case of mathematical operations, iteration will typically produce formations of a higher order, moving from the simpler to the more complex (see, e.g., 12/294), but the new formations are still mathematical objects, and logical operations can similarly produce “multi-tiered” or multi-leveled formations of signs (see, e.g., 12/344). However, the prior operation of logical formalization refers back to something extra-logical as matter to be formed (logicized, rationalized), so that something of a different order is now produced, something that is “more than” what was originally given—yet not “more” in a quantitative sense. Instead, there is a qualitative difference between “this angel and this piece of cheese” on the
one hand and “this something and another something” on the other hand. But formalization of the sort just mentioned is not the only example of such a qualitative “more”, for apperceptions too can function in this way. And with this notion of an apperception whose result is a “more” of a different order, we are at last in a position to turn to the 1929 quotation from Husserl that motivated the present investigation, now restored to its context: “If the world and its concrete realities are ‘more’ than mere nature, then we now have to inquire what this empty-formal talk of ‘more’ may mean”\(^{33}\). He first notes that it cannot be a matter of taking a natural object as a whole that is made up of pieces, in such a way that when we are directed to one piece, the “more” consists of the rest of the pieces—and he then goes on to insist that we must not succumb to the prejudice whereby the human being as a whole has a founding part, the “human body”, along with a supplementary part, the “psyche.” In other words, Husserl is beginning to realize that something he seems to have taken for granted in his earlier work—a stratified regional ontology in which animate organisms are “psychophysical” beings—is actually a \textit{sedimented historical achievement} that can be summed up in the notion of the \textit{psychophysical apperception}\(^ {34}\).

But there is a larger issue here: namely, the automatic acceptance of a model of stacked strata to describe the regional ontologies that Husserl inherited: first, that of sheer natural things or inanimate objects; then living beings; and finally, the region of mental life, including cultural formations\(^ {35}\). These are typically thought in terms of a hierarchical, founding-founded structure in which only the lowest stratum—the sheer natural thing—is conceived as an independent stratum that is not built on, and does not continue to include within itself, a lower stratum. In contrast, when something is apperceived as a living body and thus as being more than a merely physical object (cf., e.g., \textit{39/632}), in this model it is still a type of thing in the sense of being a real physical entity experienced as an

\(^{33}\) “Wenn die Welt ‘mehr’ ist, wenn die konkreten Realitäten der Welt ihrerseits mehr sind als bloße Natur, so muss nun erst gefragt werden, was diese leer-formale Rede vom ‘mehr’ bedeuten darf”—\textit{39/290}.

\(^{34}\) See Behnke 2009a, 189f; 2009b, 13ff; and 2011, 89ff, along with the sources cited in these places.

\(^{35}\) To the \textit{Ding-Leib/Seele-Geist} pattern Husserl sometimes adds a final term, \textit{Gemeingeist} (see, e.g., 14/Text Nr. 9, 10 and Beilage XXV, XXVI); sometimes the model is simplified to include only \textit{Natur} as a lower sphere of natural objects and \textit{Geist} as a higher sphere of social objectivities (cf., e.g., \textit{39/420}; \textit{HM4/passim}; 32/passim). On the other hand, one of Husserl’s major contributions in the third volume of \textit{the Ideas} involves pointing out that to the middle member—\textit{Leib/Seele}—there corresponds not only the science of psychology, but also that of somatology, which in turn includes both a natural-scientific approach to the body and an approach based on the direct somatic perception each experiencer has of his/her own body. Cf. Behnke 2009a, 188f, and 2009b, 12f, for more details and specific references to Husserl.
identical unity persisting across alterations (39/289f, 443)–a paradigm that Husserl eventually begins to question (see, e.g., 39/431). Now it is true that any apperception that further enriches an already given object with a new sense does indeed presuppose this initial object and is founded on it. However, this need not be seen as a problem, but simply as a performance that might be compared to the case of a practical action that transforms a pregiven object into something “more” than the object we started with36. Instead, the problem here has to do with the way in which one reaches the initial, presupposed stratum in the first place. More specifically, the root of the problem lies in the difference between two different kinds of abstraction (a difference that echoes our previous discussion of “totalities” of “units” vs. coherent “wholes”). Let us consider each of these in turn.

I shall term the first “reductionistic abstraction”. Here everything is analyzed into its component parts, with the aim of reaching the simplest possible parts – in the natural sciences, these were traditionally the “atoms” of classical physics, while in psychology, these were atomistic “sense-data”. Moreover, what is abstractively set aside in order to reach these simplest parts is simply eliminated–it no longer enters into the picture at all–and the cognitive performances of “abstracting” are, as it were, “forgotten”: the atomistic “parts” are posited and accepted as existing in their own right, quite independently of any more complex formations they may enter into, and in addition, they are thought–to whatever extent possible–as homogeneous (cf. 32/§§15b, 16). The end result is taken as the foundational ontological substratum to which everything can be reduced and in terms of which everything can be explained, often in terms of the model of a hierarchy of strata. Thus, for example, perception is explained in terms of a lower stratum of “content”–sheer sensory data–to which a mental act such as an “apprehension” that bestows a meaning on this content is then added (a model that Husserl does initially make use of, but eventually transforms).

In contrast, we might speak of a style of “thematizing abstraction” that may indeed focus upon certain moments, yet without severing them from one another or from the concrete whole we started with. Here whatever is currently thematically excluded (1/126) may be temporarily disregarded, yet without utterly banishing the more encompassing concretion whose moments we are

36 See, e.g., the discussion in 39/438ff of previous acquisitions providing the basis for further activity.
explicating (cf. Husserl 1940–1941, 28; 34/54, 393). Thus, for example, when we thematize a sensuous moment, we find that it functions as a moment-through-which the thing as a meaningful, “physiognomic” whole is built up for us through passive synthesis and apperceived as this or that type of thing. But even if we set the latter modes of functioning to one side in order to inquire still more deeply into the sensuous dimension itself, we find that the specifically “hyletic” moment—for example, a sudden gleam of color—is not a lower, self-sufficient “layer” upon which, say, further strata of “valuing” and “willing” or “acting” are then built. Instead, to be affected by the color simultaneously means experiencing it as, for instance, “attractive” or “dangerous,” an experience that already includes an incipient kinaesthetic movement “toward” or “away” (and these are precisely the meaningful moments informing our experience of the “physiognomic” thing as an affectively lived whole)37. In such a case, we must accordingly speak of mutually interpenetrating moments that essentially belong together, rather than of stacked strata organized in such a way that the higher-level objectivity necessarily contains its lower levels, but the lowest level ultimately remains a self-sufficient ontological stratum irrespective of further levels founded on it. Similarly, we can no longer assume a model where perceiving another person is a matter of perceiving a natural thing, apperceiving this thing as a living being, then further apperceiving (or appresenting) this living being as a person with a mental life that is, however, still based on psychophysical (and ultimately physical) nature.

And with this we return to the problem of what the talk of “more” means when we say that the world is “more” than mere nature. But in a sense, this is a pseudo-“more”, a spurious “more”, a mere construct: we can only say that the world we live in is apperceived as “more” than objective physical nature because we have already tacitly carried out an impoverishing reductionistic abstraction to such a supposedly self-sufficient layer. Of course, this is not necessarily a move that “we ourselves” have consciously made, here and now, but is part of a received tradition, a sedimented historical achievement. And for Husserl, such acquisitions are not to be accepted blindly; instead, we must bring to light the anonymous performances involved and see them for what they are, in order to

37 Cf. Behnke 2008, 48 (Spanish translation, 61); 2010, 10f.
Yet let us pose a further question: is the difference between “reductionistic abstraction” and “thematizing abstraction” merely a matter of an obscure distinction that could only be of interest to a practicing phenomenologist, or might it have, for example, some practical ethical significance? Let us turn to this question, even if we can only consider it briefly here.

9. “More” as resistance to reductionism

As we have already seen, the lived experience of “more” can take many different forms. And sometimes what the word “more” refers to in two different contexts can be very different indeed. Take, for example, a sentence I once heard on a Canadian radio broadcast during a program devoted to a book about transnational corporate capitalism: “They only know one word, which is ‘more’". And in context, this referred to what is often called the “bottom line”–namely, more corporate profits. But this kind of “more” refers to a world in which everything is considered solely as a commodity and the value of every commodity is to be measured solely in terms of units of money to be collected into a totality, where all that matters is how much money has been amassed, not how it was acquired.

In contrast, let us consider the case of a person who cries out, “I’m more than a statistic!”–for example, more than just one among a faceless number of farmers who have lost their livelihood after the North American Free Trade Agreement was implemented. Such a person stands in resistance to a previously enacted impoverishment carried out by a series of reductionistic abstractions dominated solely by the aim of calculating (and increasing) corporate profits. Or to put it the other way around, such a person stands in solidarity with a world of lived meaning, of intercorporeal situatedness, and with Earth herself, as if the

---


39 In Behnke 2018 I have suggested a parallel between Husserl’s accounts in Ideas 2 and in the Crisis of the constitution of the objective physicalistic thing, on the one hand, and the constitution of the commodity on the other: both proceed in terms of abstraction, homogenization, unitization, and universalization. See also Seebom 2015, 333ff, on the development of market economies, currencies, commodities, and attitudes oriented toward maximizing profits. However, I have been unable to consult a short work by Antonio Millán Puelles (1921–2005), Para una fenomenología del dinero, Madrid: Encuentro, 2011.
Earth is crying out, “I am more than a set of natural resources to be mined—I am a complex whole that is more than the parts to be extracted for profit, and by ripping them out with no concern for the functioning whole, you are wounding the very web of life that supports us all”. Whoever stands in solidarity with this whole—a whole that is immeasurably “more” than the reductionistic abstractions offered as substitutes for it—is at the same time a supporter of diversity and of mutual respect, recognizing that our lives are a matter of mutually interpenetrating destinies, and that our differences are moments within an open wholeness that resists any attempt to characterize it from a single “privileged” perspective.40

At this point, having at least given voice to the need for such a vision, my research report is almost at an end. Yet there is still one more important point to consider.

10. THERE IS MORE TO BE SAID ABOUT “MORE”

It is clear to me that everything I have said so far is still incomplete—as always, there’s still more phenomenological work to do. For example, I have said nothing about the peculiar “and so forth” of eidetic phenomenological research, when we have finally arrived at some insight into the essential structure of a particular type of experience and can “see” that more examples will only confirm the description. Then there are various types of “more” that could be discussed within a phenomenological psychology concerned with laying bare the structures of everyday life; here, for example, we might point to the difference between the cyclical “more” of work that must be done over and over again (there is always more food to be prepared, more dishes to be washed, and so on) and singular projects that achieve an abiding result, bringing something “more” to the world,


Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 7, 2018
something that wasn’t there before. More generally, but along similar lines, we could turn to a distinction that Bernhard Waldenfels (1987, 144f) has drawn between “productive” action that yields something radically new and irreducible to what has gone before, and “reproductive” action, bringing about “more of the same” and moving along already established pathways. But in addition, there is more than one way to approach the topic of “more” phenomenologically. For instance, we could recognize alternatives to Husserl’s focus on bringing to light the previously “anonymous” achievements of conscious life, and ask, with Waldenfels (1971, 47f; cf. 1987, 235f), why we must always speak of a “meaning-more” on the side of consciousness and not of a “surplus” on the side of the given—a surplus that can arrive as a surprise rather than merely as a “fulfillment” or a “disappointment” of the “more” that was originally meant. One could go on from there to wonder how the present investigation has been shaped by choosing to begin with a particular kind of example—namely, the lived experience of the infinite task of phenomenological investigation, and of realizing that what has been done calls for “more”. But what if instead of starting from a lack, one took as one’s point of departure something like Ortega’s reference (1961, 21) to life’s “overflow” beyond the mere satisfaction of needs, to the flood of possibilities we find in creative play? And finally, although I have at least indicated a number of ways in which a basic “this/more” structure shows up in our experience and have noted recurring themes of “motivation” and “wholeness”, I have still not developed a single coherent theory that could account for the unity of the different “more’s” that I have discussed. All I have attempted to do is to document a journey that testifies to the fact that phenomenology is indeed an “endless program” (1/178), an ongoing and open-ended project in which we too can and must participate.

Other lifeworldly distinctions to be pursued might include those between an “exact” and a “morphological” more (cf. n. 23 above), between a more that can be immediately realized and one demanding a polythetic process, and so on.

REFERENCES


HENOMENOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE STRUCTURE OF TRANSFORMATION: THE EXAMPLE OF...


ORTEGA Y GASSET, José (1961). History as a System and Other Essays Toward a Philosophy of History, New York: W. W. Norton.


